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ON THE  
STUDY OF WORDS



# ON THE STUDY OF WORDS

BY  
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## EDITOR'S PREFACE

THE copyright of the tenth edition of Archbishop Trench's *Study of Words* having expired through lapse of time, it seemed to the publishers that a new and revised edition, at a popular price, of what is now become an English classic, would prove a boon to the large and ever-growing circle of readers who take an intelligent interest in the growth and history of their mother tongue.

When we look back to the time—now more than half a century ago—when these chapters were first delivered as lectures to the students of the Winchester Training College, we can perceive what a 'path-making' piece of work he then achieved. The popular treatises then current on English etymology were Horne Tooke's *Divisions of Purley* and Charles Richardson's *Study of Language*. In the English dictionary of the latter English lexicography had reached its high-water mark ; wherein indeed might be found a well-plenished storehouse of quotations piled together somewhat at random, but its etymological part a mere undigested *réchauffé* of all the old unscientific guess-work of Verstegan, Minsheu, Skinner, Junius, *et hoc genus omne*. The author

thus laboured under the disadvantage of writing on linguistic subjects at a time when the science of language had hardly as yet gained a footing in this country. Nevertheless, such were his scholarly instincts and soundness of judgment that he seldom goes far wrong, and we rather marvel that there is so little in his admirable lectures that needs correction. All that seemed required in this way has been added in the notes and placed within square brackets to distinguish it from the original annotations. No alterations have been made in the text. It might seem presumptuous for one who is proud to call the great Archbishop his master, and was first imbued with a taste for such studies by reading the very book which he now ventures to edit, that he should take it on himself to revise the conclusions of so eminent a scholar. It must be remembered, however, that etymological discovery has made immense strides during the last few decades, and that the author of *The Study of Words* has himself largely helped to supply the means for such revision and emendation by having initiated that great *Lexicon Totius Anglicitatis*, *The New English Dictionary*, the ground-plan of which was outlined by his hand. That monumental work, so ably carried into effect by Dr. Murray, Mr. Bradley and their assistants, must ever remain the ultimate court of appeal when any points of English philology are in question.<sup>1</sup> I have so used it, as I am sure the Archbishop himself would have done ; for though himself " the first scholar in Europe " (as a

<sup>1</sup> In one instance, however, I have had the hardihood to dissent from this high authority (see p. 53).

contemporary pronounced him) he was ever learning to the end of his life, and ever correcting and adding to his published works. I well remember seeing an interleaved copy of the present work lying open on his table, in which from time to time he used to enter the results of his later acquisitions and more mature judgments. None could draw a lesson or enforce a moral from the teaching of a word with such wisdom and insight as the Archbishop. He is here altogether unrivalled. And apart from the value of his etymologies, the all-pervading charm of his chaste and dignified style, which could invest even commonplaces with a grace of its own, will prevent his works ever being superseded as out-of-date. In the judgment of the Editor, the present generation, if they desire to enter upon the most interesting of all studies, the Study of Words, wherever else they may complete it, cannot begin better than by putting themselves under the guidance of Archbishop Trench.

A. SMYTHE PALMER.

HERMON HILL, S. WOODFORD.





## AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

THESE lectures will not, I trust, be found anywhere to have left out of sight seriously, or for long, the peculiar needs of those for whom they were originally intended, and to whom they were primarily addressed. I am conscious indeed, here and there, of a certain departure from my first intention, having been in part seduced to this by a circumstance which I had not in the least contemplated when I obtained permission to deliver them, by finding, namely, that I should have other hearers besides the pupils of the Training School. Some matter adapted for those rather than for these I was thus led to introduce—which afterwards I was unwilling, in preparing for the press, to remove; on the contrary adding to it rather, in the hope of obtaining thus a somewhat wider circle of readers than I could have hoped, had I more rigidly restricted myself in the choice of my materials. Yet I should greatly regret to have admitted so much of this as should deprive these lectures of their fitness for those whose profit in writing and in publishing I had mainly in view, namely, schoolmasters and those preparing to be such.

Had I known any book entering with any fulness, and in a popular manner, into the subject-matter of these pages, and making it its exclusive theme, I might still have delivered these lectures, but should scarcely have sought for them a wider audience than their first, gladly leaving the matter in their hands, whose studies in language had been fuller and riper than my own. But abundant and ready to hand as are the materials for such a book, I did not ; while yet it seems to me that the subject is one to which it is beyond measure desirable that their attention, who are teaching, or shall have hereafter to teach, others should be directed ; so that they shall learn to regard language as one of the chiefest organs of their own education and that of others. For I am persuaded that I have used no exaggeration in saying, that for many a young man "his first discovery that words are living powers, has been like the dropping of scales from his eyes, like the acquiring of another sense, or the introduction into a new world,"—while yet all this may be indefinitely deferred, may, indeed, never find place at all, unless there is some one at hand to help for him, and to hasten the process ; and he who so does, will ever after be esteemed by him as one of his very foremost benefactors. Whatever may be Horne Tooke's shortcomings (and they are great), whether in details of etymology, or in the philosophy of grammar, or in matters more serious still, yet, with all this, what an epoch in many a student's intellectual life has been his first acquaintance with *The Diversions of Purley*. And they were not among the least of the obligations which the young men of our time owed to Coleridge, that

he so often himself weighed words in the balances, and so earnestly pressed upon all with whom his voice went for anything, the profit which they would find in so doing. Nor, with the certainty that I am anticipating much in my little volume, can I refrain from quoting some words which were not present with me during its composition, although I must have been familiar with them long ago ; words which express excellently well why it is that these studies profit so much, and which will also explain the motives which induced me to add my little contribution to their furtherance :

“ A language will often be wiser, not merely than the vulgar, but even than the wisest of those who speak it. Being like amber in its efficacy to circulate the electric spirit of truth, it is also like amber in embalming and preserving the relics of ancient wisdom, although one is not seldom puzzled to decipher its contents. Sometimes it locks up truths, which were once well known, but which, in the course of ages, have passed out of sight and been forgotten. In other cases it holds the germs of truths, of which, though they were never plainly discerned, the genius of its framers caught a glimpse in a happy moment of divination. A meditative man cannot refrain from wonder, when he digs down to the deep thought lying at the root of many a metaphorical term, employed for the designation of spiritual things, even of those with regard to which professing philosophers have blundered grossly ; and often it would seem as though rays of truths, which were still below the intellectual horizon, had dawned upon the imagination as it was looking up to heaven. Hence they who feel an inward call to

teach and enlighten their countrymen, should deem it an important part of their duty to draw out the stores of thought which are already latent in their native language, to purify it from the corruptions which Time brings upon all things, and from which language has no exemption, and to endeavour to give distinctness and precision to whatever in it is confused, or obscure, or dimly seen"—*Guesses at Truth, First Series*, p. 295.

# ON THE STUDY OF WORDS

## I

### INTRODUCTION

THERE are few who would not readily acknowledge that mainly in worthy books are preserved and hoarded the treasures of wisdom and knowledge which the world has accumulated ; and that chiefly by aid of these they are handed down from one generation to another. I shall urge on you in these lectures something different from this ; namely, that not in books only, which all acknowledge, nor yet in connected oral discourse, but often also in words contemplated singly, there are boundless stores of moral and historic truth, and no less of passion and imagination, laid up—that from these, lessons of infinite worth may be derived, if only our attention is roused to their existence. I shall urge on you (though with teaching such as you enjoy, the subject will not be new), how well it will repay you to study the words which you are in the habit of using or of meeting, be they such as relate to highest spiritual things, or our common words of the shop and the market, and of all the familiar intercourse of life. It will indeed repay you far better than you can easily believe. I am sure, at least, that for many a young man his first discovery of the fact that words are living powers, are the vesture, yea, even the body, which thoughts weave for themselves, has been like the dropping of scales from his eyes, like the acquiring of another sense, or the introduction into a new world ; he is never able to

cease wondering at the moral marvels that surround him on every side, and ever reveal themselves more and more to his gaze.

We indeed hear it not seldom said that ignorance is the mother of admiration. No falser word was ever spoken, and hardly a more mischievous one ; implying, as it does, that this healthiest exercise of the mind rests, for the most part, on a deceit and a delusion, and that with better knowledge it would cease ; while, in truth, for once that ignorance leads us to admire that which with fuller insight we should perceive to be a common thing, and one therefore demanding no such tribute from us, a hundred, nay, a thousand times, it prevents us from admiring that which is admirable indeed. And this is so, whether we are moving in the region of nature, which is the region of God's wonders, or in the region of art, which is the region of man's wonders ; and nowhere truer than in this sphere and region of language, which is about to claim us now. Oftentimes here we walk up and down in the midst of intellectual and moral marvels with a vacant eye and a careless mind, even as some traveller passes unmoved over fields of fame, or through cities of ancient renown—unmoved, because utterly unconscious of the lofty deeds which there have been wrought, of the great hearts which spent themselves there. We, like him, wanting the knowledge and insight which would have served to kindle admiration in us, are oftentimes deprived of this pure and elevating excitement of the mind, and miss no less that manifold teaching and instruction which ever lie about our path, and nowhere more largely than in our daily words, if

only we knew how to put forth our hands and make it our own. "What riches," one exclaims, "lie hidden in the vulgar tongue of our poorest and most ignorant. What flowers of paradise lie under our feet, with their beauties and their parts undistinguished and undiscerned, from having been daily trodden on."

And this subject upon which we are thus entering ought not to be a dull or uninteresting one in the handling, or one to which only by an effort you will yield the attention which I shall claim. If it shall prove so, this I fear must be through the fault of my manner of treating it; for certainly in itself there is no study which *may* be made at once more instructive and entertaining than the study of the use, origin, and distinction of words, which is exactly that which I now propose to myself and to you. I remember a very learned scholar, to whom we owe one of our best Greek lexicons, a book which must have cost him years, speaking in the preface to his great work with a just disdain of some, who complained of the irksome drudgery of such toils as those which had engaged him so long—thus irksome, forsooth, because they only had to do with words; of them who claimed pity for themselves, as though they had been so many galley-slaves chained to the oar, or martyrs who had offered themselves to the good of the literary world. He declares that, for his part, the task of classing, sorting, grouping, comparing, tracing the derivation and usage of words, had been to him no drudgery, but a delight and labour of love.

And if this may be true in regard of a foreign tongue, how much truer ought it to be in regard

of our own, of our 'mother tongue,' as we affectionately call it. A great writer not very long departed from us has borne witness at once to the pleasantness and profit of this study. "In a language," he says, "like ours, where so many words are derived from other languages, there are few modes of instruction more useful or more amusing than that of accustoming young people to seek for the etymology or primary meaning of the words they use. There are cases in which more knowledge of more value may be conveyed by the history of a word than by the history of a campaign."

And, implying the same truth, a popular American author has somewhere characterized language as "fossil poetry." \* He evidently means that just as in some fossil, curious and beautiful shapes of vegetable or animal life, the graceful fern or the finely vertebrated lizard, such as now, it may be, have been extinct for thousands of years, are permanently bound up with the stone, and rescued from that perishing which would have otherwise been theirs—so in words are beautiful thoughts and images, the imagination and the feeling of past ages, of men long since in their graves, of men whose very names have perished, these, which would so easily have perished too, preserved and made safe for ever. The phrase is a striking one; the only fault which one might be tempted to find with it is, that it is too narrow. Language may be, and indeed is, this "fossil poetry"; but it may be affirmed of it with exactly the same truth that it is fossil ethics, or fossil history. Words quite as often and as effectually embody facts of history, or convictions of the moral common sense, as of

\* [Emerson, *Works* (Routledge), p. 86.]



the imagination or passion of men ; even as, so far as that moral sense may be perverted, they will bear witness and keep a record of that perversion. On all these points I shall enter at full in after lectures ; but I may give by anticipation a specimen or two of what I mean, to make from the first my purpose and plan more fully intelligible to all.

Language then is fossil poetry ; in other words, we are not to look for the poetry which a people may possess only in its poems, or its poetical customs, traditions, and beliefs. Many a single word also is itself a concentrated poem, having stores of poetical thought and imagery laid up in it. Examine it, and it will be found to rest on some deep analogy of things natural and things spiritual ; bringing those to illustrate and to give an abiding form and body to these. The image may have grown trite and ordinary now ; perhaps through the help of this very word may have become so entirely the heritage of all, as to seem little better than a commonplace ; yet not the less he who first discerned the relation, and devised the new word which should express it, or gave to an old, never before but literally used, this new and figurative sense, this man was in his degree a poet—a maker, that is, of things which were not before, which would not have existed but for him, or for some other gifted with equal powers. He who spake first of a ‘ dilapidated ’ fortune, what an image must have risen up before his mind’s eye of some falling house or palace, stone detaching itself from stone, till all had gradually sunk into desolation and ruin. Or he who to that Greek word which signifies “ that

which will endure to be held up to and judged by the sunlight," gave first its ethical signification of 'sincere,' 'truthful,' or as we sometimes say, 'transparent,' can we deny to him the poet's feeling and eye? \* Many a man had gazed, we are sure, at the jagged and indented mountain ridges of Spain, before one called them 'sierras' or 'saws,' the name by which now they are known, as *Sierra Morena*, *Sierra Nevada*; but that man coined his imagination into a word which will endure as long as the everlasting hills which he named.

But it was said just now that words often contain a witness for great moral truths—God having impressed such a seal of truth upon language, that men are continually uttering deeper things than they know, asserting mighty principles, it may be asserting them against themselves, in words that to them may seem nothing more than the current coin of society. Thus to what grand moral purposes Bishop Butler turns the word 'pastime'; how solemn the testimony which he compels the world, out of its own use of this word, to render against itself—obliging it to own that its amusements and pleasures do not really satisfy the mind and fill it with the sense of an abiding and satisfying joy; † they are only 'pastime'; they serve

\* [*Εὐλακρίτης*, as if examined (*κρίνω*) in the light (*εἶλη*) of the sun, and so pure, sincere, like Ken's "conscience as the noon-day clear."].

† *Sermon* xiv. *Upon the Love of God*. Curiously enough, Montaigne has, in his *Essays*, drawn the same testimony out of the word: "This ordinary phrase of Past-time, and passing away the time, represents the custom of those wise sort of people, who think they cannot have a better account of their lives, than to let them

only, as this word confesses, to *pass* away the *time*, to prevent it from hanging, an intolerable burden, on men's hands ; all which they can do at the best is to prevent men from discovering and attending to their own internal poverty and dissatisfaction and want. He might have added that there is the same acknowledgment in the word 'diversion,' which means no more than that which *diverts* or turns us aside from ourselves,\* and in this way helps us to forget ourselves for a little. And thus it would appear that, even according to the world's own confession, all which it proposes is—not to make us happy, but a little to prevent us from remembering that we are unhappy, to *pass* away our *time*, to *divert* us from ourselves. While on the other hand we declare that the good which *will* really fill our souls and satisfy them to the uttermost, is not *in* us, but *without* us and *above* us, in the words which we use to set forth any transcending delight. Take three or four of these words—'transport,' 'rapture,' 'ravishment,' 'ecstasy,'—

run out and slide away, to pass them over and to baulk them, and, as much as they can, to take no notice of them and, to shun them, as a thing of troublesome and contemptible quality. But I know it to be another kind of thing, and find it both valuable and commodious even in its latest decay, wherein I now enjoy it, and nature has delivered it into our hands in such and so favourable circumstances that we commonly complain of ourselves if it be troublesome to us or slide unprofitable away."

\* ['Diversion' is rather a 'turning aside' from one's serious and more regular occupation to enjoy rest and recreation, a suspension of work. Just as 'sport' for 'disport' (old Fr. *se desporter*, Lat. *dis-portare*) is a 'taking oneself off,' or withdrawing for a time from one's customary labour for play or amusement.]

‘transport,’ that which *carries* us, as ‘rapture,’ or ‘ravishment,’ that which *snatches* us out of and above ourselves ; and ‘ecstasy’ is very nearly the same, only drawn from the Greek.

And not less, where a perversion of the moral sense has found place, words preserve oftentimes a record of this perversion. We have a signal example of this, even as it is a notable evidence of the manner in which moral contagion, spreading from heart and manners, invades the popular language in the use, or rather misuse, of the word ‘religion,’ during all the ages of Papal domination in Europe. Probably many of you are aware that in those times a “religious person” did not mean any one who felt and allowed the bonds that bound him to God and to his fellow-men, but one who had taken peculiar vows upon him, a member of one of the monkish orders ; a ‘religious’ house did not mean, nor does it now mean in the Church of Rome, a Christian household, ordered in the fear of God, but an house in which these persons were gathered together according to the rule of some man, Benedict, or Dominic, or some other. A ‘religion’ meant not a service of God, but an order of monkery ; and taking the monastic vows was termed going into a ‘religion.’ Now what an awful light does this one word so used throw on the entire state of mind and habits of thought in those ages ! That then was ‘religion,’ and nothing else was deserving of the name ! And ‘religious’ was a title which might not be given to parents and children, husbands and wives, men and women fulfilling faithfully and holily in the world the several duties of their stations, but only to those who

had devised self-chosen service for themselves.\*

In like manner that 'lewd,' which meant at one time no more than 'lay,' or unlearned—the 'lewd' people, the lay people—should come to signify the sinful, the vicious, is not a little worthy of note.† How forcibly we are reminded here of that saying of the Pharisees of old : " This people which knoweth not the law is cursed " ; how much of their spirit must have been at work before the word could have acquired this secondary meaning !

But language is fossil history as well. What a record of great social revolutions, revolutions in nations and in the feelings of nations, the one word ' frank ' contains, which is used, as we all know, to express aught that is generous, straightforward, and free. The Franks, I need not remind you, were a powerful German tribe, or association of tribes, who gave themselves this proud name of the ' franks ' or the free ; and who, at the breaking up of the Roman Empire, possessed themselves of Gaul, to which they gave their own name. They

\* A reviewer in *Fraser's Magazine*, December 1851 in the main a favourable, and always a kind one, doubts whether I have not here pushed my assertion too far. So far from this being the case, it was not merely " the popular language," as I have expressed myself, which this corruption had invaded, but a decree of the great Fourth Lateran Council (A.D. 1215), forbidding the further multiplication of monastic Orders, runs thus : *Ne nimia religionum diversitas gravem in Ecclesiâ Dei confusionem inducat, firmiter prohibemus, ne quis de cetero novam religionem inveniat, sed quicunque voluerit ad religionem conver ti, unam deapprobatis assumat.*

† [Lewd, O. Eng. *læwede* (as if *laic + ed*, ' laicatus '), has passed through the following transitions of meaning : (1) lay, not clerical ; (2) unclerkly, unlearned ; (3) ignorant, low, base ; (4) ill-conditioned, wicked ; (5) lascivious.]

were the ruling conquering people, honourably distinguished from the Gauls and degenerate Romans, among whom they established themselves, by their independence, their love of freedom, their scorn of a lie ; they had, in short, the virtues which belong to a conquering and dominant race in the midst of an inferior and conquered one. And thus it came to pass that by degrees the name ' frank ' indicated not merely a national, but involved a moral distinction as well ; and a ' frank ' man was synonymous not merely with a man of the conquering German race, but was an epithet applied to any man possessed of certain high moral qualities, which for the most part appertained to, and were found only in, men of that stock ; \* and thus in men's daily discourse, when they speak of a person as being ' frank,' or when they use the words ' franchise,' ' enfranchisement,' to express civil liberties and immunities, their language here is the outgrowth, the record, and the result of great historic changes, bears testimony to facts of history, whereof it may well happen that the speakers have never heard. Let me suggest to you the word ' slave,' as one which has undergone a process entirely analogous, although in an opposite direction.†

\* [But " frank " may very well come direct from old Fr. *franc*, old Ger. *franko*, meaning free, from which the Franks obtained their name.]

† See Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, c. 55. [Gibbon understood slave, a Slavonian, to be derived from *slava*, glory, as if the glorious people. Many more recent scholars take the name to be from *slovo*, a word, as if it meant " the speakers," those who (in their own estimation) can speak intelligibly in contrast to foreigners who seem to them dumb or unintelligible ; e.g. Niemec, " dumb " used for the Germans. Compare " barbarian " and " Welsh "]

Having given by anticipation this handful of examples in illustration of what in these lectures I propose, I will, before proceeding further, make a few observations on a subject, which, if we would go at all to the root of the matter, we can scarcely leave altogether untouched—I mean the origin of language ; in which however we will not entangle ourselves deeper than we need. There are, or rather there have been, two theories about this. One, and that which rather has been than now is, for few maintain it still, would put language on the same level with the various arts and inventions with which man has gradually adorned and enriched his life. It would make him by degrees to have invented it, just as he might have invented any of these, for himself ; and from rude imperfect beginnings, the inarticulate cries by which he expressed his natural wants, the sounds by which he sought to imitate the impression of natural objects upon him, little by little to have arrived at that wondrous organ of thought and feeling, which his language is often to him now.

It might, I think, be sufficient to object to this explanation, that language would then be an *accident* of human nature ; and, this being the case, that we certainly should somewhere encounter tribes sunken so low as not to possess it ; even as there is no human art or invention, though it be as simple and obvious as the preparing of food by fire, but there are those who have fallen below its exercise. But with language it is not so. There have never yet been found human beings, not the most degraded horde of South African bushmen, or Papuan cannibals, who did not employ this means

of intercourse with one another. But the more decisive objection to this view of the matter is, that it hangs together with, and is indeed an essential part of, that theory of society, which is contradicted alike by every page of Genesis, and every notice of our actual experience—the ‘ourang-outang’ theory, as it has been so happily termed—that, I mean, according to which the primitive condition of man was the savage one, and the savage himself the seed out of which in due time the civilized man was unfolded ; whereas, in fact, so far from being this living seed, he might more justly be considered as a dead withered leaf, torn violently away from the great trunk of humanity, and with no more power to produce any thing nobler than himself out of himself, than that dead withered leaf to unfold itself into the oak of the forest. So far from being the child with the latent capacities of manhood, he is himself rather the man prematurely aged, and decrepit, and outworn.

But the truer answer to the inquiry how language arose, is this, that God gave man language, just as He gave him reason,\* and just because He gave him reason (for what is man’s word but his reason coming forth, so that it may behold itself ?) that He gave it to him, because he could not be man, that is, a social being, without it.† Yet this

\* [M. Müller has conclusively shown that these two endowments are essentially one, no reason without language, no language apart from reason. See his *Science of Thought*, *passim*.]

† [Ludwig Noiré has an able argument to show that language is the voice of the community, “a product of association and of the community of feeling which is developed, intensified, and finally carried to perfection



must not be taken to affirm that man started at the first furnished with a fully-formed vocabulary of words, and as it were with his first dictionary and first grammar ready-made to his hands. He did not thus begin the world *with names* but *with the power of naming*: for man is not a mere speaking machine; God did not teach him words, as one of us teaches a parrot, from without; but gave him a capacity, and then evoked the capacity which He gave. Here, as in every thing else that concerns the primitive constitution, the great original institutes, of humanity, our best and truest lights are to be gotten from the study of the three first chapters of Genesis; and you will observe that there it is not God who imposed the first names on the creatures, but Adam—Adam, however, at the direct suggestion of his Creator. *He* brought them all, we are told, to Adam, “to see what he would call them; and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof” (Gen. ii. 19). Here we have the clearest intimation of the origin, at once divine and human, of speech; while yet neither is so brought forward as to exclude or obscure the other.

And so far we may concede a limited amount of right to those who have held a progressive acquisition, on man’s part, of the power of embodying thought in words. I believe that we should conceive the actual case most truly, if we conceived this power of naming things and expressing their relations, as one laid up in the depths of man’s being, one of the divine capacities with which he

by community of life.”—*Max Müller and the Philosophy of Language*, p. 81 seq.]

was created : but one (and in this differing from those which have produced in various people various arts of life), which could not remain dormant in him, for man could be only man through its exercise ; which therefore did rapidly bud and blossom out from within him at every solicitation from the world without, or from his fellow-man ; as each object to be named appeared before his eyes, each relation of things to one another arose before his mind. It was not merely the possible, but the necessary, emanation of the spirit with which he had been endowed. Man makes his own language, but he makes it as the bee makes its cells, as the bird its nest.

*How* this latent power evolved itself first, how this spontaneous generation of language came to pass, is a mystery, even as every act of creation is of necessity such ; and as a mystery all the deepest inquirers into the subject are content to leave it. Yet we may perhaps a little help ourselves to the realizing of what the process was, and what it was not, if we liken it to the growth of a tree springing out of, and unfolding itself from, a root, and according to a necessary law—that root being the divine capacity of language with which man was created, that law being the law of highest reason with which he was endowed : if we liken it to this rather than to the rearing of an house, which a man should slowly and painfully fashion for himself with dead timbers combined after his own fancy and caprice ; and which little by little improved in shape, material, and size, being first but a log-house, answering his barest needs, and only after centuries of toil and pain growing for his

sons' sons into a stately palace for pleasure and delight.

Were it otherwise, were the savage the primitive man, we should then find savage tribes furnished, scantily enough, it might be, with the elements of speech, yet at the same time with its fruitful beginnings, its vigorous and healthful germs. But what does their language on close inspection prove? In every case what they are themselves, the remnant and ruin of a better and a nobler past. Fearful indeed is the impress of degradation which is stamped on the language of the savage, more fearful perhaps even than that which is stamped upon his form. When wholly letting go the truth, when long and greatly sinning against light and conscience, a people has thus gone the downward way, has been scattered off by some violent revolution from that portion of the world which is the seat of advance and progress, and driven to its remote isles and further corners, then as one nobler thought, one spiritual idea after another has perished from it, the words also that expressed these have perished too. As one habit of civilization has been let go after another, the words which those habits demanded have dropped as well, first out of use, and then out of memory, and thus after a while have been wholly lost.\*

Moffat, in his *Missionary Labours and Scenes in South Africa*, gives us a very remarkable ex-

\* [The statements of this paragraph will, of course, not be accepted by anthropologists and evolutionists, with whose conclusions they are directly at variance. See Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 3rd ed. i. 21 seq.]

ample of the disappearing of one of the most significant words from the language of a tribe sinking ever deeper in savagery ; and with the disappearing of the word, of course, the disappearing as well of the great spiritual fact and truth whereof that word was at once the vehicle and the guardian. The Bechuanas, a Caffre tribe, employed formerly the word ' Morimo,' to designate " Him that is above," or " Him that is in Heaven," and attached to the word the notion of a supreme Divine Being. This word, with the spiritual idea corresponding to it, Moffat found to have vanished from the language of the present generation, although here and there he could meet with an old man, scarcely one or two in a thousand, who remembered in his youth to have heard speak of ' Morimo ' ; and this word, once so deeply significant, only survived now in the spells and charms of the so-called rain-makers and sorcerers, who misused it to designate a fabulous ghost, of whom they told the absurdest and most contradictory things.

And as there is no such witness to the degradation of the savage as the brutal poverty of his language, so is there nothing that so effectually tends to keep him in the depths to which he has fallen. You cannot impart to any man more than the words which he understands either now contain, or can be made, intelligibly to him, to contain. Language is as truly on one side the limit and restraint of thought, as on the other side that which feeds and unfolds thought. Thus it is the ever-repeated complaint of the missionary that the very terms are well-nigh or wholly wanting in the dialect of the savage whereby to impart to him

heavenly truths, or indeed even the nobler emotions of the human heart. Dobrizhoffer, the Jesuit missionary, in his curious *History of the Abipones*, tells us that neither these nor the Guarinies, two of the principal native tribes of Brazil, possessed any word in the least corresponding to our 'thanks.' But what wonder, if the feeling of gratitude was entirely absent from their hearts, that they should not have possessed the corresponding word in their vocabularies? Nay, how should they have had it there? And that in this absence lies the true explanation is plain from a fact which the same writer records, that, although inveterate askers, they never showed the slightest sense of obligation or of gratitude, when they obtained what they sought; never saying more than, "This will be useful to me," or, "This is what I wanted." Dr. Krapf, after laborious researches in some widely extended dialects of East Africa, has remarked in them the same absence of any words expressing the idea of gratitude.\*

Nor is it only in what they have forfeited and lost, but also in what they have retained or invented, that these languages proclaim their degradation and debasement, and how deeply they and those that speak them have fallen. Thus I have read of a tribe in New Holland, which has no word to signify God, but has one to designate a process by which an unborn child may be destroyed in the

\* [It must be remembered, however, that the hasty conclusions of travellers and missionaries as to the absence of ethical words among primitive tribes have often been corrected by a better acquaintance with their language.]

bosom of its mother. And I have been informed, on the authority of one excellently capable of knowing, an English scholar long resident in Van Diemen's Land, that in the native language of that island there are four words to express the taking of human life—one to express a father's killing of a son, another a son's killing of a father, with other varieties of murder; and that in no one of these lies the slightest moral reprobation, or sense of the deep-lying distinction between to 'kill' and to 'murder'; while at the same time, of that language so richly and so fearfully provided with expressions for this extreme utterance of hate, he also reports that any word for 'love' is wanting in it altogether.

Yet with all this, ever and anon in the midst of this wreck and ruin, there is that in the language of the savage, some subtle distinction, some curious allusion to a perished civilization, now utterly unintelligible to the speaker; or some other note, which proclaims his language to be the remains of a dissipated inheritance, the rags and remnants of a robe which was a royal one once. The fragments of a broken sceptre are in his hand, a sceptre wherewith once he held dominion (he, that is, in his progenitors) over large kingdoms of thought, which now have escaped wholly from his sway.

But while it is thus with him, while this is the downward course of all those that have chosen the downward path, while with every impoverishing and debasing of personal or national life there goes hand in hand a corresponding impoverishment and debasement of language, so on the contrary, where

there is advance and progress, where a divine idea is in any measure realizing itself in a people, where they are learning more accurately to define and distinguish, more truly to know, where they are ruling, as men ought to rule, over nature, and making her to give up her secrets to them, where new thoughts are rising up over the horizon of a nation's mind, new feelings are stirring at a nation's heart, new facts coming within the sphere of its knowledge, there will language be growing and advancing too. It cannot lag behind; for man feels that nothing is properly his own, that he has not secured any new thought, or entered upon any new spiritual inheritance, till he has fixed it in language, till he can contemplate it, not as himself, but as his word; he is conscious that he must express truth, if he is to preserve it, and still more if he would propagate it among others. "Names," as it has been excellently said, "are impressions of sense, and as such take the strongest hold upon the mind, and of all other impressions can be most easily recalled and retained in view. They therefore serve to give a point of attachment to all the more volatile objects of thought and feeling. Impressions that when past might be dissipated for ever, are by their connexion with language always within reach. Thoughts, of themselves, are perpetually slipping out of the field of immediate mental vision; but the name abides with us, and the utterance of it restores them in a moment." And on the necessity of names for the propagation of the truth it has been well observed: "Hardly any original thoughts on mental or social subjects ever make their way among mankind, or assume

their proper importance in the minds even of their inventors, until aptly selected words or phrases have, as it were, nailed them down and held them fast."

Nor does what has here been said of the manner in which language enriches itself contradict a prior assertion, that man starts with language as God's perfect gift, which he only impairs and forfeits by sloth and sin, according to the same law which holds good in respect of each other of the gifts of heaven. For it was not meant, as indeed was then observed, that men would possess words to set forth feelings which were not yet stirring in them, combinations which they had not yet made, objects which they had not yet seen, relations of which they were not yet conscious; but that up to his needs (those needs including not merely his animal wants, but all his higher spiritual cravings), he would find utterance freely. The great logical, or grammatical, framework of language, (for grammar is the logic of speech, even as logic is the grammar of reason), he would possess, he knew not how; and certainly not as the final result of gradual acquisitions, and of reflexion setting these in order, and drawing general rules from them; but as that rather which alone had made those acquisitions possible; as that according to which he unconsciously worked, filling in this framework by degrees with these later acquisitions of thought, feeling, and experience, as one by one they arrayed themselves in the garment and vesture of words.

Here then is the explanation of the fact that language should be thus instructive for us, that it



should yield us so much, when we come to analyse and probe it; and yield us the more, the more deeply and accurately we do so. It is full of instruction, because it is the embodiment, the incarnation, if I may so speak, of the feelings and thoughts and experiences of a nation, yea, often of many nations, and of all which through long centuries they have attained to and won. It stands like the pillars of Hercules, to mark how far the moral and intellectual conquests of mankind have advanced, only not like those pillars, fixed and immovable, but ever itself advancing with the progress of these. The mighty moral instincts which have been working in the popular mind have found therein their unconscious voice; and the single kinglier spirits that have looked deeper into the heart of things have oftentimes gathered up all they have seen into some one word, which they have launched upon the world, and with which they have enriched it for ever—making in that new word a new region of thought to be henceforward in some sort the common heritage of all. Language is the amber in which a thousand precious and subtle thoughts have been safely embedded and preserved. It has arrested ten thousand lightning flashes of genius, which, unless thus fixed and arrested, might have been as bright, but would have also been as quickly passing and as perishing, as the lightning. “Words convey the mental treasures of one period to the generations that follow; and laden with this, their precious freight, they sail safely across gulfs of time in which empires have suffered shipwreck, and the languages of common life have sunk into obli-

vion." And for all these reasons far more and mightier in every way is a language than any one of the works which may have been composed in it. For that work, great as it may be, is but the embodying of the mind of a single man, this of a nation. The *Iliad* is great, yet not so great in strength or power or beauty as the Greek language. *Paradise Lost* is a noble possession for a people to have inherited, but the English tongue is a nobler heritage yet.

And short as we may, and indeed must, stop of apprehending all this, there is an obscure sense, or instinct I might call it, in every one of us, of at least some part of this truth. We all of us, whether we have given a distinct account of the matter to ourselves or no, believe that the words which we use, some at least of them, stand in a more or less real relation to the things which they designate—that they are not arbitrary signs, affixed at random, for which any other might have been substituted as well. And this sense of the significance of names, that they are, or ought to be—that in a world of absolute truth they ever would be—the utterance of the innermost character and qualities of the things or persons that bear them, speaking out in various other ways, speaks out in none more clearly than in this—namely, in the amusement and interest which children find in any striking agreement between a name and the person who owns that name—or, which naturally lays hold on their attention far more, in any striking contradiction between the name and the name-bearer; as, for instance, if Mr. Strongitharm is a weakling, or Mr. Black an

albino ; the first striking from a sense of fitness, the other from one of incongruity.

Nor is this a mere childish entertainment. It continues with us through life ; and that its roots lie deep is attested by the earnest use which is often made, and that at most earnest moments of men's lives, of such agreements or disagreements as these. Thus Shakespeare shows his own profound knowledge of the human heart, when he makes old John of Gaunt, worn with long sickness, and now ready to depart, play with his name, and dwell upon the consent between it and his condition ; so that when his royal nephew asks him, " How is it with aged Gaunt ? " he answers,

" Oh, how that name befits my composition,  
Old *Gaunt* indeed, and *gaunt* in being old—  
*Gaunt* am I for the grave, *gaunt* as the grave—"

with much more in the same fashion ; while it is into the mouth of the slight and frivolous king that Shakespeare puts the exclamation of wonder,

" Can sick men play so nicely with their names ? "—

Thus too, if a man is engaged in a controversy or quarrel, and his name implies anything good, an adversary will lay hold of the name, will seek to bring out a real contradiction between the name and its bearer, so that he shall appear as one presenting himself under false colours, affecting a merit which is really strange to him. Examples of this are innumerable. For instance, there was one Vigilantius in the early Church—his name might be interpreted ' the Watchful.' He was engaged in a controversy with Jerome, in regard

of certain vigils ; which he thought perilous to Christian morality, but of which Jerome was a very eager maintainer ; who instantly gave a turn to his name, and proclaimed that he, the enemy of these watches, the friend of slumber and sloth, should have been not *Vigilantius*, or 'the Watcher,' but *Dormitanti*us, or 'the Sleeper,' rather.

But this hostile use of names, this attempt to place them and their owners in the most intimate connexion, to make, so to speak, the man answerable for his name, we trace still more frequently where the name does not thus need to be reversed ; but may be made, as it now is, or with very slightest change, to contain a confession of the ignorance, worthlessness, or futility of the bearer. If it implies, or can be made to imply, anything bad, it is instantly laid hold of, as expressing the very truth about him. Pope Hildebrand, in one of our *Homilies*, is styled "Brand of Hell," as setting the world in a blaze ; Sanders, the foul-mouthed libeller of Queen Elizabeth, is with more of justice by old Fuller styled "Slanders rather." So, too, there were two persons of considerable note in our Civil Wars, the one named Vane, and the other Sterry, and one of them, Sterry, was chaplain to the other. Baxter, having occasion to mention them in the memoirs of his life which he has left, and liking neither, observes of this Vane and this Sterry, that "vanity and sterility were never more suitably joined together" ; and speaks in another place of the "vanity of Vane, and the sterility" (the charge as regards this last is a very unjust one) "of Sterry."

Where, on the other hand, it is desired to do a man honour, how gladly, in like manner, is his name seized on, if it bears in it anything of an honourable significance, or is capable of an honourable interpretation—men finding in that name a presage and prophecy, an indication and out-speaking, of that which was actually in its bearer. A multitude of examples, many of them beautiful enough, might be brought together in this kind. How often, for instance, and with what effect, the name of Stephen, the protomartyr, that name signifying ‘the Crown,’ was taken as a prophetic intimation of the martyr-crown, which it should be given to him, the first in that noble army, to wear. Irenæus means in Greek ‘the Peaceable’; and early Church writers love to remark how fitly the great bishop of Lyons in the second century bore this name, setting forward as he so eminently did the peace of the Church, resolved as he was, so far as in him lay, to preserve the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. In like manner Fuller, our own Church historian, who made so many puns on others, has a pun made upon his own name in some commendatory verses affixed to one of his books :

Thy style is clear and white; thy very name  
Speaks pureness, and adds lustre to the frame.\*

\* A few more examples in a note. Antiochus Epiphanes, or ‘the Illustrious,’ is for the Jews, whom he so madly attempted to hellenize, Antiochus Epimanes, or “the Insane.” Cicero, denouncing Verres, the infamous prætor of Sicily, is too skilful a master of the passions to allow his name to escape him. He was indeed ‘Verres,’ for he *swept* the province; he was a sweep-net for it (everriculum in provinciâ); and then presently, recurring to the name, and giving altogether another turn

These examples, curious as they are, I yet adduce less for their own sake, than because they contain an implicit witness for the wide-spread faith of men in the significance of the words and names which they employ. You will not, then, find it a hard and laborious task to persuade your pupils of this. They are prepared to accept, they will be prompt to believe it. And great indeed will be our gains, their gains and ours—for teacher and taught will for the most part enrich themselves together—if, having these treasures of wisdom and knowledge lying round about us, so far more precious than mines of Californian gold, we determine that we will make what portion of them we can our own, that we will ask the words which we use to give an account of themselves, to say

to it, others, he says, might be partial to the “*jus verri-num*,” which might either mean verrine law, or boar sauce, but not he. Tiberius Claudius Nero, charged by the popular voice with being a drunkard, becomes Biberius Caldius Mero. The controversies of the Church with heretics yield only too abundant a supply, and that upon both sides, of examples in this kind. The noble Athanasius is Satanasius for the Arians; and some of St. Cyprian’s adversaries did not shrink from so foul a perversion of his name as to call him Κορριανός, or “the Dungy.” But then, on the other hand, how often is Pelagius declared by the Church Fathers to be a ‘pelagus’ or ocean of wickedness. It was in vain that the Manichæans changed their master’s name from Manes to Manichæus, that so it might not so nearly resemble the word signifying madness in the Greek (*devitantes nomen insanix*, Augustine, *De Hær.* 46); they did not thereby escape. Metrophanes, a Patriarch of Constantinople, being considered by his fellow-countrymen to have betrayed the interests of the Greek Church, his spiritual mother, in certain negotiations with the Latin, instead of Metrophanes acquired the title of Metrophonos, or “the Matricide.” It would be easy to increase this list.

whence they are, and whither they tend. Then shall we often rub off the dust and rust from what seemed to us but a common token, which as such we had taken and given a thousand times ; but which now we shall perceive to be a precious coin, bearing the " image and superscription " of the great King : then shall we often stand in surprise and in something of shame, while we behold the great spiritual realities which underlie our common speech, the marvellous truths which we have been witnessing *for* in our words, but, it may be, witnessing *against* in our lives. And as you will not find, for so I venture to promise, that this study of words will be a dull one when you undertake it yourselves, as little need you fear that it will prove dull and unattractive, when you seek to make your own gains herein the gains also of those who may be hereafter committed to your charge. Only try your pupils, and mark the kindling of the eye, the lighting up of the countenance, the revival of the flagging attention, with which the humblest lecture upon words, and on the words especially which they are daily using, which are familiar to them in their play or at their church, will be welcomed by them. There is a sense of reality about children which makes them rejoice to discover that there is also a reality about words, that they are not merely arbitrary signs, but living powers ; that, to reverse the words of one of England's " false prophets," they may be the fool's counters, but are the wise man's money ; not, like the sands of the sea—innumerable disconnected atoms, but growing out of roots, clustering in families, connecting and intertwining

themselves with all that men have been doing and thinking and feeling from the beginning of the world till now.

And it is of course our English tongue, out of which mainly we should seek to draw some of the hid treasures which it contains, from which we should endeavour to remove the veil which custom and familiarity have thrown over it. We cannot employ ourselves better. There is nothing that will more help than will this to form an English heart in ourselves and in others. We could scarcely have a single lesson on the growth of our English tongue, we could scarcely follow up one of its significant words, without having unawares a lesson in English history as well, without not merely falling on some curious fact illustrative of our national life, but learning also how the great heart which is beating at the centre of that life was gradually shaped and moulded. We should thus grow too in our feeling of connexion with the past, of gratitude and reverence to it ; we should estimate more truly, and therefore more highly, what it has done for us, all that it has bequeathed us, all that it has made ready to our hands. It was something for the children of Israel, when they came into Canaan, to enter upon wells which they digged not and vineyards which they had not planted, and houses which they had not built ; but how much greater a boon, how much more glorious a prerogative, for any one generation to enter upon the inheritance of a language, which other generations by their truth and toil have made already a receptacle of choicest treasures, a storehouse of so much unconscious wisdom, a fit



organ for expressing the subtlest distinctions, the tenderest sentiments, the largest thoughts, and the loftiest imaginations, which at any time the heart of man can conceive. And that those who have preceded us have gone far to accomplish this for us, I shall rejoice if I am able in any degree to make you feel in the lectures which will follow the present.

## II

### ON THE POETRY IN WORDS

I SAID in my last lecture, or rather I quoted another who had said, for I would not even seem to claim as my own so striking a phrase, that language is fossil poetry. It is true that for us very often this poetry which is bound up in words has in great part or altogether disappeared.\* We fail to recognize it, partly from long familiarity with it, partly, it may be, from never having had our attention called to it. None have pointed it out to us; and thus it has come to pass that we have been close to this wealth, and yet it has not been ours. Margaret has not been for us 'the Pearl,' nor Esther 'the Star,' nor Susanna 'the Lily,' nor Stephen 'the Crown.' "In our ordinary language," as Montaigne has well said, "there are several excellent phrases and metaphors to be met with, of which the beauty is withered by age. and the colour is sullied by too common handling; but that takes nothing from the relish to an understanding man, neither does it derogate from the glory of those ancient authors, who, 'tis likely, first brought those words into that lustre." We read in a well-known French comedy of one who was surprised to discover that he had been talking prose all his life without being aware of it. If we knew all, we might be much more surprised to find that we had been talking poetry, without ever having so much as suspected that it was so. For indeed poetry and passion seek to insinuate,

\* [So Curtius, "We need the instinctive perception of the poetry slumbering in language."—*Greek Etymology*, i. 126 (1875).]

and do insinuate themselves everywhere in language; they preside continually at the giving of names. I propose to devote this present lecture to a few examples and illustrations, by which I would make the truth of this which I have affirmed appear.

"Iliads without a Homer," some one has called, with a little exaggeration, the beautiful but anonymous ballad poetry of Spain. One may be permitted, perhaps, to push the exaggeration a little further in the same direction, and to apply the same language not merely to a ballad but to a word. For poetry, which is passion and imagination embodying themselves in words, does not necessarily demand a combination of words for this; of this passion and imagination a single word may be the vehicle. As the sun can image itself alike in a tiny dewdrop or in the mighty ocean, and can do it, though on a different scale, as perfectly in the one as in the other, so the spirit of poetry can dwell in and glorify alike a word and an Iliad. Nothing in language is too small, as nothing is too great, for it to fill with its presence. Everywhere it can find, or, not finding, can make, a shrine for itself, which afterwards it can render translucent and transparent with its own indwelling glory. On every side we are beset with poetry. Popular language is full of it, of words used in an imaginative sense, of things called,—and not merely in transient moments of high passion, and in the transfer which at such moments, finds place of the image to the thing imaged, but permanently,—by names having immediate reference not to what they are, but

to what they are like. Thus at Naples it is the ordinary language to call the lesser storm-waves 'pecore,' or sheep, the larger 'cavalloni,' or big horses. Who that has watched the foaming crests, the white manes, as it were, of the larger billows, as they roll in measured order into the bay, but will own not merely the fitness but the grandeur, of this last image ?

Let me illustrate my meaning somewhat more at length by the word 'tribulation.' We all know in a general way that this word, which occurs not seldom in Scripture, and in the Liturgy, means affliction, sorrow, anguish ; but it is quite worth our while to know *how* it means this, and to question the word a little closer. It is derived from the Latin 'tribulum,' which was the threshing instrument or roller, whereby the Roman husbandmen separated the corn from the husks ; and 'tribulatio' in its primary significance was the act of this separation. But some Latin writer of the Christian Church appropriated the word and image for the setting forth of a higher truth ; and sorrow, distress, and adversity being the appointed means for the separating in men of whatever in them was light, trivial, and poor from the solid and the true, their chaff from their wheat,\* therefore he called these sorrows and trials 'tribulations,' threshings, that is, of the inner spiritual man, without which there could be no fitting him for the heavenly garner. Now in proof of my assertion that a single word is often a concentrated

\* 'Triticum' itself is probably connected with 'tero,' 'tritrus.' This is one of the few among Varro's etymologies which has some probability in it,

poem, a little grain of pure gold capable of being beaten out into a broad extent of gold-leaf, I will quote, in reference to this very word 'tribulation,' a graceful composition by George Wither, an early English poet, which you will at once perceive is all wrapped up in this word, being from first to last only the expanding of the image and thought which this word has implicitly given; these are his lines—

Till from the straw the flail the corn doth beat,  
 Until the chaff be purgèd from the wheat,  
 Yea, till the mill the grains in pieces tear,  
 The richness of the flour will scarce appear.  
 So, till men's persons great afflictions touch,  
 If worth be found, their worth is not so much,  
 Because, like wheat in straw, they have not yet  
 That value which in threshing they may get.  
 For till the bruising flails of God's corrections \*  
 Have threshèd out of us our vain affections;  
 Till those corruptions which do misbecome us  
 Are by Thy sacred Spirit winnowed from us;  
 Until from us the straw of worldly treasures,  
 Till all the dusty chaff of empty pleasures,  
 Yea, till His flail upon us He doth lay,  
 To thresh the husk of this our flesh away;  
 And leave the soul uncovered; nay, yet more,  
 Till God shall make our very spirit pour,  
 We shall not up to highest wealth aspire;  
 But then we shall; and that is my desire.

\* [It may be noted that Fr. *fléau*, substantially the same word as our 'flail,' both being from Lat. *flagellum*, a scourge, is also used for a plague or judgment of God. 'Trial' is an exact parallel to 'tribulation,' its radical meaning being that which separates the good grains from the worthless chaff and straw by threshing and winnowing, then sifting out the truth by examination or afflictive dispensations, the word coming through Fr. *trier* from Lat. *tritare*, to triturate, or thresh out. Thus Milton's "tried in sharp tribulation" (*P. Lost*, xi. 63) is etymologically exact. A *try* was once a sieve or riddle. See my *Word-hunter's Note-book*, p. 49.]

This deeper religious use of the word 'tribulation' was unknown to classical, that is to heathen, antiquity, and belongs exclusively to the Christian writers : and the fact that the same deepening and elevating of the use of words recurs in a multitude of other, and many of them far more signal, instances, is one well deserving to be followed up. Nothing, I am persuaded, would more strongly bring before us what a new power Christianity was in the world than to compare the meaning which so many words possessed before its rise, and the deeper meaning which they obtained, so soon as they were assumed by it as the vehicles of its life, the new thought and feeling enlarging, purifying, and ennobling the very words which they employed. This is a subject which I shall have occasion to touch on more than once in these lectures, but is itself well worthy of, as it would afford ample material for, a volume.

Before leaving this part of my subject, and on the suggestion of this word 'tribulation,' I will quote a word or two from Coleridge. They bear on the matter we have in hand. He has said, "In order to get the full sense of a word, we should first present to our minds the visual image that forms its primary meaning." What admirable counsel is here. If we would but accustom ourselves to the doing of this, what vast increases of precision and force would all the language which we speak, and which others speak to us, obtain ; how often would that which is now obscure at once become clear ; how distinct the limits and boundaries of that which is often now confused and confounded. It is difficult to measure the

amount of food for the imagination, as well as gains for the intellect, which the observing of this single rule would afford us. Let me illustrate this by one or two examples. We say of such a man that he is 'desultory.' Do we attach any very distinct meaning to the word? Perhaps not. But get at the image on which 'desultory' rests; take the word to pieces; learn that it is from *de* and *salto*, 'to leap from one thing to another,' as a man who in the ring, technically called a 'desultor,' riding two or three horses at once, leaps from one to the other, being never on the back of any one of them long; take, I say, the word thus to pieces, and put it together again, and what a firm and vigorous grasp will you have now of its meaning. A 'desultory' man is one who jumps from one study to another, and never continues for any time in one.

Again, you speak of a person as 'capricious,' as being full of 'caprices'; but what exactly are caprices? 'Caprice' is from *capra*, 'a goat.' If ever you have watched a goat, you will have observed how sudden, how unexpected, how unaccountable are the leaps and springs, now forward, now sideward, in which it indulges. A 'caprice' then is a movement of the mind as unaccountable, as little to be calculated on beforehand, as the springs and bounds of a goat.\* Is not the word so

\* [The goat (Lat. *caper*) has originated many words indicative of frolicsome or freakish activity, e.g., 'to caper,' 'to capriole,' Fr. *cabrioter*, Welsh, *gafrio* (from *gafr*, a goat), It. *ticchio*, a freak or whim from O. St. Ger. *ziki*, a kid (A. Sax. *ticcen*). When Boyle speaks of "the capering of a kid" (1691), and De Quincey of the 'capricious caprioling' of the chamois (*Works*, xiii. 121), they use the words with etymological accuracy.]

understood a far more picturesque one than it was before? and is there not some real gain in the vigour and vividness of impression which is in this way obtained?

The poetry which has been embodied in the names of places, in those names which designate the leading features of outward nature, promontories, mountains, capes, and the like, is very worthy of being elicited and evoked anew, latent as it now has oftentimes become. Nowhere do we so easily forget that names had once a peculiar fitness, which was the occasion of their giving. Colour sometimes has suggested the name, as in the well-known instance of our own 'Albion,' "the silver-coasted isle," as Tennyson so beautifully has called it, which had this name from the white line of cliffs which it presents to those approaching it by the narrow seas. Oftener, perhaps, it is shape which is incorporated in the name, as in 'Trinacria,' or 'the three-cornered land,' which was the Greek name of Sicily. But more striking, as the embodiment of a poetical feeling, is the modern name of the great southern peninsula of Greece. We are all aware that it is called the 'Morea'; but we may not be so well aware from whence that name is derived. It had long been the fashion among ancient geographers to compare the shape of this region to a platane leaf,\* and a glance at the map will show that the general outline of that leaf, with its sharply incised edges, justified the comparison. This, however, had

\* Strabo, viii. 2; Pliny, *H. N.* iv. 5; Agathemerus, i. i. p. 15: Ἐχειν δὲ ὁμοιον σχῆμα φύλλῳ πλατάνου.



remained merely as a comparison ; but at the shifting and changing of names, which went with the breaking up of the old Greek and Roman civilization, the resemblance of this region to a leaf, not now, however, a platane, but a mulberry leaf, appeared so strong, that it exchanged its old name of Peloponnesus for ' Morea,' which embodied men's sense of this resemblance, *morus* being a mulberry-tree in Latin, and *μωρέα* in Greek. I am aware that this etymology of ' Morea ' has been called in question ;\* but on no sufficient grounds. Deducing as the objector does ' Morea ' from a Slavonic word *more*, the sea† he finds in this derivation a support for his favourite notion that the modern population of Greece is not descended from the ancient, but consists in far the larger proportion of intrusive Slavonic tribes.

In other ways also the names of places will oftentimes embody some poetical aspect under which now or at some former period men learned to regard them. Oftentimes when discoverers come upon a new land they will seize with a firm grasp of the imagination the most striking feature which it presents to their eyes, and permanently embody this in a word. Thus the island of Madeira is now, I believe, nearly bare of wood ; but its sides were covered with forests at the time when it was first discovered, and hence the name,

\* By Fallmerayer, *Gesch. der Halbinsel Morea*, pp. 240 sqq.

† [Similarly Lord Strangford comparing its other name, " the Apian," i.e. the watery, " land."—*Letters, and Papers on Philolog. Subjects*, p. 171.]

'madeira' in Portuguese having this meaning of wood.\* So too the first Spanish discoverers of Florida gave to it this name from the rich carpeting of flowers which, at the time when first their eyes beheld it, everywhere covered the soil. Surely Florida, as the name passes under our eye, or from our lips, is something more than it was before, when we may thus think of it as the land of flowers.† We have heard something of Port Natal lately, probably we shall in coming years hear still more. The name also embodies an interesting fact, namely that this port was first discovered on Christmas Day, the *dies natalis* of our Lord.

Then again what poetry is there, as indeed there ought to be, in the names of flowers. I do not speak of those, the exquisite grace and beauty of whose names is forced on us so that we cannot miss it, such as 'meadow-sweet,' 'eye-bright,' 'sun-dew,' 'forget-me-not,' 'Venus' looking-glass,' 'queen-of-the-meadows,' 'love-in-idleness,' 'Reine Marguerite,' and the like; but take 'daisy'; surely this charming little English flower, which has stirred the peculiar affection of English poets from Chaucer to Wordsworth, and received the tribute of their sons, becomes more charming when we know, as Chaucer long ago has

\* [The Portuguese Ilha da Madeira, "Island of Timber" (Lat. *materia*), is said to be a translation of the older Italian name Isola do Legname, "the wooded island." See I. Taylor, *Names and their Histories*, p. 182.]

† An Italian poet, Fazio degli Uberti, tells us that Florence had its appellation from the same cause:

"Poichè era posta in un prato di fiori,  
Le denno il nome bello, onde s'ingloria."

told us, that ' daisy ' is day's eye, the eye of day ; these are his words—

That well by reason it men callen may  
The *daisie*, or else the eye of day.\*

For only consider how much is implied here. To the sun in the heavens this name, eye of day, was naturally first given ; and those who transferred the title to our little field-flower meant no doubt to liken its inner yellow disk or shield to the great golden orb of the sun, and the white florets which encircle this disk to the rays which the sun spreads on all sides round him. What imagination was here, to suggest a comparison such as this, binding together as this does the smallest and the greatest ! what a travelling of the poet's eye, with the power which is the privilege of that eye, from earth to heaven, and from heaven to earth, and uniting both !

And then again what poetry is there often in the names of birds and beasts and fishes, and indeed of all the animated world around us ; how skilfully are these names adapted to bring out the most striking and characteristic features of the object to which they are given. Thus when the Romans became acquainted with the stately giraffe, long concealed from them in the inner wilds of Africa (which we learn from Pliny they first did in the shows exhibited by Julius Cæsar), it was happily imagined to designate a creature combining, though with infinitely more grace,

\* [" The dayseye or elles the ye of day."—*Legend of Good Women*, Prol., l. 184, ed. Skeat. But *dæges-ége* as a name of the daisy already occurs in Anglo-Saxon.]

yet something of the height and even the proportions of the *camel* with the spotted skin of the *pard*, by a name which should incorporate both these in its most prominent features,\* calling it the 'camelopard.' Nor can we, I think, hesitate to accept that account as the true one, which describes the word as no artificial creation of the scientific naturalist, but as bursting extempore from the lips of the populace at the first moment when the novel creature was presented to their gaze. 'Cerfvolant,' a name which the French have so happily given to the horned scarabeus, the same which we somewhat less poetically call the 'stag-beetle,' is another example of what may be effected with the old materials, by merely bringing them into new and happy combinations.

You know the appearance of the lizard, and the *star-like* shape of the spots which are sown over its back. Well, in Latin it is called 'stellio,' from *stella*, a star; just as in like manner the basilisk was so called in Greek (the word means 'little king') because of the shape as of a *kingly* crown which the spots on its head may be made by the fancy to assume. Need I remind you of our own 'goldfinch,' evidently so called from that bright patch of yellow on its wing; our 'kingfisher,' having its name from the royal beauty, the *kingly* splendour of the plumage with which it is adorned. The lady-bird or lady-cow is prettily named, as indeed the whole legend about it is full of grace and fancy; but a common name which in

\* Varro: "Quod erat figurâ ut camelus, maculis ut panthera"; and Horace (*Ep.* ii. l. 195):

"Diversum confusa genus panthera camelo."

many of our country parts it bears, the 'golden knop' or 'knob,' is prettier still.

This word reminds me of the vast amount of curious legendary lore which is everywhere bound up in words, and which they, if duly solicited, will yield back to us again. For example, the Greek word 'halcyon,' which we have adopted without change, has reference, and wraps up in itself an allusion, to one of the most beautiful and significant legends of heathen antiquity; according to which the sea preserved a perfect calmness for all the period, the fourteen "halcyon days," during which this bird was brooding over her nest.\* The poetry of the names survives, whether the name suggested the legend, or the legend the name. Take again the names of some of our precious stones, as of the topaz, so called, as some said, because men were only able to conjecture (τοπάζειν) the position of the cloud-concealed island from which it was brought.†

Very curious is the determination which some words, indeed many, seem to manifest, that their poetry shall not die; or, if it dies in one form, that it shall revive in another. Thus if there is danger that, transferred from one language to another, they shall no longer speak to the imagina-

\* [Pliny (*Nat. Hist.* x. 32) says of the *halcyones* or kingfishers, "the time whiles they are broody is called the Halycon daies, for during that season the sea is calme and navigable" (Holland's trans., 1634, vol. i. p. 287.)]

† Pliny, *H. N.* xxxvii. 32. [The origin of the word 'topaz' remains a *crux*. Some have suggested Sansk. *tapas*, heat, as if the glowing stone. Another suggestion is a coalescence of τὸ πᾶζ, as if "the golden stone" or chrysolite, the Heb. *páz*, meaning (1) gold, (2) the topaz. —A. S. P., *Folk-etymology*, p. 589.]

tion of men as they did of old, they will make to themselves a new life, they will acquire a new soul in the room of that which has ceased to quicken and inform them any more. Let me make clear what I mean by one or two examples. The Germans, knowing nothing of carbuncles, had naturally no word of their own for them, and when they first found it necessary to name them, as naturally borrowed the Latin 'carbunculus,' which originally had meant 'a little live coal,' to designate these precious stones of a fiery red colour. But 'carbunculus,' though a real word, full of poetry and life, for a Latin, would have been only an arbitrary sign for as many as were ignorant of that language. What then did they, or what, rather, did the working genius of the language do? It adopted, but in adopting modified slightly yet effectually, the word, changing it into 'Karfunkel,' thus retaining the outlines of the original, yet at the same time, inasmuch as 'funkeln' signifies 'to sparkle,' reproducing now in an entirely novel manner the image of the bright sparkling of the stone, for every knower of the German tongue.\*

Take another illustration of this from another quarter. The French 'rossignol,' a nightingale, is undoubtedly the Latin 'lusciniola,' the diminutive of 'luscinia,' with the alteration, which so frequently finds place in the Romance languages, of the commencing *l* into *r*. Whatever may be the etymology of 'luscinia,' whether it be 'in lucis

\* [For further instances of the popularization of foreign words, or 'folk-etymology,' I may be permitted to refer to *The Folk and their Word Lore*.]

cano,' the singer in the groves, or 'lucens cano,' the mourning singer, or 'in lucem cano,' the singer until dawn, or as is most probable, 'luscus cano,' the weak-eyed and therefore twilight singer, with which our 'nightingale' would most closely correspond, it is plain that for Frenchmen in general the word would no longer be suggestive of any of these meanings, hardly even for French scholars, after the serious transformations which it had undergone; while yet, at the same time, in the exquisitely musical 'rossignol,' and still more perhaps in the Italian 'usignuolo,' there is an evident intention and endeavour to express something of the music of the bird's song in the liquid melody of the imitative name which it bears; and thus to put a new soul into the word, in lieu of that other which it has let go.

. I must add one example more of the dying out of the old life in a word, and the birth of a new in its stead. Every one who has visited Lucerne in Switzerland must remember the rugged mountain called 'Mont de Pilate' or 'Pilate's mountain,' which stands opposite to him; and if he has been among the few who climb it, will have been shown by his guide the lake at its summit in which Pontius Pilate in his despair drowned himself, with an assurance that from this the mountain obtained its name. Nothing of the kind. 'Mont de Pilate' was originally 'Mons *Pileatus*,' or 'the *hatted* hill';\* the clouds, as one so often sees, gathering round

\* [No proof, so far as I am aware, has been alleged that the mountain ever was called 'Pileatus.' It is a mere conjecture. See Taylor, *Names and their Histories*, p. 223.]

its summit, and forming the shape and appearance of a turban or hat. When in the Middle Ages this true derivation was forgotten or misunderstood, the other was invented and imposed. An instructive example this, let me observe by the way, of that which we cannot doubt has happened continually in far older legends, I mean that the name has suggested the legend, and not the legend supplied the name.

I have said that poetry and imagination seek to penetrate everywhere; and this is literally true; for even the hardest, austere studies cannot escape their influence; they will put something of their own life into the dry bones of a nomenclature which seems the remotest from them, the most opposed to them. He who in prosody called a metrical foot consisting of one long syllable followed by two short ("~") a 'dactyle' or a finger, with allusion to the long first joint of the finger and the two shorter which follow, whoever he may have been, and some one must have done it the first, he must be allowed to have brought a certain amount of imagination into a study so alien to it as prosody very well might appear.

He did the same with law who invented the Latin law-term 'stellionatus,' a word including generally such legally punishable acts of swindling or injurious fraud committed on the property of another as were not specified in any more distinct enactment. The word was drawn from a practice attributed, I suppose without any foundation, to the lizard, the 'stellio' we spoke of just now, of casting its winter skin, and then at once swallowing it secretly, out of a malignant grudge lest any



should profit by that which was accounted a sure specific in certain diseases. It was then transferred to any malignant wrong done by one person to another.\*

In other regions it was only to be expected that we should find poetry. Thus it is nothing strange that architecture, which has been called frozen music, and which is poetry embodied in material forms, should have a language of its own, not dry or hard, not of the mere intellect alone, but one in the forming of which it is evident that the imaginative faculties were at work. To take only one example,—this, however, from Gothic art, which naturally yields the most remarkable—what exquisite poetry in the name of “the rose window,” or better still, ‘the rose,’ given to the rich circular aperture of stained glass, with its leaf-like compartments, in either transept of the Gothic cathedral. Here indeed we may note an exception from that which usually finds place; for usually art borrows beauty from nature, and very faintly, if at all, reflects back beauty upon her. In this present instance, however, art is so beautiful, has reached so glorious and perfect a development, that if the associations which the rose supplies lend to that window some hues of beauty and a glory which otherwise it would not have, the latter abundantly

\* [That quaint divine, Thomas Adams (ab. 1620) says: “Extortion and cozenage is proverbially called *crimen stellionatus*, the sin of *stellature*. When the *stellion* hath cast his skin he greedily devours it again; which, saith Theophrastus, he doth in envy, because he understands that it is a noble remedy against the falling sickness.” (*Works*, 1861, i. 79). See also Topsell, *Historie of Serpents*, 1608, p. 277.]

repays the obligation ; and even the rose itself may become lovelier still, associated with those shapes of grace, those rich gorgeous tints, and all the religious symbolism of that in art which has borrowed and bears its name. After this it were little to note the imagination, although that was most real, which dictated the term 'flamboyant' to express the wavy flame-like outline, which, at a particular period of art, the tracery in the Gothic window assumed.

'Godsacre' or 'Godsfield,' which is the German name for a burial-ground, and which once was our own, though we unfortunately have nearly, if not quite, let it go, what a hope full of immortality does this little word proclaim ; how rich is it in all the highest elements of poetry, and of poetry in its noblest alliance, that is, in its alliance with faith—able as it is to cause all loathsome images of decay and dissolution to disappear, not denying them, but suspending, losing, taking them up into the sublimer thought of the victory over death, of a harvest of life which God shall one day reap even there where now seems the very triumphing place of death.\*

Let us then acknowledge man a born poet. If not every man always himself a 'maker,' yet evermore able to rejoice in what others have made, adopting it freely, moving gladly in it as his own most congenial element and sphere. For indeed as man does not live by bread alone, so neither does he seek in language merely the instrument which shall

\* [Hardly less beautiful is the German *fried-hof*, "enclosure of peace," as a name for the churchyard, if this be indeed its meaning. See Kluge, s.v.]

put him in such relations with his fellow-men as shall enable him to buy and sell and get gain, or otherwise make provision for the lower necessities of his animal life ; but something rather which shall stand in a real relation and correspondence to the higher faculties of his being, shall feed, nourish, and sustain these, shall stir him with images of beauty and suggestions of greatness. Neither here nor anywhere else could he become the mere utilitarian, even if he would. Despite his utmost efforts, were he mad enough to employ them, he could not succeed in exhausting his language of the poetical element which is inherent in it, in stripping it of blossom, flower, and fruit, and leaving it nothing but a bare and naked stem. He may fancy for a moment that he has succeeded in doing this, but it will only need for him to become a little better philologist, to go a little deeper into the study of the words which he is using, and he will discover that he is as remote from this consummation as ever.

For ourselves, let us desire nothing of the kind. Our life is not otherwise so full of imagination and poetry that we need give any diligence to empty it of that which it possesses of these. It will always have enough of dull and prosaic and commonplace for us all. What profit can there be in seeking to extend the region of these ? Profit there were none, but on the contrary infinite loss. It is *stag-nant* waters which corrupt themselves ; not those on which the breath and the winds of heaven are freely blowing. And words of passion and imagination are indeed what one has called them of old, *ψυχῆς ἄνεμοι*, "winds of the soul," to keep it in

healthful motion and agitation,\* to lift it upward and to drive it onward, to preserve it from that unwholesome stagnation which constitutes the fatal preparedness for so many other and worse evils.

\* [It is worth noting that the root idea underlying the word 'soul' (Goth. *saiwala*) seems to be that of a troubled sea. See A. S. P., in *The Guardian*, 1902, pp. 378, 411.]

### III

#### ON THE MORALITY IN WORDS

Is man of a divine birth and stock ? coming from God, and, when he fulfils the law and intention of his creation, returning to Him again ? We need no more than his language to prove it. So much is there in that which could never have existed on any other supposition. How else could all those words which testify of his relation to God, and of his consciousness of this relation, and which ground themselves thereon, have found their way into this, the veritable transcript of his innermost life, the genuine utterance of the faith and hope which is in him ? In no other way than this could we explain that great and preponderating weight thrown into the scale of goodness and truth, which, despite of all in the other scale, we must thankfully acknowledge in every language to be there. How else shall we account for that sympathy with the right, that testimony against the wrong, which, despite of all its aberrations and perversions, is yet its prevailing ground-tone ?

But has man fallen, and deeply fallen, from the heights of his original creation ? We need no more than his language to prove it. Like everything else about him, it bears at once the stamp of his greatness and of his degradation, of his glory and of his shame. What dark and sombre threads he must have woven into the tissue of his life, before we could trace those threads of an equal darkness which run through the tissue of his language ! What facts of wickedness and woe must have existed in the first, ere there could

be such words to designate these as are found in the last ! There have been always those who have sought to make light of the hurts which man has inflicted on himself, of the sickness with which he is sick ; who would fain persuade themselves and others that moralists and divines, if they have not quite invented, have yet enormously exaggerated, these. But are these statements found only in Scripture and in sermons ? Are there not mournful corroborations of their truth imprinted deeply upon every region of man's natural and spiritual life, and on none more deeply than on his language ? It needs no more than to open a dictionary, and to cast our eye thoughtfully down a few columns, and we shall find abundant confirmation of this sadder and sterner estimate of man's moral and spiritual condition. How else shall we explain this long catalogue of words, having all to do with sin, or with sorrow, or with both ? How came they there ? We may be quite sure that they were not invented without being needed, that they have each a correlative in the world of realities. I open the first letter of the alphabet ; what means this ' Ah,' this ' Alas,' these deep and long-drawn sighs of humanity, which at once encounter us there ? And then presently follow words such as these, ' Affliction,' ' Agony,' ' Anguish,' ' Assassin,' ' Atheist,' ' Avarice,' and twenty more—words, you will observe, for the most part not laid up in the recesses of the language, to be drawn forth and used at rare opportunities, but occupying many of them its foremost ranks. And indeed, as regards abundance, it is a melan-

choly thing to observe how much richer is every vocabulary in words that set forth sins, than in those that set forth graces. When St. Paul (Gal. v. 19-23) would put these against those, "the works of the flesh" against "the fruit of the Spirit," those are seventeen, these only nine; and where do we find in Scripture such lists of graces as we do at 2 Tim. iii. 2, Rom. i. 29-31, of their contraries?

Nor can I help taking note, in the oversight and muster from this point of view of the words which constitute a language, of the manner in which its utmost resources have been taxed that so it may express the infinite varieties, now of human suffering, now of human sin. Thus what a fearful thing is it that any language should have a word expressive of the pleasure which men feel at the calamities of others; for the existence of the word bears testimony to the existence of the thing. And yet in more than one such a word is found.\* Nor are there wanting, I suppose, in any language, words which are the mournful record of the strange wickednesses which the genius of man, so fertile in evil, has invented. What whole processes of cruelty are sometimes wrapped up in a single word! Thus I hardly open an Italian dictionary before I light upon the verb 'abbacinare,' meaning to deprive of sight by holding a red-hot metal basin close to the eyes.

\* In the Greek, *ἐπιχαιρεκακία*, in the German, 'Schadenfreude.' Cicero so strongly feels that such a word is wanting, that he *gives* to 'malevolentia' the *same* significance, "*voluptas ex malo alterius*," though it *lies* not of necessity in the word.

And our dictionaries, while they tell us much, yet will not tell us all. How shamefully rich is the language of the vulgar everywhere in words and phrases which are seldom allowed to find their way into books, yet which live as a sinful oral tradition on the lips of men, to set forth that which is unholy and impure. And of these words, as no less of those which have to do with the kindred sins of revelling and excess, how many set the evil forth with an evident sympathy and approbation, as taking part with the sin against Him who has forbidden it under pain of His extremest displeasure. How much cleverness, how much wit, yea, how much imagination must have stood in the service of sin, before it could possess a nomenclature so rich, so varied, and often so heaven-defying as it has.

How many words men have dragged downward with themselves and made partakers more or less of their own fall. Having originally an honourable significance, they have yet with the deterioration and degeneration of those that used them, or those about whom they were used, deteriorated and degenerated too. What a multitude of words originally harmless have assumed an harmful as their secondary meaning; how many worthy have acquired an unworthy. Thus 'knave' meant once no more than lad (nor does it now in German mean more), 'villain' than peasant; a 'boor' was only a farmer, a 'varlet' was but a serving-man,\* a 'menial,'

\* ['Varlet' is etymologically the same word as valet, and more remotely as 'vassal.']



one of the 'many,' or household,\* a 'churl' but a strong fellow, a 'minion' a favourite; man is "God's dearest *minion*" (Sylvester). 'Time-server' was used two hundred years ago quite as often for one in an honourable as in a dishonourable sense, "serving the time." † 'Conceits' had once nothing conceited in them; 'officious' had reference to offices of kindness and not of busy meddling; 'moody' was that which pertained to a man's mood, without any gloom or sullenness implied. 'Demure' conveyed no hint, as it does now, of an over-doing of the outward demonstrations of modesty. ‡

\* ['Many,' i.e. Mid.-Eng. *mainee*, O. Fr. *maisnie*, a family or household; Low. Lat. *mansionata*, the contents of a 'mansion' or house.]

† See in proof Fuller's *Holy State*, b. 3, c. 19.

‡ ['Demure,' a word of difficult etymology, is supposed by some to have originally meant well-mannered, as if from Old Fr. (*home*) *de murs*, (a man) of manners (Skeat). Murray thinks the last part of the word is Old Fr. *meur* (= *mûr*), ripe, mature (so Wedgwood), then sober, grave, grounding this on Cotgrave (a late authority), but he fails to account for the prefix *de*- (N. E. D.). The objection to this, further, is that Old Fr. *meur* is not found in this sense (Godefroy), and that it does not agree with the earliest use of the word in English (1337), where *dimuuir* is applied to the sea as calm, settled, as opposed to rough. I would propose to connect it with O. Fr. *demeurer*, *demcurer* (It. *dimorare*, Lat. *demorari*), Mid.-Eng. *demeore*, to stay, pause, or linger, and so the original meaning of the word would be holding back, reserved or retiring, quiet, not forward. Compare 'staid' from 'stay.' It may be noticed that *morose* (properly Lat. *mōrosus*, self-willed) was formerly often associated with *mōra*, *mōrari*, to delay, as if it meant lingering or dwelling on bad thoughts, a partial approximation to 'demure.' Thus 'demure' as describing one who 'demurs' (which is the same word in a verbal form) to the gay and frivolous doings of the time, comes to connote Pharisaic propriety.]

In 'crafty' and 'cunning' there was nothing of crooked wisdom implied, but only knowledge and skill; 'craft,' indeed, still retains very often its more honourable use, a man's 'craft' being his skill, and then the trade in which he is well skilled. And think you that the Magdalen could have ever given us 'maudlin' \* in its present contemptuous application, if the tears of penitential weeping had been held in due honour by the world? 'Tinsel,' from the French 'étincelle,' meant once anything that sparkles or glistens; thus "cloth of *tinsel*" would be cloth inwrought with silver and gold; but the sad experience that "all is not gold that glitters," that much which shows fair and specious to the eye is yet worthless in reality, has caused the world imperceptibly to assume the meaning which it now has, and when we speak of 'tinsel,' either literally or figuratively, we always mean now that which has no reality of sterling worth underlying the glittering and specious shows which it makes. 'Tawdry,' a word of curious derivation which I will not now pause to go into, has run through exactly the same course: it once conveyed no intimation of *mean* finery, or *shabby* splendour, as now it does.† 'Voluble' was once an epithet of honour applied to an orator, and meant exactly what 'fluent'

\* [For further strange developments of this word, see my *Folk and their Word-love*, p. 111.]

† [The word was originally used of cheap necklaces sold at the Fair of St. Awdry (or *Aetheldrydh*) at Ely, with allusion to the legend of her being addicted in her youth to this kind of finery. These were called 'Saint Awdry laces,' and then (by coalescence) 't Awdry laces.']

means now ; ' plausible ' was once worthy of applause.\*

A like deterioration through use may be traced in the word ' to resent.' It was not very long ago that Barrow could speak of the good man as a faithful ' resenter ' and requiter of benefits, of the duty of testifying an affectionate ' resentment ' of our obligations to God. But, alas ! the memory of benefits fades and fails from us so much more quickly than that of injuries ; that which we afterwards remember and revolve in our minds is so much more predominantly the wrongs, real or imaginary, which men have done us, than the favours they have bestowed on us, that ' to resent ' in our modern English has come to be confined entirely to that deep reflective displeasure which men entertain against those that have done, or whom they believe to have done, them a wrong. And this leads us to inquire how it comes to pass that we do not speak of the ' retaliation ' of benefits as often as the ' retaliation ' of injuries ? The word does but signify the again rendering as much as we have received ; but this is so much seldomer thought of in regard of benefits than of wrongs, that the word, though not altogether unused in this its worthier sense, has yet a strange and somewhat unusual sound in our ears when so employed. Were we to speak of a man ' retaliating ' kindnesses, I am not sure that every one would understand us.

\* Having in mind what ' *Dirne* ' means now in German, one almost shrinks from observing that it was at one time used of the Blessed Virgin Mary ; yet see Grimm's *Wörterbuch*, s.v.

Neither is it altogether satisfactory to take note that 'animosity,' according to its derivation, means no more than 'spiritedness'; that in the first use of the word in the later Latin to which it belongs, it was employed in this sense; was applied, for instance, to the spirit and fiery courage of the horse; nay, in English had once this meaning; but that now it is applied to only one kind of vigour and activity, that namely which is displayed in enmity and hate, and expresses a spiritedness in these. Does not this look too much as if these oftenest stirred men to a lively and vigorous activity?

And then what a mournful witness for the hard and unrighteous judgments we habitually form of one another lies in the word 'prejudice.' The word of itself means plainly no more than 'a judgment formed beforehand,' without affirming anything as to whether that judgment be favourable or unfavourable to the person about whom it is formed. Yet so predominantly do we form harsh unfavourable judgments of others before knowledge and experience, that a 'prejudice,' or judgment before knowledge and not grounded on evidence, is almost always taken to signify an unfavourable anticipation about one; and 'prejudicial' has actually acquired a secondary meaning of anything which is mischievous or injurious.

As these words are a testimony to the *sin* of man, so there is a signal testimony to his *infirmity*, to the limitation of human faculties and human knowledge, in the word 'to retract.' To retract means properly, as its derivation declares, no

more than to handle over again, to reconsider. And yet, so certain are we to find in a subject which we reconsider, or handle a second time, that which was at the first rashly, inaccurately, stated, that which needs therefore to be amended, modified, withdrawn, that 'to retract' could not tarry long with its primary meaning of reconsidering; and has come to signify, as we commonly use it, 'to withdraw.' Thus the greatest Father of the Latin Church, at the close of his life wishing to amend whatever he might now perceive in his various published works to have been incautiously or incorrectly stated, gave to the book, in which he carried out this intention (for they had then no such opportunities as second and third editions afford now), this very name of 'Retractations,' being literally 'rehandlings,' but in fact, as any one turning to the work will at once perceive, withdrawals of various statements which he now considered to need thus to be withdrawn.\* What a seal does this word's acquisition of such a secondary use as this set to the proverb, *Humanum est errare*.

At the same time urging, as I have thus done, this degeneration of words, I should greatly err, if I failed to bring before you the fact that a parallel process of purifying and ennobling has also been going forward, especially through the

\* [I fear this moralization of the word must be given up as founded on a mistake. The Latin *retractatio* is simply a 'drawing back' or 'withdrawal' of something previously advanced, the verb *retractare* (formed from *retractus*, p. partic. of *re-trahere*, to draw back) meaning to with-draw or revoke as well as to handle again.]

influences of a Divine faith working in the world ; which, as it has turned *men* from evil to good, or has lifted them from a lower earthly goodness to an higher heavenly, so has it in like manner elevated, purified, and ennobled a multitude of the words which they employ, until these which once expressed only an earthly good, express now an heavenly. The Gospel of Christ, as it is the redemption of man, so is it in a multitude of instances the redemption of his word, freeing it from the bondage of corruption, that it should no longer be subject to vanity, nor stand any more in the service of sin or of the world, but in the service of God and of His truth. Thus in the Greek language there is a word for 'humility' ; \* but this humility meant for the Greek—that is, with very rarest exceptions—meanness of spirit. He who brought in the Christian grace of humility, did in so doing rescue also the word which expressed it for nobler uses and to a far higher dignity than hitherto it had attained. There were 'angels' before heaven had been opened, but these only earthly messengers ; 'martyrs' also, or witnesses, but these not unto blood, nor yet for God's highest truth ; 'apostles,' but sent of men ; 'evangels,' but not of the kingdom of heaven ; 'advocates,' but not "with the Father." 'Paradise' was a word common in slightly different forms to almost all the nations of the East ; but they meant by it only some royal park or garden of delights ; till for the Jew it was exalted to signify the wondrous abode of our first parents ; and higher honours awaited it still, when on the

\* [ταπεινοφροσύνη.]

lips of the Lord, it signified the blissful waiting-place of faithful departed souls (Luke xxiii. 43) ; \* yea, the heavenly blessedness itself (Rev. ii. 7). Nor was the word 'regeneration' unknown to the Greeks : they could speak of the earth's 'regeneration' in the spring-time, of recollection as the 'regeneration' of knowledge ; the Jewish historian could describe the return of his countrymen from the Babylonian captivity, and their re-establishment under Cyrus in their own land, as the 'regeneration' of the Jewish state. But still the word, on the lips either of Jew or Greek, was removed very far from that honour reserved for it in the Christian dispensation—namely, that it should be the bearer of one of the chiefest and most blessed mysteries of the faith. And many other words in like manner there are, " fetched from the very dregs of paganism," as Sanderson has said,† (he instances the Latin 'sacrament,' the Greek 'mystery'), which words the Holy Spirit has not refused to employ for the setting forth of the great truths of our redemption. Reversing in this the impious deed of Belshazzar, who profaned the sacred vessels of God's house to sinful and idolatrous uses (Dan. v. 2), that blessed Spirit has often consecrated the very idol-vessels of Babylon to the service of the sanctuary.

Let us now proceed to contemplate some of the attestations to God's truth, and then some

\* [But Paradise was already so used by the Jewish Rabbis.]

† *Sermons*, 1671, vol. ii. p. 124.

of the playings into the hands of the devil's falsehood, which lurk in words.

And first, the attestations to God's truth, the fallings in of our words with his unchangeable Word : for these, as the true uses of the word, while the other are only its abuses, have a prior claim to be considered. Some modern "false prophets" who would gladly explain away all such phenomena of the world around us as declare man to be a sinful being and enduring the consequences of sin, tell us that pain is only a subordinate kind of pleasure, or, at worst, that it is a sort of needful hedge and guardian of pleasure. But there is a deeper feeling in the universal heart of man, bearing witness to something very different from this shallow explanation of the existence of pain in the present economy of the world—namely, that it is the correlative of sin, that it is *punishment* ; and to this the word 'pain,' which there can be no reasonable doubt is derived from 'pœna,' bears continual witness. Pain is punishment ; so does the word itself, no less than the conscience of every one that is suffering it, declare. Just so, again, there are those who will not hear of great pestilences being God's scourges of men's sins ; who fain would find out natural causes for them, and account for them by the help of these. I remember it was thus with too many in the time of our fearful visitations from the cholera. They may do so, or imagine that they do so ; yet every time they use the word 'plague,' they implicitly own the fact which they are endeavouring to deny ; for 'plague' means properly and according to its



derivation, 'blow,' or 'stroke; '\* and was a title given to these terrible diseases, because the great universal conscience of men, which is never at fault, believed and confessed that these were 'strokes' or 'blows' inflicted by God on a guilty and rebellious world. With reference to such words so used we may truly say: *Vox populi, vox Dei*—a proverb which, shallowly interpreted, may be made to contain a most mischievous falsehood; but interpreted in the sense wherein no doubt it was spoken, holds a deepest truth. We must only remember that this 'people' is not the populace either in high place or in low; and that this "voice of the people" is not any momentary outcry, but the consenting testimony of the good and wise, of those neither brutalized by ignorance, nor corrupted by a false cultivation, in all places and in all times.

Every one who admits the truth which lies in this saying must, I think, acknowledge it as a remarkable fact, that men should have agreed to apply the word 'miser,' or miserable, to the man eminently addicted to the vice of covetousness, to him who loves his money with his whole heart and soul. Here too the moral instinct lying deep in all hearts has borne testimony to the tormenting nature of this vice, to the gnawing care with which even here it punishes him that

\* [From Lat. *plāga*, a blow, Greek *plēgē*. It is interesting to find an accident or visitation of providence called a 'stroke of God' in a document so ancient as the Code of Khammurabi (about 2250 B.C.), "If in a sheepfold a stroke of God has taken place" (§ 266, ed. Johns). So in Hebrew the verb for to plague (Gen. xii. 17, etc.), *nāga*, is properly to strike or smite.]

entertains it, to the enmity which there is between it and all joy ; and the man who enslaves himself to his money is proclaimed in our very language to be a ' miser,' or a miserable man.\*

Other words will also be found to bear testimony to great moral truths. St. James has, I doubt not, been often charged with exaggeration, if not openly, yet in the hearts of men, perhaps we have sometimes been tempted to charge him with it ourselves, because he has said, "Who-soever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all" (ii. 10). And yet what says he different here from that which we are all agreed to say, which the Romans said long ago, they using 'integritas,' and we 'integrity,' to express the right moral condition for a man? For what was 'integritas' before it was assumed into ethical use? It was entireness; the 'integrity' of the body being, as Cicero explains it, the full possession and the perfect soundness of *all* the members of the body; and ethical 'integrity,' though of course it cannot be predicated so absolutely of any sinful child of Adam, is yet this same entireness or completeness transferred to the region of the higher moral life. It is exactly that condition which Herod had *not* attained, who at the Baptist's bidding "did many things gladly" (Mark vi. 20), but did not put away his brother's wife; and all whose partial obedience therefore profited him nothing; he had dropped one link in the golden

\* We here in fact say in a word what the Roman moralist, when he wrote—"Nulla avaritia sine pœnâ est, quamvis satis sit ipsa pœnarum"—took a sentence to say.

chain of obedience, and as a consequence the whole chain fell to the ground.

It is certainly very noticeable, and many have noticed it already, that the Greek word signifying 'wickedness' (*πονηρία*) comes of another signifying 'labour' (*πόνος*). How well does this agree with those passages in Scripture which describe sinners as "*wearying themselves* to commit iniquity," as "*labouring* in the very fire." \* "St. Chrysostom's eloquence," as Bishop Sanderson has observed on this very matter, "enlarges itself and triumphs in this argument more frequently than in almost any other; and he clears it often and beyond all exception, both by Scripture and reason, that the life of a wicked or worldly man is a very drudgery infinitely more toilsome, vexatious, and unpleasant than a godly life is." † Take again the witness of words to a central truth of our faith. A deep-lying connexion acknowledged by the mind of man between sin and expiation, a profound conviction that sin was that which needed expiation and satisfaction, and could not be forgiven without it, this confession entwining itself in the very roots of men's minds, and so incorporating itself in the very words which they employed, all this has been traced in the relations of the German word for sin with another word signifying to expiate or atone ('Sünde' with 'sühnen'). Doubts were

\* [Compare "A man of pleasure is a man of pains."—Young. So the root meaning of Heb. *rasha*, to be wicked, is to be agitated and disturbed. See Jos. Mede, *Works*, i. 241.]

† *Sermons*, London, 1671, vol. ii. p. 244.

alterwards expressed as to whether the words were thus etymologically related or no; whether the relation which had been traced between them was not merely fanciful, and, as such, not to be pressed into the service of the Truth, acceptable as their witness would otherwise have been. The scholar, however, in Germany who has the best right to speak authoritatively on the matter, after a full discussion of the subject, has come back to this, that the relationship of 'Sünde' and 'sühnen,' though not quite so close as some before him had assumed, is yet most real; and that the idea of that which needs expiation does lie in the word sin, 'sühnen' in 'Sünde,'\* As the great lines in which the human mind travels are evermore the same, we must recognize as a confirmation of this conclusion that in the Latin 'piaculum' is used for an enormous sin, which *as such* demands *expiation*.

How deep an insight into the failings of the human heart lies at the root of many words; and, if only we would attend to them, what valuable warnings many contain against subtle temptations and sins! Thus, all of us have probably more or less felt the temptation of seeking to please others by an unmanly assenting to their view of some matter, even when our own independent convictions would lead us to a different. The existence of such a temptation, and the fact that too many yield to it, are both declared in the Latin word for a flatterer—'assentator'—

\* Grimm, *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.* 1839, pp. 747 sqq. [German philologists now treat these words as distinct. See Kluge, s.vv.]

that is, 'an assenter'; one who has not courage to say *No*, when a *Yes* is expected from him: and quite independently of the Latin, the German language, in its contemptuous and precisely equivalent use of 'Jaherr,' a 'yea-Lord,' warns us in like manner against all such unmanly compliances. I may observe by the way that we also once possessed the word 'assentation' in the sense of unworthy flattering lip-assent; the last example of it which Richardson gives is from Bishop Hall: "It is a fearful presage of ruin when the prophets conspire in *assentation*." The word is quite worthy to be revived.\*

Again, how well it is to have that spirit of depreciation of others, that eagerness to find spots and stains in the characters of the noblest and the best, who would otherwise oppress and rebuke us with a goodness and a greatness so far surpassing ours—met and checked by a word at once so expressive, and so little pleasant to take home to ourselves, as the French 'dénigreur,' a 'blackener.' This word also is now, I believe, out of use; which is a pity, while the race which it designates is so far from being extinct. Full too of instruction and warning is our present employment of the word 'libertine.' It signified, according to its earliest use in French and in English, a speculative free-thinker in matters of religion and in the theory of morals, or, it might be, of government. But as by a sure process *free-thinking* does and will end in *free-acting*, as he who has cast off the one yoke will cast off the other, so a 'libertine' came in two or three

\* [It is used by Southey and Isaac Taylor. See *N.E.D.*]

generations to signify a profligate, especially in relation to women, a licentious and debauched person.

There is much too that we may learn from looking a little closely at the word 'passion.' We sometimes think of the 'passionate' man as a man of strong will, and of real, though ungoverned, energy. But this word declares to us most plainly the contrary; for it, as a very solemn use of it declares, means properly 'suffering'; and a passionate man is not a man doing something, but one suffering something to be done on him. When then a man or child is "in a passion," this is no coming out in him of a strong will, of a real energy, but rather the proof that for the time at least he has no will, no energy; he is suffering, not doing, suffering his anger, or what other evil temper it may be, to lord over him without control. Let no one then think of 'passion' as a sign of strength.\* As reasonably might one assume that it was a proof of a man being a strong man that he was often well beaten; such a fact would be evidence that a strong man was putting forth his strength on him, but of anything rather than that he himself was strong. The same sense of passion and feebleness going together, of the first being born of the second, lies, as I may re-

\* ["Strong passions mean weak will."—Coventry Patmore. "Some men are liable to *passion* in the same way as others are to the epilepsy, or any sudden particular disorder."—Butler, *Sermon viii*, "*Upon Resentment*." "Excessive anger is attended with all imaginable symptoms of weakness."—Secker, *Works*, 1825, iii. 61. Indeed, "all wickedness is weakness" (Milton, *Samson Agonistes*, l. 834), and the two words are probably akin. Compare Prov. xvi. 32.]

mark by the way, in the twofold use of the Latin word, 'impotens'; which, meaning first weak, means then violent, and then often weak and violent together.

Or meditate, I would ask you, on the use of the word 'humanitas,' to signify the mental and moral cultivation befitting a man; and consider how much herein is implied. We have happily overlived in England the time when it was still a question in debate among us, whether education were a good thing for every living soul or not; the only question which can be said seriously to divide Englishman now being, in what manner that mental and moral training, which is society's debt to each one of its members, may be most effectually imparted to him. Were it not so, were there any who still affirmed that it was good for any man that he should be left with powers not called out, and with faculties untrained, we might appeal to this word 'humanitas,' and the use to which the Roman put it, in proof that he at least was not of this mind, even as now we may not slight the striking witness to the truth which this word contains. The Roman expressed by 'humanitas' the highest and most harmonious culture of all the human faculties and powers. Then, and then only, man was truly man, when he received this; in so far as he did not receive this, his 'humanity' was maimed and imperfect; he fell short of himself, of his ideal, of that which he was created to be; for so much was involved in this employment of the word. I may just observe that in what has just been said lies the explanation of the term, 'the humanities,' which,

more in Scotland than here, is used to designate those studies which are considered the most specially adapted for training this the true humanity in every man.

In our use of the word 'talents,' as when we say "a man of talents" (not "of talent," for that as we shall see presently, is nonsense,\* though "of a talent" would be allowable), there is a clear recognition of the responsibilities which go along with the possession of intellectual gifts and endowments, whatsoever they may be. We derive the word from the parable at Matthew xxv. 14, in which various talents, more and fewer, are committed to the several servants by their lord, that they may trade with them in his absence, and give account of their employment at his return. Men may choose to forget the ends for which their 'talents' were given them; they may count them merely something which they have gotten; † they may turn them to selfish ends; they may glorify themselves in them, instead of glorifying the Giver; they may practically deny that they were given at all; yet in this word, till

\* [Mr. Fitzedward Hall, in opposition to Archbishop Trench and Landor, defends the propriety of this usage, and shows by a catena of writers from 1602, including Steele, Hor. Walpole, Southey and Ruskin, that 'talent' has always been employed for mental ability (*Modern English*, pp. 63-65). He contests the statement that the word is traceable solely to the parable. In the older English sense of inclination, like Ital. "*talento* an inclination of the minde, an earnest will, desire or appetite" (Florio), it came direct from the Greek *talanton*, a balance. (Compare, *penchant* and *propensity*).]

† An *ἐξὺς*, as the heathen did, not a *δωρημα*, as the Christian does: see a remarkable passage in Bishop Andrews' *Sermons*, vol. iii. p. 384.



they can rid their vocabulary of it, abides a continual memento that they were so given, or rather lent, and that each man shall have to render an account of their use.

Again, in the words 'oblige' and 'obligation,' as when we speak of "being *obliged*," or of "having received an *obligation*," a moral truth is asserted, this namely, that having received a benefit or a favour at the hands of another, it does not now lie in our free choice, but we morally *are bound*, to show ourselves grateful for the same. We cannot prove otherwise without denying not merely a moral truth, but one incorporated in the very language which we employ. Thus South, in a sermon, *Of the odious Sin of Ingratitude*, has well asked, "If the conferring of a kindness did not *bind* the person upon whom it was conferred to the returns of gratitude, why, in the universal dialect of the world, are kindnesses still called *obligations*?" \*

Once more—the habit of calling a woman's chastity her 'virtue' is very significant. I will not deny that it may in part be indicative of the tendency, which we many times find traces of in language, to narrow the whole circle of virtues to some one upon which peculiar stress is laid; but still in the selecting of this peculiar one as *the* 'virtue' of woman, there speaks out a true sense that this is indeed in her the citadel of the whole moral being,† the overthrow of which is for her

\* *Sermons*, London, 1737, vol. i. p. 407.

† [So in the Indian Epic Ráma says of his wife, 'Neither houses, nor vestments, nor enclosing walls are the screen of a woman. Her own virtue alone protects her

the overthrow of all—that it is the keystone of the arch, which being withdrawn, the whole collapses and falls.

Let us a little consider the word 'kind.' We speak of a 'kind' person, and we speak of man-'kind,' and perhaps, if we think about the matter at all, we seem to ourselves to be using quite different words, or the same words in senses quite unconnected. But they are connected, and that by closest bonds; a 'kind' person is a 'kinned' person, one of kin; one who acknowledges and acts upon his kinship with other men, confesses that he owes to them, as of one blood with himself, the debt of love. And so man*kind* is man*kinned*.\* In the word is contained a declaration of the relationship which exists between all the members of the human family; and seeing that this relationship in a race now scattered so widely and divided so far asunder can only be through a common head, we do in fact every time that we use the word

(Monier-Williams), with which may be compared Milton's eulogy of Chastity, "She that has that is clad in complete steel" (*Comus*, l. 421), and a similar sentiment in W. Black's *Daughter of Heh*, chap. xiv. (p. 36, cheap ed.)]

\* Thus it is not a mere play upon words, but something much deeper, which Shakespeare puts into Hamlet's mouth, when, speaking of his father's brother who had married his mother, he characterizes him as "A little more than *kin*, and less than *kind*."

['Kind,' A. Sax. (*ge-*)*cynde*, is not actually derived from *kin* (A. Sax. *cynn*), though nearly related to it. The transitions of meaning have been (1) born, (2) native, natural (so 'kindly'), (3) well-born (*generosus*), (4) well-disposed, liberal, affectionate; almost identical with those of the cognate word, 'gentle.' Compare also 'benign,' Lat. *benignus* for *beni-genus* (= *bene-genitus*), well-born.]

'mankind,' declare our faith in the one common descent of the whole race of man. And beautiful before, how much more beautiful now do the words 'kind' and 'kindness' appear, when we apprehend the root out of which they grow ; that they are the acknowledgment in loving deeds of our kinship with our brethren ; and how profitable to keep in mind that a lively recognition of the bonds of blood, whether of those closer ones which unite us to that whom by best right we term our family, or those wider ones which knit us to the whole human family, that this is the true source out of which all genuine love and affection must spring ; for so much is affirmed in our daily, hourly use of the word.

But it was observed just now that there are also words which bear the slime on them of the serpent's trail ; and the uses of words, which imply moral perversity—I say not upon their parts who now employ them in the senses which they have acquired, but on theirs from whom little by little they received their deflection, and were warped from their original rectitude. Thus for instance is it with the word 'prude,' signifying as now it does a woman with an over-scrupulous affectation of a modesty which she does not really feel, and betraying the absence of the reality by this over-preciseness and niceness about the shadow. This use of the word must needs have been the result of a great corruption of manners in them among whom it grew up ; goodness must have gone strangely out of fashion, before things could have come to this. For 'prude,' which is a French

word, means virtuous or prudent ; ' prud'homme ' being a man of courage and probity. But where morals are greatly and generally relaxed, virtue is often treated as hypocrisy ; and thus, in a dissolute age, and one disbelieving the existence of any inward purity, 'prude' came to designate a sort of female Tartuffe, one who affected a virtue, even as none were esteemed to do anything more ; and in this use of it, which, having once acquired, it continues to retain, abides an evidence of the corrupt world's dislike to and disbelief in the realities of goodness, its willingness to treat them as mere hypocrisies and shows.

Again, why should the word 'simple' be used slightly, and 'simpleton' more slightly still. According to a derivation which I am not prepared to give up, the 'simple' is one "without fold," (*sine plicâ*) ; \* just what we may imagine Nathanael to have been, and what our Lord attributed as the highest honour to him, the "Israelite without guile" ; and, indeed, what higher honour could there be than to have nothing double about us, to be without duplicities or folds ? Even the world, that despises 'simplicity,' does not profess to approve of 'duplicity,' or double-foldedness. But inasmuch as we feel that in a world like ours such a man will make himself a prey, will prove no match for the fraud and falsehood which he will everywhere encounter, and as there is that in most men which, were they

\* [Rather "one-fold," Lat. *simplex* (i.e. *sim-plic-s*, "same-ply") as opposed to *du-plex*, *com-plex*, *multi-plex*. An interesting parallel is afforded by Scot. *æ-fald* (= Old Eng. *an-fald*, "one-fold"), meaning simple, straight forward.]

obliged to choose between deceiving and being deceived, would make them choose the former, it has come to pass that 'simple,' which in a world of righteousness would be a word of highest honour, implies here in this world of ours something of scorn for the person to whom it is applied. And must it not be confessed to be a striking fact that exactly in the same way a person of deficient intellect is called an 'innocent,' innocens, one that does not hurt? so that this word assumes that the first and chief use men make of their intellectual powers will be to do hurt, that where they are wise it will be to do evil. What a witness does human language bear here against human sin.

Nor are these isolated examples of the contemptuous application of words expressive of goodness. They meet us on every side. Thus 'silly,' written 'seely' in our earlier English, is beyond a doubt the German 'selig,' which means 'blessed.'\* We see the word in its transition state in our early poets, with whom 'silly' is so often an affectionate epithet applied to sheep, as expressive of their harmlessness and innocence. With a still slighter departure from its original meaning, an early English poet applies the word to the Lord of Glory Himself, while yet an infant

\* [A. Sax. *sælig*, originally "timely," "opportune," from *sæl*, a time. A similar shifting of meaning from innocence or simplicity of character to foolishness is seen in Ger. *albern*; Fr. *benet* (Cotgrave), Greek *euēthēs*; Welsh *gwirion*; Ger. *schlecht*, Scottish *sackless*. Another instance of the same depreciation of meaning is presented by "daft," which in the oldest English meant becoming, gentle, mild. In A. Sax. Matt. xxi. 5, Zion's King comes to her *ge-dæfte*, i.e. meek (Skcat).]

of days, styling him "this harmless *silly* Babe." But here the same process went forward as with the words 'simple' and 'innocent.' And the same moral phenomenon repeats itself continually. For example: at the first promulgation of the Christian faith, and while yet the name of its Divine Founder was somewhat new and strange to the ears of the heathen, they were wont, some perhaps out of ignorance, but more of intention, slightly to mispronounce this name, as though it had not been 'Christus,' but 'Chrestus'—that word signifying in Greek 'benevolent,' or 'benign.' That they who did this of intention meant no honour hereby to the Lord of Life, but the contrary, is certain; and indeed the word, like the 'silly,' 'innocent,' 'simple,' of which we have already spoken, had already contracted a slight tinge of contempt, or else there would have been no inducement to fasten it on the Saviour. What a strange shifting of the moral sense there must have been, before it could have done so, before men could have found in a name implying benignity and goodness a nickname of scorn. The French have their 'bonhommie' with the same undertone of contempt, the Greeks also a well-known word.\* It is to the honour of the Latin, and is very characteristic of the best side

\* A passage from Lady Sheil's *Life and Manners in Persia*, p. 247, is curious as showing us precisely the same moral phenomenon reappearing in another quarter: "They [the Persians] have odd names for describing the moral qualities; Sedâkat means sincerity, honesty, candour; but when a man is said to be possessed of sedâkat, the meaning is that he is a credulous, contemptible simpleton."

of Roman life, that 'simplex' and 'simplicitas' never acquired this abusive signification.

Again, we all know how prone men are to ascribe to chance or fortune those good gifts and blessings which indeed come directly from God—to build altars to fortune rather than to Him who is the Author of every good thing. And this faith of theirs, that their blessings, even their highest, come to them by a blind chance, they have incorporated in a word; for 'happy' and 'happiness' are of course connected with and derived from 'hap,' which is chance. But how unworthy is this word to express any true felicity, of which the very essence is that it excludes hap or chance, that the world neither gave nor can take it away.\* It is indeed *more* objectionable than 'lucky' and 'fortunate,' objectionable as also are these, inasmuch as by the 'happy' man we mean much more than by the 'fortunate.' Very nobly has a great English poet protested against the misuse of the latter word, when of one who had lost indeed everything beside, but, as he esteemed, had kept the truth, he exclaims :

Call not the royal Swede *unfortunate*,  
Who never did to *fortune* bend the knee.

There are other words which reveal a wrong or insufficient aspect which men take of their duties—or which at all events others have taken before them; for it is possible that the mischief may have been done long ago, and the present

\* [See some good remarks on these contrasted words in Horace Bushnell, *The New Life*, p. 148.]

users of the words may only have inherited it from others, not helped to bring it about themselves. Thus when an employer of labour advertises that he wants so many 'hands,' we must needs feel that this language could never have become current, a man could never have thus shrunk into a 'hand' in the eyes of his fellow-man, unless this latter had in good part forgotten that annexed to those hands which he would purchase to toil for him were also heads and hearts\*—a fact, by the way, of which, if he persists in forgetting it, he may be reminded in very unwelcome ways at the last. In Scripture there is another *pars pro toto* not unfrequent, as when it is said, "The same day there were added unto them about three thousand *souls*" (Acts ii. 41). 'Hands' here, 'souls' there—the contrast may suggest some profitable reflections to us all.†

But another way in which the immorality of words mainly displays itself, one too in which perhaps they work their greatest mischief, is that of giving honourable names to dishonourable things, making sin plausible by dressing it out sometimes even in the very colours of goodness, or if not so, yet in such as go far to conceal its own native deformity. "The tongue," as St. James has declared, "is a *world* of iniquity" (iii. 6); or as some interpreters affirm the words

\* The use of *σώματα* for slaves in Greek (it occurs in this sense, Rev. xviii. 13), rests on exactly the same forgetfulness of the moral worth of every man.

† [But "souls" is used for slaves as articles of merchandise, like "bodies" in the previous note, in Rev. xviii. 13.]



ought rather to be translated, and they would be then still more to our purpose, "*the ornament of iniquity*," that which sets it out in fair and attractive colours: and those who understand the original will at once perceive that such a meaning may possibly lie in the words. I do not believe that these last-named expositors are right, yet certainly the connexion of the Greek word for 'tongue' with our 'gloze,' 'glossy,' with the German 'gleissen,' to smooth over or polish,\* and with an obsolete Greek word as well, also signifying 'to polish,' is not accidental, but real, and may well suggest some searching thoughts as to the uses whereunto we turn this '*best*,' but, as it may therefore prove also, this *worst*, "member that we have."

How much wholesomer on all accounts is it that there should be an ugly word for an ugly thing, one involving moral condemnation and disgust, even at the expense of a little coarseness, rather than one which plays fast and loose with the eternal principles of morality, which makes sin plausible, and shifts the divinely reared landmarks of right and wrong, thus bringing the user under the woe of them "that call evil good, and good evil, that put darkness for light, and light for darkness, that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter" (Isa. v. 20)—a text on which South

\* ["To gloze," to palliate or flatter, properly to put "glosses" or explanations on (Greek *glōssai*), to interpret, has no relation to *gloss*, superficial lustre, specious appearance; or *glossy* (Prov. Swed. *glossa*, to shine), or Ger. *gl eisen*, though these words have often been confused.—*Folk-Etymology*, 145.]

has written four of his grandest sermons, with reference to this very matter, and bearing this striking title, *On the fatal Imposture and Force of Words*. How awful, yea, how fearful, is this force and imposture of theirs, leading men captive at will. There is an atmosphere about them which they are evermore diffusing, an atmosphere of life or of death, which we insensibly inhale at each moral breath we draw.\* "The winds of the soul," they fill its sails, and are continually impelling it upon its course, heavenward or to hell.

Thus how greatly different the light in which we shall have learned to regard a sin, according as we have been wont to designate it, and to hear it designated, by a word which brings out its loathsomeness and deformity; or by one which palliates these and conceals. These last are only too frequent; as when in Italy, during the period that poisoning was rifest, nobody was said to be poisoned; it was only that the death of some was 'assisted' (aiutata.) Worse than these are words which seek to turn the edge of the Divine threatenings against some sin by a jest; as when in France a subtle poison, by which impatient heirs delivered themselves from those who stood between them and the inheritance which they coveted, was called 'poudre de succession.' We might suppose beforehand that such cloaks for

\* Bacon's words have been often quoted, but they will bear being quoted once more: "Credunt enim homines rationem suam verbis imperare. Sed fit etiam ut verba vim suam super intellectum retorqueant et reflectant."

sin would be only to be met with among people in an advanced state of artificial cultivation. But it is not so. Captain Erskine, who visited not many years since in an English man-of-war the Feijee Islands, and who gives some extraordinary details of the extent to which the practice of cannibalism was then carried on by their inhabitants, pork and human flesh being the two staple articles of food among them, tells us in his deeply-interesting record of his voyage, that natural pig the natives call '*short pig*,' and man dressed and prepared for food, '*long pig*.' Now there was doubtless an attempt to hide under this name, to carry off with a jest, the revolting character of the practice in which they indulged. For the fact that they were themselves aware of this, that their consciences did bear witness against it, was attested by their uniform desire to conceal all traces of the practice, so far as this was possible, from European eyes.

But worst perhaps of all are names which throw a flimsy veil of sentiment over some sin. What a source, for example, of mischief without end in our country parishes is the one practice of calling a child born out of wedlock a '*love-child*,' instead of a bastard. It would be hard to estimate how much it has lowered the tone and standard of morality among us; or for how many young women it may have helped to make the downward way more sloping still. How vigorously ought we to oppose ourselves to all such immoralities of language; which opposition will yet never be easy or pleasant; for many that will endure to commit a sin, will profoundly

resent having that sin called by its right name ; \* like Nym in Shakespeare, whose stealing is not stealing, but 'conveying,' "*convey* the wise it call" ; like the electors in some of our profligate boroughs, who receive, not bribes—they would be indignant if anything of the kind were said—but 'head-money' for their votes.

Coarse as, according to our present usages of language, may be esteemed the word by which our plain-speaking Anglo-Saxon fathers were wont to designate the unhappy women who make a trade of selling their bodies to the lusts of men, yet is there a profound moral sense in that word, bringing prominently out, as it does, the true vileness of their occupation, who for *hire* are content to profane and lay waste the deepest sanctities of their life.† Consider the truth which

\* On the general subject of the reaction of a people's language on that people's moral life, I will adduce some words of Milton, who, as he did so much to enlarge, to enrich, to purify our mother tongue, so also in the Latin which he wielded so well has thus declared his mind : "Neque enim qui sermo, purusne an corruptus, quæve loquendi proprietas quotidiana populo sit, parvi interesse arbitrandum est, quæ res Athenis non semel saluti fuit ; immo vero, quod Platonis sententia est, immutato vestiendi more habituque graves in Republicâ motus mutationesque portendi, equidem potius collabente in vitium atque errorem loquendi usu occasum ejus urbis remque humilem et obscuram subsequi crediderim : verba enim partim inscita et putida, partim mendosa et perperam prolata, quid si ignavos et oscitantes et ad servile quidvis jam olim paratos incolarum animos haud levi indicio declarant ? Contra nullum unquam audivimus imperium, nullam civitatem non mediocriter saltem floruisse, quamdiu linguæ sua gratia, suusque cultus constitit." Compare an interesting epistle (the 114th) of Seneca.

† [The idea that (*w*)*hore* is derived from "hire" is a

is witnessed for here, as compared with the falsehood of many other titles by which they have been known—names which may themselves be called “whited sepulchres,” so fair are they without, yet hiding so much foul within; as, for instance, that in the French language\* which ascribes *joy* to a life which more surely than any other dries up all the sources of gladness in the heart, brings anguish, astonishment, blackest melancholy on all who have addicted themselves to it. In the same way how much more moral words are the English ‘sharper,’ and ‘blackleg,’ than the French ‘chevalier d’industrie:’ † and the same holds good of the English equivalent, coarse as it is, for the Latin ‘conciliatrix.’ In this last word we have a notable example of the putting of sweet for bitter, of the attempt to present a disgraceful occupation on an amiable, almost a sentimental side, rather than in its own true deformity and ugliness.‡

mistake. It is probably related to Lat. *cara*, dear, Ir. *caraim*, I love (Kluge), like “leman” from *leof-man*, a dear one. But the word was frequently brought into connexion with the Mid.-Eng. *hore*, filth, unclean living. See *Folk-Etymology*, 437-439.]

\* [*Fille-de-joie*.]

† For a curious account of the first rise of this phrase see Lemontey’s *Louis XIV*, p. 43.

‡ So conscious have men been of this tendency of theirs to throw the mantle of an honourable word over a dishonourable thing, or *vice versa*, of the temptation to degrade an honourable thing, when they do not love it, by a dishonourable appellation, that the Greek language has a word significative of this very attempt, *προκορίζεσθαι*, itself a word with an interesting history; and its great moral teachers frequently occupy themselves in detecting this most frequent, yet perhaps practically most mischievous, among all the impostures of

Use and custom soon dim our eyes in such matters as these; or else we should be deeply struck by a familiar instance of this falsehood in names, which perhaps has never so much as struck us at all—I mean the profane appropriation of ‘eau de vie’ (water of life), a name borrowed from some of the Saviour’s most precious promises (John iv. 14; Rev. xxii. 17), to a drink which the untutored savage with a truer instinct has named ‘fire-water’; and which has proved for thousands and tens of thousands in every clime, not ‘water of life,’ but the fruitful source of disease, crime, and madness, bringing forth first these, and when these are finished, bringing forth death. There is here a blasphemous irony in the appropriation of the language of heaven to that which, not in its use, but too frequent abuse, is the instrument of hell, that is almost without a parallel.\*

If I wanted any further proof of this which I

words. Thus, when Thucydides (iii. 82) would paint the fearful moral deterioration of Greece in the progress of her great Civil War, he adduces this alteration of the received value of words, this fitting of false names to everything—names of honour to the base, and of baseness to the honourable—as one of its most striking signs; even as it again set forward the evil, of which it had been first the result.

\* [The spirit obtained by the distillation of wine appears to have been called “life-giving water” with reference to its medicinal properties. Raymond Lully, one of the first to proclaim its supposed virtues, believed it to be the universal medicine destined to renew the energies of the human race. Indeed, among many peoples of antiquity “the Tree of Life” (whether it be the palm, vine, asclepias, etc.) seems to have obtained its name from the intoxicating and exhilarating liquor (*amritam*, *soma*, ambrosia, wine, etc.) which it yields. See Lenormant, *Beginnings of History*, 85 seq.]

have been urging, namely, the moral atmosphere which words diffuse, I would ask you to observe how the first thing which men will do, when engaged in controversy with others, be it in the conflict of the tongue or the pen, or of weapons sharper yet, if sharper there be, will be to assume some honourable name to themselves, which, if possible, begs the whole matter in dispute, and at the same time to affix on their adversaries a name which shall place them in a ridiculous or contemptible, an invidious or odious light. There is a deep instinct in man, deeper perhaps than they give any account of to themselves, which tells them how far this will go; that multitudes, utterly unable to weigh the arguments of the case, will yet be receptive of the influences which these words continually, though almost imperceptibly, diffuse. By arguments they might hope to gain over the reason of a few, but by help of these nicknames they enlist what at first are so much more effectual, the passions and prejudices of the many, on their side. Thus when at the breaking out of our Civil Wars the Parliamentary party styled *themselves* 'the Godly,' and the Royalists 'the Malignants,' it is very certain that, wherever they could procure entrance for these words, the question upon whose side the right lay was already decided. I do not cite this example as at all implying that the Royalists did not make exactly the same employment of question-begging words, of words steeped quite as deeply in the passion which animated them, but only as a sufficient illustration of my meaning.

Seeing then that language contains so faithful a record of the good and of the evil which in time past have been working in the minds and hearts of men, we shall not err, regarding it as a moral barometer, which indicates and permanently marks the rise or fall of a nation's life. To study a people's language will be to study *them*, and to study them at best advantage ; there, where they present themselves to us under fewest disguises, most nearly as they are. Too many have had a hand in it, and in bringing it to its present shape, it is too entirely the collective work of the whole nation, the result of the united contributions of all, it obeys too immutable laws, to allow any successful tampering with it, any making of it to witness other than the actual facts of the case.

Thus the frivolity of an age or nation, its mockery of itself, its inability to comprehend the true dignity and meaning of life, the feebleness of its moral indignation against evil, all this will find an utterance in the use of solemn and earnest words in senses comparatively trivial or even ridiculous—'gehenna,' for instance, has in French issued in 'gêne,' meaning nothing more than a slight and petty annoyance ; or in the squandering of such words as should have been reserved for the highest mysteries of the spiritual life, 'spirituel,' for instance, itself, on slight and secular objects ; in the employment almost in jest and play, it may be in honour, or words implying the deepest moral guilt—as again the French 'perfide,' 'malice,' 'malin' ; while, on the contrary, the high sentiment, the scorn of everything mean or base of another people or time, will as certainly in one



way or another stamp themselves on the words which they employ ; and thus will it be with whatever good or evil they may own.

Often a people's use of some single word will afford us a deeper insight into their real condition, their habits of thought and feeling, than whole volumes written expressly with the intention of imparting this insight. Thus our word 'idiot' is abundantly characteristic, not indeed of English, but of Greek life, from which we have derived it and our use of it. The *ἰδιώτης*, or 'idiot,' was in its earliest sense the *private* man, as contradistinguished from him who was clothed with some office, and had a share in the management of public affairs. In this its primary use it is occasionally employed in English ; as by Jeremy Taylor, when he says, "Humility is a duty in great ones as well as in *idiots*." It came then to signify a rude, ignorant, unskilled, intellectually unexercised person, a boor ;\* this derived or secondary sense bearing witness, as has been most truly said, to "the Greek notion of the indispensableness of public life, even to the right development of the intellect,"† a conviction which was entirely inwoven in the Greek habit of thought, and lay at the foundation of all schemes of mental culture. Nor is it easy to see how it could have uttered itself with greater clearness than it does in this secondary use of the word 'idiot.' Our tertiary, according to which the 'idiot' is one deficient in

\* ["That which Scripture is to them that read, the same doth picture perform unto *idiots* or the unlearned"] —*Homilies*, 1623 (p. 180, ed. 1840).]

† Hare's *Mission of the Comforter*, p. 552.

intellect, not merely with its powers unexercised, is but this secondary pushed a little further. Again, the innermost distinctions between the Greek mind and the Hebrew reveal themselves in the several salutations of each, in the 'Rejoice' of the first, as contrasted with the 'Peace' of the second. The clear, cheerful, world-enjoying temper of the Greek embodies itself in the first; he could desire nothing better or higher for himself, nor wish it for his friend, than to have *joy* in his life. But the Hebrew had a deeper longing within him, and one which finds utterance in his 'Peacc.\*' It is not hard to perceive why this latter people should have been chosen as the first bearers of that truth which indeed enables truly to *rejoice*, but only through first bringing *peace*; nor why from them the word of life should first go forth. It may be urged, indeed, that these were only forms, and so in great measure they may have at length become; as in our 'good-bye' or 'adieu' we can hardly be said now to commit our friend to the Divine protection; yet still they were not such at the first, nor would they have held their ground, if ever they had become such altogether.

So too the modifications of meaning which a word has undergone, as it had been transplanted from one soil to another, the way in which one nation receiving a word from another, has yet

\* [But *shalôm*, the Hebrew word for "peace" was not strictly an ethical word, being frequently used for physical well-being, prosperity, health or success. It is the word, e.g., used for "the *prosperity* of the wicked" (Ps. lxxiii. 3), and when David asked Uriah "how the war *prospered*" (2 Sam. xi. 7), the Hebrew has "the *peace* of the war."] ]

brought into it some new force which was foreign to it in the tongue from whence it was borrowed, has deepened, or extenuated, or otherwise altered its meaning—all this may prove profoundly instructive, and may reveal to us, as perhaps nothing else would, the most fundamental diversities existing between them. Observe, for instance, how different is the word 'self-sufficient' as used by us and by the heathen nations of antiquity. The Greek word exactly corresponding is a word of honour, and applied to men in their praise. And indeed it was the glory of the heathen philosophy to teach man to find his resources in his own bosom, to be thus sufficient for himself ; and seeing that a true centre without him and above him, a centre in God, had not been revealed to him, it was no shame for him to seek it there ; better this than no centre at all. But the Gospel has taught us another lesson, to find our sufficiency in God : and thus 'self-sufficient,' which with the Greek was a word in honourable use, is not so with us. 'Self-sufficiency,' is not a quality which any man desires now to be attributed to him. We have a feeling about the word, which causes it to carry its own condemnation with it ; and its different uses, for honour once, for reproach now, do in fact ground themselves on the central differences of heathenism and Christianity.

Once more, we might safely conclude that a nation would not be likely tamely to submit to tyranny and wrong, which had made 'quarrel' out of 'querela.' The Latin word means properly 'complaint' \* and we have in 'querulous,

\* [So in the Prayer-Book version of the Psalms, "Stand

this its proper meaning coming distinctly out. Not so, however, in 'quarrel'; for Englishmen, being wont not merely to complain, but to set vigorously about righting and redressing themselves, their griefs being also grievances, out of this word, which might have given them only 'querulous' and 'querulousness,' they have gotten 'quarrel' as well.

On the other hand, we cannot wonder that Italy should have filled our Great Exhibition with beautiful specimens of her skill in the arts, with statues and sculptures of rare loveliness, but should only rivet her chains the more closely by the weak and ineffectual efforts which she makes to break them, when she can degrade the word 'virtuoso,' or 'the virtuous,' to signify one accomplished in painting, music, and sculpture, such things as are the ornamental fringe of a nation's life, but can never be made, without loss of all manliness of character, its main texture and woof—not to say that excellence in these fine arts has been in too many cases divorced from all true virtue and worth.\* The opposite exaggeration of the ancient Romans, who often made 'virtus' to signify warlike courage alone, as if for them all virtue were included in this one, was at all events more tolerable than this; for there is a sense in which a man's 'valour' *is* his value, is the measure of his worth; for what virtue can exist without courage,

up to judge my *quarrel* " (xxxv. 23), i.e. complaint, and Col. iii. 13.]

\* Let me remind the reader that all this was written long before the noble resurrection of Italy in the year 1859.

without manliness ?\* Or what can we conclude, when we find a word meaning 'sickly softness' (morbidezza) used as an expression of beauty ? Have we not here too sure a witness for the decay of moral strength and health, when these can not merely be disconnected from beauty, but implied to be in opposition to it ? How little, again, the modern Italians live in the spirit of their ancient worthies, or reverence the greatest among them, we may argue from the fact that they have been content to take the name of one among their noblest, and degrade it so far that every glib and loquacious hireling who shows strangers about their picture-galleries, palaces and ruins, is termed by them a 'Cicerone,' or a Cicero ! † So too the French use of the word 'honnêteté,' as external civility, marks a tendency to accept the shows and pleasant courtesies of social life in the room of deeper moral qualities.

Happily it is nearly impossible for us in England to understand the mingled scorn, hatred, fear, suspicion, contempt, which is associated with the word 'sbirri' in Italian. These 'sbirri' are the humble, but at the same time the acknowledged ministers of justice ; while yet everything which is mean and false and oppressive, which can make

\* Plutarch (*Coriol.* 1) has noticed this : that the Latin "virtus" had much more predominantly the sense of the Greek *ἀνδρεία* than *ἀρετή*.

† [This probably takes too seriously what is merely a humorous reference to the unnecessary eloquence of the guide, who for the same reason seems to be called a *Maron* by Coryat in his *Crudities*, 1611, with allusion to Vergilius Maro. Addison has *cicerone* in his *Essay on Medals*, i. 1725.]

justice hateful, is implied in the name which they bear. There is no surer sign of a bad oppressive government, than when the titles of the administrators of law, titles which should be in themselves so honourable, thus acquire a hateful undertone. What a world of oppressions, of frauds, of wrongs, must have found place, before the Greek word for tax-gatherer or exciseman could have been steeped in uttermost scorn, as it was ; while, on the other hand, however unwelcome the visits of the one or the interference of the other may be to us, yet the sense of the entire fairness and justice with which their dues are levied acquits these names to us of the slightest sense of dishonour. 'Police-man' has no evil subaudition, but the contrary, with us ; though in the last century, when our police was otherwise administered than now, 'catchpole,' in Wiclif's time quite an honourable word, had acquired one.\* So too, at the present day, if any accidental profits accrue to the Crown, they are levied so honourably, with such fairness and more than fairness to the subject, that, were not the thing already done, 'escheat' would never now yield 'cheat,' nor 'escheatour' give 'cheater' and then 'cheat,' as, through the extortions and unrighteousness of which these dues to the Crown were formerly an excuse, they in fact have done.

It is still worse, as marking that a still holier sanctuary than that of civil government has become profane and odious in men's sight, when words which express sacred functions and offices become redolent of scorn. How thankful we may

\* [He uses *catchepollis*, 1 Kings xix. 20, Deeds xvi. 35. See my *Folk and their Word-Lore*, p. 126.]

be that in England we have no word equivalent to the German 'Pfaffe,' which, the same as 'papa' and 'pope,' and meaning at first but a priest, yet now carries with it the insinuation of almost every unworthiness in the forms of servility and avarice which can render the priest's office and person base and contemptible.

How much may be learned by noting the words which nations have been obliged to borrow from other nations, as not having them of home-growth—this in most cases, if not in all, testifying that the thing itself was not native, was only an exotic, transplanted, like the word which indicated it, from a foreign soil. Thus it is singularly characteristic of the social and political life of England, as distinguished from that of the other European nations, that to it alone the word 'club' belongs; the French and German languages having been alike unable to grow a word of their own as its equivalent, being obliged both to borrow from us its designation. And no wonder; for these voluntary associations of men for the furthering of such social or political ends as are near to the hearts of the associates could have only had their rise under such favourable circumstances as ours. In no country where there was not extreme personal freedom could they have sprung up; and as little in any where men did not know how to use this freedom with moderation and self-restraint, could they long have been endured. It was comparatively easy to adopt the word; but the ill success of the 'club' itself everywhere save here where it is native, has shown that it was not so easy to transplant the thing. While we have lent this and other

words, mostly political, to the French and German, it would not be less instructive, were this a suitable opportunity, to trace our corresponding obligations to them.

And scarcely less significant than the presence of a word in a language, will be occasionally its entire absence. This too may read us sometimes a not unimportant lesson. How curious, for instance, are the conclusions which Cicero in his high Roman fashion draws from the absence of any word in the Greek corresponding to the Latin 'ineptus'; not from this concluding, as we might at first sight anticipate, that the character designated by the word was wanting, but rather that the fault was so common, so universal with the Greeks, that they failed to recognize it as a fault at all.\*

But it is time to bring this lecture to an end. These illustrations, to which it would not be hard to add many more, are ample enough to justify what I have asserted of the existence of a moral element in words; they are enough to make us feel about them, that they do not hold themselves neutral in the great conflict between good and evil,

\* *De Orat.* ii. 4. 7: "Quem enim nos ineptum vocamus is mihi videtur ab hoc nomen habere ductum, quod non sit aptus. Idque in sermonis nostri consuetudine perlate patet. Nam qui aut tempus quid postulet, non videt, aut plura loquitur, aut se ostentat, aut eorum quibuscum est, vel dignitatis vel commodi rationem non habet, aut denique in aliquo genere aut inconcinnus aut multus est, is ineptus esse dicitur. Hoc vitio cumlata est eruditissima illa Græcorum natio. Itaque quovim hujus mali Græci non vident, ne nomen quidem ei vitio imposuerunt. Ut enim quæras omnia, quomodo Græci ineptum appellent, non invenies."



light and darkness, which is dividing the world ; that they are not contented to be the passive vehicles, now of the truth and now of falsehood. We see, on the contrary, that they continually take their side, are some of them children of light, others children of this world, or even of darkness ; they beat with the pulses of our life ; they stir with our passions ; they receive from us the impressions of our good and of our evil, which again they are active further to propagate amongst us. Must we not own then that there is a wondrous and mysterious world, of which we may hitherto have taken too little account, around us and about us ? Is there not something very solemn and very awful in having such an instrument as this of language is, placed in our hands, which is so mighty to wound or to heal, to kill or to make alive ? and may there not be a deeper meaning than hitherto we have attached to it, lying in our Lord's declaration, " By thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned " ?

## IV

### ON THE HISTORY IN WORDS

It might at first sight appear as if language, apart, that is, from literature and books, and where these did not exist, would prove the frailest, the most untrustworthy, of all the vehicles of knowledge, and that most likely to betray its charge. So far, however, from this being the fact, it is the great, oftentimes the only, connecting link between the present and the remotest past, an ark riding above waterfloods that have swept away or submerged every other landmark and memorial of ages and generations of men. Far beyond all written records in a language, the language itself stretches back and offers itself for our investigation—"The pedigree of nations," as Johnson calls it—itself a far more ancient monument and document than any writing which employs it. These written records, moreover, may have been falsified by carelessness, by vanity, by fraud, by a multitude of causes ; but *it* is never false, never deceives us, if we know how to question it aright.

And this questioning of it will often lead to conclusions of extreme importance. Thus there have been those who have denied on one ground or another the accuracy of the Scripture statement that the whole earth was peopled from a single pair ; who have sought to prove that there must have been many beginnings, many centres of human population. In answer to these, the *physical* unity of the face of mankind has been triumphantly shown by Dr. Prichard and others : but all recent investigations plainly announce that a yet stronger evidence, and a moral argument

more convincing still, for the unity of mankind will ere long be forthcoming ; the proofs are daily accumulating of a tendency in all languages, however widely they may differ now, to refer themselves to the common stock and single fountain head. Of course *we* need not these proofs, who believe the fact, because it is written ; yet can we only rejoice at each new homage which Science pays to revealed Truth, being sure that at the last she will stand in her service altogether.

Such investigations as these, however, lie plainly out of your sphere. Not so, however, those humbler yet not less interesting inquiries, which by the aid of any tolerable dictionary you may carry on into the past history of your own land, as borne witness to by the present language of its people, on which language the marks and vestiges of great revolutions are visibly and profoundly impressed, never again to be obliterated from it. You know how the geologist is able from the different strata and deposits, primary, secondary, or tertiary, succeeding one another, which he meets, to arrive at the successive physical changes through which a region has passed ; is in a condition to preside at those changes, to measure the forces which were at work to produce them, and almost to indicate their date. Now with such a composite language as the English before us, we may carry on moral and historical researches precisely analogous to his. Here too are strata and deposits, not of gravel and chalk, sandstone and limestone, but of Celtic, Latin, Saxon, Danish, Norman, and then again Latin and French words, with slighter intrusions from other quarters : and any one with skill to

analyse the language might re-create for himself the history of the people speaking that language, might come to appreciate the divers elements out of which that people was composed, in what proportion these were mingled, and in what succession they followed one upon the other.

Take, for example, the relation in which the Saxon and Norman occupants of this land stood to one another. I doubt not that an account of this, in the main as accurate as it would be certainly instructive, might be drawn from an intelligent study of the contributions which they have severally made to the English language, as bequeathed to us jointly by them both. Supposing all other records to have perished, who might still work out and almost reconstitute the history by these aids ; even as now, when so many documents, so many institutions survive, this must still be accounted the most important, and that of which the study will introduce us, as no other can, into the innermost heart and life of great periods of our history.

Nor indeed is it hard to see why the language must contain such instruction as this, when we a little realize to ourselves the stages by which it has come down to us in its present shape. There was a time when the languages which the Saxon and the Norman severally spoke, existed each by the side of, but unmingled with, the other ; one, that of the small dominant class, the other that of the great body of the people. By degrees, however, with the fusion of the two races, the two languages also fused into a third ; or rather one prevailed over the other, but only prevailed by

receiving a multitude of the words of that other into its own bosom. At once there would exist duplicates for many things. But as in popular speech two words will not long exist side by side to designate the same thing, it became a question how the relative claims of the Saxon and Norman word should adjust themselves, which should remain, which should be dropped; or, if not dropped, should be transferred to some other object, or express some other relation. It is not of course meant that this was ever formally proposed, or as something to be settled by agreement; but practically one was to be taken, one left. Which was it that should maintain its ground? Evidently, where a word was often on the lips of one race, its equivalent seldom on those of the other, where it intimately cohered with the manner of life of one, was only remotely in contact with that of the other, where it laid strong hold on one, and only slight on the other, the issue could not be doubtful. In several cases the matter was simpler still: it was not that one word expelled the other, or that rival claims had to be adjusted; but that there never had existed more than one word, the thing having been quite strange to the other section of the nation.

Here is the explanation of the assertion made just now—namely, that we might almost reconstruct our history, so far as it turned upon the Norman Conquest, by an analysis of our present language, a mustering of its words in groups, and a close observation of the nature and character of those which the two races have severally contributed to it. Thus we should confidently conclude that

the Norman was the ruling race, from the noticeable fact that all the words of dignity, state, honour, and pre-eminence, with one remarkable exception, (to be adduced presently,) descend to us from them—'sovereign,' 'sceptre,' 'throne,' 'realm,' 'royalty,' 'homage,' 'prince,' 'duke,' 'count,' ('earl' indeed is Scandinavian, though he must borrow his 'countess' from the Norman,) 'chancellor,' 'treasurer,' 'palace,' 'castle,' 'hall,' 'dome,' and a multitude more. At the same time the one remarkable exception of 'king' would make us, even did we know nothing of the actual facts, suspect that the chieftain of this ruling race came in not upon a new title, not as overthrowing a former dynasty, but claiming to be in the rightful line of its succession; that the true continuity of the nation had not, in fact any more than in word, been entirely broken, but survived, in due time to assert itself anew.

And yet, while the statelier superstructure of the language, almost all articles of luxury, all that has to do with the chase, with chivalry, with personal adornment, is Norman throughout; with the broad basis of the language, and therefore of the life, it is otherwise. The great features of nature, sun, moon, and stars, earth, water, and fire, all the prime social relations, father, mother, husband, wife, son, daughter, these are Saxon. 'Palace' and 'castle' may have come to us from the Norman, but to the Saxon we owe far dearer names, the 'house,' the 'roof,' the 'home,' the 'hearth.' His 'board' too, and often probably it was no more, has a more hospitable sound than the 'table' of his lord. His sturdy arms turn the

soil ; he is the ' boor,' the ' hind,' the ' churl ' ; or if his Norman master has a name for him, it is one which on his lips becomes more and more a title of opprobrium and contempt, the ' villain.' The instruments used in cultivating the earth, the flail, the plough, the sickle, the spade, are expressed in his language ;\* so too the main products of the earth, as wheat, rye, oats, bere ; and no less the names of domestic animals. Concerning these last it is curious to observe (and it may be remembered that Wamba, the Saxon jester in *Ivanhoe*, plays the philologist here),† that the names of almost all animals so long as they are alive, are thus Saxon, but when dressed and prepared for food become Norman—a fact, indeed, which we might have expected beforehand ; for the Saxon hind had the charge and labour of tending and feeding them, but only that they might appear on the table of his Norman lord. Thus ' ox,' ' steer,' ' cow,' are Saxon, but ' beef ' Norman ; ' calf ' is Saxon, but ' veal ' Norman ; ' sheep ' is Saxon, but ' mutton ' Norman ; so it is severally with

\* [The words here are not very happily chosen, ' flail ' being from the Old Fr. *fiæl*, Lat. *flagellum* ; and both *spade* and *sickle* are ultimately of Latin origin (*spatha* and *secula*), though found in the oldest English.]

† Wallis, in his *Grammar*, p. 20, had done so before. [And similarly Fuller, " I know not whether his observation, with the reason thereof, be worth the insertion who first took notice that our cattle for food are English when feeding in the field, but French when fed on in a family. Whereof he assigned this reason, that after the Norman Conquest the French so tyrannized over the English tenants that they forced them to keep and feed their cattle ; but the Monsieurs eat all their good meat after it was slaughtered."—*Worthies of England*, 1662 (i. 134, ed. 1811).]

'swine' and 'pork,' 'deer' and 'venison,' 'fowl' and 'pullet.' 'Bacon,' the only flesh which perhaps ever came within his reach, is the single exception.\*

Putting all this together, with much more of the same kind, which might be produced, but has only been indicated here, we should certainly gather, that while there are manifest tokens, as preserved in our language, of the Saxon having been for a season an inferior and even an oppressed race, the staple elements of Anglo-Saxon life, however overlaid for a while, had still made good their claim to be the solid groundwork of the after nation as of the after language; and to the justice of this conclusion all other historic records, and the present social condition of England, consent in bearing testimony.

What I have here supposed might be done in the way of reproducing the past history of England, had all records of her earlier times, and of the great social changes of those times, been entirely swept away, this has been done for the earlier history of Italy, of which the written memorials *have* thus perished, by the great modern historian of Rome. He draws most important conclusions respecting the races which occupied the Italian soil, and the relations in which they stood to one another, from an analysis of the words which in the Latin language are derived severally from a Greek and from other sources. "It can-

\* [Fuller more correctly, on the passage just cited, gives 'bacon' as the Frenih word correlative to the English 'hog.' It is the Old Fr. *bacon*, Low Lat. *bacon-em*, originally the cured 'back' of the pig.]



not," he says, "be mere chance that the words for house, field, plough, ploughing, wine, oil, milk, kine, swine, and others relating to tillage and gentler ways of life, agree in Latin and in Greek, while all objects appertaining to war or the chase are designated by words utterly un-Grecian."\* From hence he draws the conclusion that this un-Grecian population, which has bequeathed these latter words, stood toward the Grecian very much in the same relation which we have seen the Norman, as declared by the consenting witness of history and language, to have occupied in respect of the Saxon.

Thus far our lesson has been derived from a noting of the relative proportions in which the words of one stock and of another are mingled in a language, with the domains of human activity to which these severally appertain. But this is not all; there are vast harvests of historic lore garnered often in single words; there are continually great facts of history which they at once declare and preserve; facts which sometimes have survived nowhere else but in them. Thus consider how much of history lies in the word 'Church. There can, I think, be no reasonable doubt that 'Church' is originally from the Greek *κυριακή*, and signifies, "that which pertains to the Lord," or "the house which is the Lord's." But here a difficulty meets us. How explain the presence

\* There is a far profounder evoking by aid of language of a history quite beyond our ken in Mommsen's *Römische Geschichte*, b. i. c. 2—a book of deepest interest, and which ought not to remain untranslated. [It was translated by Rev. W. P. Dickson in 1861.]

of a Greek word in the vocabulary of our Anglo-Saxon forefathers? for that *we* derive the word mediately from them, and not immediately from the Greek, is certain. What contact, direct or indirect, was there between the languages to account for this? The explanation is curious. While the Anglo-Saxons and other tribes of the Teutonic stock were *almost* universally converted through contact with the Latin Church in the western provinces of the Roman Empire, or by its missionaries, yet it came to pass that before this, some of the Goths on the lower Danube had been brought to the knowledge of Christ by Greek missionaries from Constantinople; and this word *κυριακή* or 'Church' did, with certain others, pass over from the Greek to the Gothic tongue; and these Goths, the first converted to the Christian faith, the first therefore that had a Christian vocabulary, lent the word in their turn to the other German tribes, among others to our Anglo-Saxon forefathers; thus it has come round by the Goths from Constantinople to us.\*

\* The passage most illustrative of the parentage of the word is from Walafrid Strabo (about A.D. 840), who writes thus: "Ab ipsis autem Græcis Kyrch à Kyrios, et alia multa accepimus. Sicut domus Dei Basilica, i.e. Regia à Rege, sic etiam Kyrica, i.e. Dominica, à Domino, nuncupatur. Si autem quæritur, quâ occasione ad nos vestigia hæc græcitatibus advenerint, dicendum præcipuè à Gothis, qui et Getæ, cùm eo tempore, quo ad fidem Christi perducti sunt, in Græcorum provinciis commorantes, nostrum, i.e. theotiscum sermonem habuerint." Cf. Rudolf von Raumer, *Einwirkung des Christenthums auf die Althochdeutsche Sprache*, p. 288.

[But, as a matter of fact, no derivative of *Kuriakē* (or better, *Kuriakon*, "the Lord's house"), such as *Kyreika*, or *Kyrjakō*, is found in Gothic, where the word

Or again, examine the words 'pagan' and 'paganism,' and you will find that there is history in them. Many of us, no doubt, are aware that 'pagani,' derived from 'pagus,' a village, signifies properly the dwellers in hamlets and villages, as distinguished from the inhabitants of towns and cities ;\* and the word was so used, and without any religious significance, in the earlier periods of the Latin language. 'Pagani' did indeed then not unfrequently designate *all* civilians, as contradistinguished from the military caste ; and this fact may not have been without a certain influence, when the idea of the faithful as soldiers of Christ was strongly realized in the minds of men. But how mainly was it that it came first to be employed as equivalent to 'heathen,' and applied to those yet alien from the faith of Christ ? It was thus. The Christian Church fixed itself first in the seats and centres of intelligence, in the towns and cities of the Roman Empire, and in them its first triumphs were won ; while, long after these had accepted the truth, heathen superstitions and idolatries lingered on in the obscure hamlets and villages of the country ; so that 'pagans,' or villagers, came to be applied to *all* the remaining votaries of the old and decaying superstitions,

for church is *ai khhlēsjo*, derived from Greek *ekhlēsia*. The former Greek word was probably assimilated by the West Germans of the fourth century. See a very long, learned, and elaborate note by Dr. Murray in *N. E. D.*].

\* [Orosius says, "Alieni a civitate Dei ex locorum agrestium compitis et pagis 'pagani' vocantur sive gentiles" (Migne, xxxi. 3). Similarly Arab. *Kafir*, an infidel, is connected by some with *Kafir* (*Kejir*), a village (Burton and Drake, *Unexplored Syria*, i. 170).]

inasmuch as far the greater number of them were of this class. The first document in which the word appears in this its secondary sense is an edict of the Emperor Valentinian, of date A.D. 368. The word 'heathen' acquired its meaning from exactly the same fact, namely, that at the introduction of Christianity into Germany, the wild dwellers on the 'heaths' longest resisted the truth. Here, then, are two instructive notices for us—first, the historic fact that the Church of Christ did thus plant itself first in the haunts of learning and intelligence; and then the more important moral fact, that it shunned not discussion, that it feared not to grapple with the wit and wisdom of this world, or to expose its claims to the searching examination of educated men; but, on the contrary, had its claims first recognized by them, and in the great cities of the world won first a complete triumph over all the opposing powers.\*

I quoted in my first lecture the words of one, who, magnifying the advantage of following up the history of words, observed that oftentimes more would be learned from this than from the history of a campaign. There are many words, 'sophist,' 'barbarous,' 'clerk,' 'romance,' 'sacrament,' 'benefice,' for example, on any of which we might prove the truth of this assertion. Let us take 'sacrament,' and see whether its history, while it carries us far, yet will not carry us by

\* There is a good note on "pagan" in Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, c. 21, at the end; and in Grimm's *Deutsche Mythol.*, p. 1198; and the history of the changes in the word's use is traced in another interest in Mill's *Logic*, vol. ii. p. 271.

ways full of instruction ; and this, while we confine ourselves strictly to the word's history, not needlessly mixing ourselves with discussions in regard of the thing, or of its place and importance in the Christian scheme. We shall find ourselves first among the forms of Roman law, where the ' *sacramentum* ' first appears as the deposit or pledge, which in certain suits plaintiff and defendant were alike obliged to make, and whereby they engaged themselves to one another, the loser of the suit forfeiting his pledge to sacred temple uses, from which fact the name ' *sacramentum*,' or thing consecrated, was first derived. The next employment of the word would plant us amidst the military affairs of Rome, ' *sacramentum* ' being applied to the military oath with which the Roman soldiers mutually engaged themselves at their first enlisting never to desert their standards, or turn their back upon the enemy, or abandon their *imperator*—this use of the word teaching us the sacredness which the Romans attached to their military engagements, and going far to explain to us their victories. The word was then transferred from this military oath to any solemn oath whatsoever.

This, which has hitherto been traced, we may call the history of the word, anterior to the period when it was assumed into Christian usage at all, and these three stages it had already passed through, before the Church claimed it for her own, before indeed she had herself come into existence. Her early writers, out of a sense of the sacredness and solemnity of the oath among all human transactions, first used the word to signify

any sacred transaction whatsoever that had some special solemnity or sanctity attached to it, and especially any mystery where more was meant than met the eye or the ear. Thus in the early Church writers the Incarnation is a 'sacrament,' the lifting up of the brazen serpent is a 'sacrament,' the giving of the manna, and many things more. This period of the world's history it is very expedient that we be aware of, and acquainted with it; for thus all force is taken away from the passages quoted by Romish controversialists in proof of their seven sacraments. It is quite true that the early Church writers did entitle marriage, and supreme unction, and the others which they have added, 'sacraments,' but then they called 'sacraments,' or mysteries, many things more, which even the theologians of Rome themselves do not pretend to include in the 'sacraments' properly so called; so that the evidence here is unfortunately too good; proving too much, it proves nothing. But there is another stage in the word's history, and that stage the one which concerns us the most nearly of all, its limitation to the two 'sacraments,' properly so called, of the Christian Church. The remembrance of the use of 'sacrament,' a use which had not passed away, to signify the plighted troth of the Roman soldier to his *imperator*, was that, I think, which specially wrought to the adaptation of the word to Baptism; wherein we also, with more than one allusion to this oath of theirs, pledge ourselves "to fight manfully under Christ's banner, and to continue his faithful soldiers and servants to our life's end"; while the *mysterious* character of the Holy Eucharist was,

I believe, its especial point of fitness for having this name of 'sacrament' applied to it.

The word 'universitas' belongs to the best times of classical Latin ; but the use of it in our modern sense of an university does not date farther back than the beginning of the thirteenth century. Its coming up at any time would have been remarkable ; its coming up exactly at that time is eminently so. It was a token of much—and chiefly of the sense which now possessed men of an inner bond and connexion between all branches of human learning and knowledge ; they mutually completed one another ; they should not be taught apart from, and without recognition of, each other. There was such a thing as a *studium universale*, an *universitas litterarum*. And that the first, as well as the most famous, of these universities should have been at Paris, the great seat of theological learning, contains a signal evidence that in theology was, and was felt to be, the connecting link between them all.

I have already sought to find history embedded in the word 'frank' ; but I must bring forward the Franks again, and ask you to consider whether the well-known fact that in the East not Frenchmen alone, but *all* Europeans, are so called, does not require to be accounted for ? It can be so, and this wide usage of the word is indeed a deep foot-print of the past. This appellation dates from the Crusades, and Michaud, the chief French historian of these, with justice finds herein an evidence that his countrymen took a decided lead, as their gallantry well fitted them to do, in these great romantic enterprises of the middle ages ;

impressing themselves so strongly on the mind and imagination of the East as *the* crusading nation of Europe, that their name was extended to *all* the warriors of Christendom. And considering how large a proportion of the noblest Crusaders, as of others most influential in bringing these enterprises about, as Peter the Hermit, Pope Urban the Second, St. Bernard, were French, it must be allowed that the actual facts bear him out in his assertion.\*

To the Crusades also probably, and to the intense hatred which they roused throughout Christendom against the Mahometan infidels, we owe 'miscreant,' in its present sense of one to whom we would attribute the vilest principles and practices. The word meant at the first simply a 'misbeliever,' and would have been applied as freely, and with as little sense of injustice, to the royal-hearted Saladin as to the most infamous wretch that fought in his armies. By degrees, however, those who employed it tinged it more and more with their feeling and passion, more and more lost sight of its primary use, until they would apply it to any whom they regarded with feelings of abhorrence resembling those which they entertained for an infidel; just as 'Samaritan' was often employed by the Jews purely as a term of reproach, and with no thought whether the person on whom it was fastened was really sprung from the mongrel people or not; indeed where they were quite sure that he was not. 'Assassin' also, the explanation of which we must be content to

\* See Fuller's *Holy War*, b. i. c. 13.



leave, belongs probably to a romantic chapter in the history of the Crusades.\*

Various explanations of 'Cardinal' have been proposed; it has been sought, that is, in various ways to account for the appropriation of this name to the parochial clergy of the city of Rome with the subordinate bishops of that diocese. I believe this application is an outgrowth, and itself a standing testimony, of the measureless assumptions of the Roman See. One of the favourite comparisons by which that See was used to set out its relation of superiority to all other Churches of Christendom was this; it was the 'hinge' or 'cardo' on which all the rest of the Church, as the door, at once depended and turned. It followed presently upon this that the clergy of Rome were 'cardinales,' as nearest to, and most closely connected with, him who was thus the 'hinge' or 'cardo' of all.†

There is a little word not in uncommon use among us, an inquiry into the pedigree of which will lay open to us an important page in the intel-

\* Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, c. 64.

[The Arabic *hashshāshīn*, Moslem fanatics who intoxicated themselves with *hashish*, or hemp. See Yule, *Marco Polo*, i. 132; Conder, *Syrian Stone-Lore*, 420-423; Spelman, *Glossarium*, s.v.]

† Thus a letter, professing to be of Pope Anacletus the First in the first century, but really forged in the ninth: "Apostolica Sedes *cardo* et caput omnium Ecclesiarum à Domino est constituta; et sicut *cardine* ostium regitur, sic hujus S. Sedis auctoritate omnes Ecclesiæ reguntur." And we have "cardinal" put in relation with this "*cardo*" in a genuine letter of Pope Leo the Ninth: "Clerici summæ Sedis *Cardinales* dicuntur, *cardini* utique illi quo cætera moventur, vicinius adherentes."

lectual history of Europe. We may all know what a 'dunce' is, but we may not be as well acquainted with the quarter from whence the word has been derived. Certain theologians in the middle ages were termed Schoolmen; being so called because they were formed in the cloister or cathedral *schools* which Charlemagne and his immediate successors had founded—men not to be lightly spoken of, as they often are by those who never read a line of their works, and have not a tithe of their wit; who moreover little guess how many of the most familiar words which they employ, or misemploy, have descended to them from these. 'Real,' 'virtual,' 'entity,' 'non-entity,' 'equivocation,' all these, with many more unknown to classical Latin, but which now have become almost necessities, were first coined by the Schoolmen; and, passing over from them into the speech of those more or less interested in their speculations, have gradually filtered through the successive strata of society, till now they have reached, some of them, to quite the lowest. At the revival of learning, however, their works fell out of favour: they were not written in classical Latin: the form in which their speculations were thrown was often unattractive; it was mainly in their authority that the Romish Church found support for its perilled dogmas: on all which accounts, it was considered a mark of intellectual progress and advance to have broken with them and altogether thrown off their yoke. Some, however, still clung to these Schoolmen, and to one in particular, *Duns Scotus*, the great teacher of the Franciscan Order; and many times an adherent of the old learning would seek to strengthen

his position by an appeal to its great doctor, familiarly called Duns ; while the others would contemptuously rejoin, " Oh, you are a *Dunsman*," or more briefly, " You are a *Duns*"—or, " This is a piece of *dunser* " ; \* and inasmuch as the new learning was ever enlisting more and more of the genius and scholarship of the age on its side, the title became more and more a term of scorn : " Remember ye not," says Tyndal, " how within this thirty years and far less, the old barking curs, *Dunce's* disciples, and like draff called Scotists, the children of darkness, raged in every pulpit against Greek, Latin, and Hebrew ? " And thus from that long extinct conflict between the old and the new learning, that strife between the mediaeval and the modern theology, we inherit the words ' dunce ' and ' duncery. ' Let us pause here for a moment to confess that the lot of poor Duns was certainly a hard one, who, whatever may have been his merits as a teacher of Christian truth, was certainly one of the keenest and most subtle-witted of men. He, the " subtle Doctor " by pre-eminence, for so his admirers called him, " the wittiest of the school divines," as Hooker declares him, could hardly have anticipated, and as little as any man deserved, that his name should be turned into a by-word expressive of stupidity and obstinate dullness.

This, however, is only one example of the curious fortune of words. We have another singular example of the same, and of a parallel injustice, in

\* [Similarly in Italian " Scotista, a follower of Scotus, as we say a Dunce."—Florio, *New World of Words*, 1611.]

the way in which the word 'mammetry,' which is a contraction of 'Mahometry,' is employed by our early English writers. Mahometanism being the most prominent form of false religion with which Englishmen were acquainted, this word was used up to and beyond the Reformation, to designate first any false religion, and then the worship of idols; idolatry being proper to, and a leading feature of, most false religions. Men did not pause to remember that Mahometanism is the great exception, its most characteristic feature and glory being its protest against all idol-worship whatsoever; which being so, the injustice was signal in calling an idol 'a mammet' or a Mahomet and idolatry 'mammetry.\*' To pursue the fortunes of the word a little further, another step caused not religious images only, but dolls, to be called 'mammets'; and when in *Romeo and Juliet* Capulet contemptuously styles his daughter "a whining *mammet*," the process is strange, yet every step of it may be easily followed, whereby the name of the Arabian false prophet is fastened on the fair maiden of Verona.

Let me take occasion from this misnomer to make one or two observations on the importance

\* [Compare a passage in Selden's *Table-Talk* (1689): "They call'd Images Mammets, and the Adoration of Images Mammetry; that is, *Mahomet* and *Mahometry*: odious names, when all the world knows the *Turks* are forbidden Images by their Religion" (p. 88, ed. Arber). At the same time *mammet*, a puppet or doll, would be likely as an independent formation from the infantile utterance 'mammam,' as in Swiss *mämmi*, a doll (cf. *Rom. and Jul.* iii. 5, 185; 1 *Hen. IV*, ii. 3, 95). In the form of *mammet* or *mommel*, a puppet or 'guy,' it is in use in the dialects all over England.]

of giving *right* names. We have seen this already in regions of our moral life ; but in other regions also it nearly concerns us. Words exercising so great an influence as they do, resuming the past, moulding the future, how very important it needs must be, that, in naming any significant fact or tendency in the world's history, we should give it its right name ; since it is a corrupting of the very springs and sources of knowledge, when we bind up not a truth, but an error, in the very designations which we employ. It is impossible to measure the extent or depth of the impression which words of this kind by the frequency of their repetition may exert ; what a continual hindrance they may cause to the right apprehension of the thing which has thus been wrongly noted.

Out of a sense of this, an eminent German scholar of the last century, who wrote a book *On the Influence of Opinions on Words*, did not stop here, nor make this the entire title of his book, but completed its designation with another and further clause—and on the Influence of Words on Opinions ;\* the matter which fulfils the promise of this latter half of the title of his work constituting, as may easily be supposed, by far the most interesting and original portion of its contents : for while the assertion of the influence of opinions on words sounds almost like a truism, or at least would be called in question by none, this, on the contrary, of words on opinions, would doubtless present itself at first as a novelty to many. Yet it is, as I have

\* *Von der Einfluss der Meinungen in die Sprache, und der Sprache in die Meinungen*, von J. D. Michaelis. Berlin, 1760.

said, an influence which has been powerfully felt in every region of human knowledge, in science, in art, in morals, in theology ; the reactive energy of words, not merely on the passions of men (for that of course), but on their calmly formed opinions, constituting a very curious chapter in the history of human knowledge and human ignorance.

Sometimes with no fault of theirs, for they did not originally bind up any error, they will yet draw some error in their train, of which error they will afterwards prove the most effectual shield. Let me instance—the author to whom I have just referred himself supplies the example—the word ‘ crystal.’ The strange and erroneous notion current among the natural philosophers of antiquity and of modern times down to a rather late day, concerning the origin of the *thing*, was plainly traceable to a confusion occasioned by the *name*. It was currently taught by them, that crystal was ice which had undergone a peculiar process of induration, so as totally and for ever to have lost its fluidity ; and Pliny, backing up one error by another, affirms that it is only found in countries of extreme cold. Only two hundred years ago this notion about the formation of crystal still survived ; for Sir Thomas Browne counts it worth his while to bring it forward, indeed places it first and foremost among the “ Vulgar Errors ” which he seeks to dissipate. It is not hard to perceive how the error arose ; the Greek word κρύσταλλος, crystal, which at first had signified ice, was very early transferred to that which bore so great a resemblance to ice as does the diaphanous quartz to which alone *we* give the name of crystal ; and

then in a little while it was tacitly assumed, that the two, having the same name, were in fact the same substance, a belief which it took ages to correct.

Take again the word 'leopard.' Here, indeed, a piece of natural history erroneous from the first is permanently bound up in the word, and the error having first given birth to the name, was afterwards itself maintained and propagated by it. The leopard, as is well known, was not for the Greek and Latin zoologists a species by itself, but a mongrel birth of the male panther or pard, and the lioness; and in its name 'leopard' or 'lion-pard,' this its assumed double descent is expressed.\* The word 'cockatrice' in like manner embodies a fable.†

'Gothic' again is plainly a misnomer, and has often I doubt not also been a misleader, when applied to a style of architecture which belongs not to one, but to all the Germanic tribes, and which moreover did not come into existence till many centuries after any people bearing the name of Goths had ceased from the earth. It was not, indeed, intended by those who first gave to this style of architecture the title of Gothic, herein to ascribe to the Goths the first invention of it, however the term seems now to bind up in itself such

\* This error lasted into modern times; thus Fuller (*A Pisgah Sight of Palestine*, vol. i. p. 195): "Leopards and mules are properly no creatures."

† [Viz. the fable that this fabulous creature was hatched by a cock from the egg of an *atter* or viper, which was popularly evolved from the Old Eng. *cocatryse*, itself derived through Old Fr. *cocatrix*, *caucatrix* from a Latin *calcatriv*. See *N.E.D.*]

an error. 'Gothic,' applied to northern mediaeval architecture, was at first a mere random name of contempt—the Goths, with the Vandals, being the standing representatives of anything rude in manners and barbarous in taste; and thus those who desired to throw scorn on this architecture in comparison with the classical Italian, which alone seemed to them worthy of admiration,\* called it 'Gothic,' which was merely for them equivalent to barbarous. We, who have learned to admire this Gothic, as the most wondrous and consummate birth of human genius in this region of art, find it hard to believe that this was a mere designation of scorn at the first, and might be easily tempted to conclude that there was here some indication of the people among whom first it arose; and many no doubt are thus led astray.

'Classical' and 'romantic,' names given to different schools of literature and art, contain an absurd antithesis; and either say nothing at all, or say something erroneous. 'Revival of Learning' is a phrase only partially true when applied to the intellectual movement in Western Europe at the close of the fifteenth century. A revival there might have been, and indeed there was, of *Greek* learning at that time; but there could not be then affirmed a revival of Latin learning, inasmuch as it had never been dead; or, if it had, still had

\* Indeed the name, as the designation of a style of architecture, probably came to us from Italy. Thus Fuller in his *Worthies*: "Let the Italians deride our English, and condemn them for *Gothish* buildings." See too a very curious expression of men's sentiments about Gothic architecture as simply barbarous, in Phillips's *New World of Words*, 1706, s.v. "Gothick."



revived very long before. 'Renaissance,' a word in like manner applied in France to the new direction which art took about the age of Francis the First, is a question-begging word. There are very many who would entirely deny that the bringing back of antique pagan forms into Christian art was a 'new birth' of it at all.

But inaccuracy of naming may draw after it more serious mischief in more important regions of man's knowledge. Nowhere perhaps is accuracy in this matter more vital than in words having reference to, and designating, religious truths; for such words, as Coleridge has well observed, are never inert, but constantly exercise an immense reactive influence on those who employ them, even as they diffuse around them an atmosphere, which those who often hear them used unconsciously inhale. The so-called Unitarians, when they claim by their name to be asserters of the Unity of the Godhead, claim that which belongs to us by quite as good a right as to them, nay, by much better; for belonging of fullest right to us, it does not properly belong to them at all. I should, therefore, without any intention of offence, refuse the name to them; just as in like manner and upon similar grounds to call the Romanists 'Catholic' seems to me, and has always seemed to many, a giving up of the whole question at issue between them and us. For the same reasons I can never understand how some of them are content, even for convenience sake, to call the great religious movement of Europe in the sixteenth century the 'Reformation.' To us it is so, in the deepest, truest sense of the word—a reform-

ing of things that were amiss in the Church. But how they, who believe it to have been a disastrous, and, on the part of those who brought it about, a most guilty schism, can call it by this name, has often surprised me.

Having dedicated this lecture to the history which is in words, I can have no fitter opportunity of urging upon you the importance of seeking in every case to acquaint yourselves with the circumstances under which any body of men, that have played an important part in history, especially in the history of your own land, obtained the name by which they were afterwards willing to be known, or which was used for their designation by others. This you may do as a matter of historical inquiry, and keeping entirely aloof in spirit from the scorn, the bitterness, the falsehood, the calumny, out of which very often this name was first imposed. Whatever of this evil may have been at work in them that coined, or gave currency to, the name, the name itself can never without serious loss be neglected by those who would truly understand the moral significance of the thing ; there is always something, often very much, to be learned from it. Learn, then, in regard of each one of these names which you may meet in your studies, whether it was one which men gave to themselves ; or one imposed on them by others, and which they never recognized ; or one which being first imposed by others, was yet in course of time admitted and accepted by themselves. We have examples in all these kinds. Thus the ' Gnostics ' called *themselves* such ; the name was of their own devising, and

one in which they boasted : in like manner the 'Cavaliers' of our Civil War. 'Quaker,' 'Puritan,' 'Roundhead,' were all, on the contrary, names devised by others, and never accepted by those to whom they were attached; while 'Whig' and 'Tory' were nicknames originally of bitterest scorn and party hate, given by two political bodies in England to one another,\* which, however, in course of years lost what was offensive in them, until they came to be accepted and employed by the very parties themselves. The German 'Lutherans' were first so called by their antagonists.† The same we may say of Methodists. This name was certainly not first taken by the followers of Wesley, but imposed on them by others, while yet they have been subsequently willing to accept and to be known by it. 'Capuchin' was in like manner a jesting name, first given by the boys in the streets to that branch of the Franciscans which afterwards accepted the name as their proper designation. It was provoked by the peaked and pointed hood (capucho) which they wore.

Now of these titles, and of many more that might be adduced, some undoubtedly, like the last, had their rise in mere external accident, and stand in no essential connexion with those that bear them; and these names, although seldom without their instruction, yet plainly are not so instructive as others, in which the innermost heart of a sys-

\* In North's *Examen*, p. 321, is a very lively, though not a very impartial, account of the rise of these names.

† Dr. Eck, one of the earliest who wrote against the Reformation, it was who first called the followers of Luther, *Lutherani*.

tem speaks out and reveals itself, so that, having mastered the name, we have placed ourselves at the central point, from which we shall best master everything besides. Thus, for instance, is it with 'Gnosticism' and 'Gnostic'; in the prominence given to *gnosis*, or knowledge, as opposed to faith, lies the key to the whole system. And I may say generally that almost all the sects and parties, religious and political, which have risen up in times past in England, are known by names that will repay study; by names, to understand which will bring us far to an understanding of their strength and their weakness, their truth and their error, the idea and intention according to which they wrought. 'Puritans,' 'Fifth-Monarchy Men,' 'Seekers,' 'Levellers,' 'Independents,' 'Friends,' 'Rationalists,' 'Latitudinarians,' 'Freethinkers,' these titles, with many more, have each its significance; and would you understand what the men themselves meant, you must first understand what they were called. From this must be your point of starting, even as to this you must bring back whatever further information you may gain; and, though I will not say that you must always subordinate it to the name, yet must you ever put it in relation and connexion with that.

You will often be able to glean knowledge from the names of things, if not as important as that I have just been speaking of, yet curious and interesting. What a record of inventions is preserved in the names which so many articles bear, of the place from which they first came, or the person by whom they were first invented. The 'magnet' has its name from Magnesia; the 'baldachin' from

'Baldacco,' the Italian name of Bagdad; it being from that city that the costly silk which composed this canopy originally came. The 'bayonet' tells us that it was first made at Bayonne—'worsted' that it was first spun at a village of the same name (in the neighbourhood of Norwich)—'sarsnet' that it is a Saracen manufacture—'cambrics' that they reached us from Cambray—'crape' from Cyprus (the earlier form of the word is 'cypres')\*—'copper' also that it drew its name from this same island, so richly furnished with mines of this metal—'diaper' that it came from Ypres—'damask' from Damascus (the 'damson' also is the 'damascene' or Damascus plum)—'arras' from Arras—'dimity' from Damietta†—'cordwain' or 'cordovan' from Cordova—'currants' from Corinth—'delf' from Delft—'indigo' (indicum) from India—'agates' from a Sicilian river, Achates—'jalap' from Xalapa, a town in Mexico—'parchment' from Pergamum—the 'bezant,' so often named in our early literature, from Byzantium, being a Byzantine coin—the 'guinea,' that it was originally coined (in 1663) of gold brought from the African

\* [On the contrary, *cypres*, *cipres* ("cyprus black as e'er was crow."—*Winter's Tale*, iv. 3) is probably a corrupt form of *crypse*, *cryspe*, or *cripse*, *crispe*, Old Fr. *crespe* (now *crêpe*), the crisp fabric, from Lat. *crispus*. See *Folk-Etymology*, 1882, p. 91; Skeat, *Notes on Etymology*, 1901, p. 37.]

† [Dimity, originally spelt *dimite*, has all the appearance of being derived from Pers. *dimyāti*, the fabric manufactured at Dimyāt, i.e. Damietta. It is probably, however, from the late Latin *dimitum*, which is the Greek *di-miton*, "two-thread" stuff, like *tri-mita*, "three-thread," and *samite* from Lat. *examitum*, Greek *hexamiton*, "six-thread."]

coast so called—'camlet,' that it was woven, at least in part, of camel's hair.\* The fashion of the cravat was borrowed from the Croats, or 'Crabats' as they used in the seventeenth century to be called. The 'biggen,' a plain cap often mentioned by our early writers, was first worn by the Beguines, communities of pietist women in the middle ages, and had its name from them. Such has been the manufacturing progress of England that we now send our calicoes and muslins to India and the East; yet the words give standing witness that we once imported them from thence; for 'calico' is from Calicut, and 'muslin' from Moussul, a city in Asiatic Turkey. 'Ermine' is the spoil of the Armenian rat; 'Sherry' or 'Sherris,' as Shakespeare wrote it, is sent us from Xeres; the 'pheasant' came to us from the banks of the Phasis; the 'cherry' was brought by Lucullus from Cerasus, a city in Pontus; the 'peach' declares itself by its name to be a Persian fruit; 'spaniels' are from Spain.†

It is true, indeed, that occasionally a name will embody and give permanence to an error; as when in 'America' the honour of discovering the New World, which belonged to Columbus, has been transferred to another eminent discoverer,‡ but one who had no title to this praise, and who, as Hum-

\* [This is doubtful. It is probably from the Arabic *Khamlat*, a kind of plush (Yule, Skeat, and Murray.)]

† [O. Fr. *espagneul*=Lat. *Hispaniolus*.]

‡ [Americo Vespucci, first so attributed in M. Walzmüller, *Cosmographiæ Introductio*, 1508, fol. 15, verso (Latin), where it is asked, "Who could justly object to its being called after its discoverer Americo, either Amerige, as if Americo's land, or America?" See E. J. Payne, *History of the New World*, vol. i. p. 192.]

boldt has lately abundantly shown, was entirely guiltless of any attempt to usurp it for himself. So too the 'turkey' in our farm-yards seems to claim Turkey for its home; and the assumption that it was from thence no doubt caused it to be so called; while, indeed, it was unknown in Europe until introduced from the New World, where alone it is indigenous. This error the French in another shape repeat, calling it 'dinde,' originally 'poulet *d'Inde*,' or Indian fowl. In like manner 'gypsies' appears to imply that Egypt was the country to which these wanderers originally belonged, and from which they had migrated westward; and certainly it was so believed in many parts of Europe at their first appearance in the beginning of the fifteenth century, and hence this title.\* It is now, however, clearly made out, their language leaving no doubt of the fact, that they are an outcast tribe which has wandered hither from a more distant land, from India itself. 'Bohemians,' the French appellation of gypsies, involves an error similar to ours: they were taken at first by the common people in France to be the expelled Hussites of Bohemia, and hence this name. In the German 'Zigeuner' there is no expression of the land from which they were presumed to have come; but if this word be 'Zieh-Gauner,' that is, 'roaming thieves,' it will indicate the evil repute in which from the very beginning they were held.†

\* [Hence also the Spanish *Gitano*, Mod. Greek *Guptos*. See Lord Strangford, *Letters and Papers*, p. 59.]

† [It is more probably an altered form of the Spanish *Zingani*, *Zincali*, It. *Zingari*, gipsies.]

And where words have not, as in these cases, embodied an error, it will yet sometimes happen that the sound or spelling of a word will *to us* possibly suggest a wrong explanation, against which in these studies it will need to be on our guard. I dare say that there has been a stage in most boys' geographical knowledge, when they have taken for granted that Jutland was so called, not because it was the land of the Jutes, but on account of its *jutting* out into the sea in so remarkable a manner. And there have not been wanting those who have ventured to trace in the name of 'Jove' a heathen reminiscence of the awful name of Jehovah. I will not enter into this here; sufficient to say that, however specious this at first sight may seem, yet on closer examination of the two words, every connexion between them disappears.

Sometimes the assumed derivation has reacted upon and modified the spelling. Thus the name of the Caledonian tribe whom we call the 'Picts' would probably have come down to us in a somewhat different form, but for the assumption which early rose up, that they were so called from their custom of staining or painting their bodies, that in fact 'Picts' meant 'the painted.'\* This, as is now

\* [It is now generally accepted that the 'Picts' were really the painted or tattooed men, Lat. *Picti* (Rhys, *Celtic Britain*, 235; Lord Strangford, *Letters and Papers*, 162), perhaps translating their native name *Cruithnig*, of the same meaning, *Scoti* and *Britones* being synonymous names (J. B. Johnston, *Place Names of Scotland*, 2nd ed. p. xxix.; E. W. B. Nicholson, *Keltic Researches; Archæolog. Rev.* 1888, i. 50; Hehn, *Cultivated Plants*, 33). Compare *Pintos*, the name of a Mexican tribe given by the Spaniards (Tylor, *Anahuac*, 309).]



acknowledged, is an exceedingly improbable supposition. It would be quite conceivable that the Romans should have given this name to the *first* barbarous tribe they encountered, who were in the habit of painting themselves thus : such a custom, forcing itself on the eye, and impressing itself on the imagination, is exactly that which gives birth to a name : but after they had been long familiar with the tribes in southern Britain, to whom this painting or tattooing was equally familiar, it is quite inconceivable that they should have applied it to one of the northern tribes in the island, with which they first came in contact at a far later day. The name is much more probably the original Celtic one belonging to the tribe, slightly altered in the mouths of the Romans.\*—It may have been the same with 'hurricane' ; for many have imagined that this word, being used especially to signify the West Indian tornado, must be derived from the tearing up and *hurrying* away of the *canes* in the sugar plantations, just in the same way as the Latin 'calamitas' has been drawn, but erroneously, from 'calamus,' the stalk of the corn. In both cases the etymology is faulty ; 'hurricane' is only a transplanting into our tongue of the Spanish 'huracan' or the French 'ouragan.'†

It is a signal evidence of the conservative powers

\* [The author is referring to the Celtic *peicta*, "fighters," assumed to be the original of 'Picts' (I. Taylor, *Words and Places*, 81, 396 ; Verstegan, *Restitution of Decayed Intelligence*, 1634, p. 114.)]

† [From *Hurakan*, which in the Maya dialect is the name of the god of the storm or tornado, said to mean 'the first (i.e. supreme) giant' (*hu rakan*). See D. G. Brinton, *Essays of an Americanist*, pp. 120-123.]

of language, that we may oftentimes trace in speech the records of customs and states of society which have now passed so entirely away as to survive nowhere else but in these words alone. For example, a 'stipulation,' or agreement, is so called, as many tell us, from 'stipula,' a straw, and with reference to a Roman custom of breaking a straw between them, when two persons would make a mutual engagement with one another.\* And we all know how important a fact of English history is laid up in 'curfew' or 'couvre-feu.' The 'limner,' or 'lumineur' (luminatore), brings us back to a period when the *illumination* of manuscripts was the leading occupation of the painter; so that from this work he derived his name. 'Thrall' and 'thraldom' descend to us from a period when it was the custom to *thrill* or drill the ear of a slave in token of servitude; a custom in use among the Jews (Deut. xv. 17), and retained by our Anglo-Saxon forefathers, who were wont thus to pierce at the church-door the ears of their bond-servants.† By 'lumber,' we are, or might be, taught that Lombards were the first pawnbrokers, even as they were the first bankers, in England; a 'lumber'-room being a 'lombard'-room, or

\* See on this disputed point, and on the relation between the Latin 'stipulatio' and the old German custom not altogether dissimilar, J. Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*, pp. 121 sqq.

† [Scientific etymology refuses to see in 'thrall' any connexion with 'thrill.' It probably stands for an original *thra(g)l*, meaning a 'runner,' and so a messenger or servant, from a root *trag*, to run, seen in A. Sax. *thrægian*, Gk. *τρέχειν*, to run. Thus 'thrall' is almost formally identical with *τροχίλος*, the running bird (Skeat).]

room where the pawnbroker stores his pledges. Nor need I do more than remind you that in our common phrase of "*signing* our name," we preserve a record of a time when the first rudiments of education, such as the power of writing, were the portion of so few, but that it was not as now the exception, but the custom, for most persons to make their mark or 'sign'; great barons and kings themselves not being ashamed to set this *sign* or cross to the weightiest documents. We more accurately express what now we do, when we speak of "subscribing the name." Then too, whenever we term arithmetic the science of 'calculation,' we in fact allude to that rudimental period of the science of numbers, when pebbles (*calculi*) were used, as now among savages they often are, to facilitate the practice of counting; the Greeks did the same in their word *ψηφίζειν*: as in another word of theirs (*πεμπάζειν*) record of a period was kept when the *five* fingers were so employed. 'Expend,' 'expense,' tell us that money was once weighed out, and not counted out, as now (*Gen. xxxiii. 16*). In 'library' we preserve the fact that books were once written on the bark (*liber*) of trees; as in 'paper,' of a somewhat later period, when the Egyptian papyrus, "the paper reeds by the brooks," furnished the chief material for writing.

Theories too, which long since were utterly renounced, have yet left their traces behind them. Thus the words 'good humour,' 'bad humour,' 'humours,' and, strangest contradiction of all, '*dry* humour,' rest altogether on a now exploded, but a very old and widely extended, theory of

medicine; according to which there were four principal moistures or 'humours' in the natural body, on the due proportion and combination of which the disposition alike of body and of mind depended.\* And 'temper,' as used by us now, has its origin in the same theory; the due admixture, or right 'tempering,' of these gave what was called the happy temper, or mixture, which, thus existing inwardly, manifested itself also outwardly. In the same manner 'distemper' which we still employ in the sense of sickness, was that evil frame either of a man's body or of his mind (for it was used alike of both), which had its rise in an unsuitable mingling of these humours. In these instances, as in many more, the great streams of thought and feeling have changed their course, and now flow in quite other channels from those which once they filled, but have left these words as lasting memorials of the channels in which once they ran.

Other singular examples we have of the way in which the record of old errors, themselves dismissed long ago, may yet survive in language,—being bound up in words that grew into use when those errors found credit, and which, now that those errors are dismissed, maintain still their currency among us. The mythology, for example, which our ancestors brought with them from the forests in Germany is as much extinct for us as are the Lares, Larvæ, and Lemures of heathen Rome; yet the deposit it has permanently left in

\* See the *Prologue* to Ben Jonson's *Every Man out of his Humour*. [An ill-tempered person is called a 'humourist' in *The Spectator*, 1711, iii. 258.]

the language is not inconsiderable. 'Lubber,' 'dwarf,' 'oaf,' 'droll,' 'wight,' 'urchin,' 'hag,' 'night-mare,' 'changeling' (wechselskind), 'wicked,'\* suggest themselves here, as bequeathed to us by that old Gothic demonology. No one now believes in astrology, that the planet under which a man may happen to be born will affect his temperament, will make him for life of a disposition grave or gay, lively or severe. Yet we seem to affirm as much in language, for we speak of one as 'jovial,' or 'saturnine,' or 'mercurial'—'jovial,' as being born under the planet Jupiter or Jove, which was the joyfullest star, and of happiest augury of all: a gloomy severe person is said to be 'saturnine,' as born under the planet Saturn, who was considered to make those that own his influence, and were born when he was in the ascendant, grave and stern as himself: another we call 'mercurial,' or light-hearted, as those born under the planet Mercury were accounted to be. The same faith in the influence of the stars survives in 'disastrous,' 'ill-starred,' 'ascendency,' 'lord of the ascendant,' and, indeed, in 'influence' itself. What curious legends belong to the explanation of the 'sardonic,' or 'Sardinian'† laugh; a laugh caused, as was supposed, by a plant in Sardinia, which they who ate, died laughing; to the 'amethyst,' esteemed, as the word implies, a preventive or antidote of

\* [Old Eng. *wikke*, wicked, near akin to A. Sax. *wicce*, a witch, as if (be-)witched, possessed by the powers of evil.]

† See an excellent history of this word in Rost and Palm's *Greek Lexicon*, s.v. *σαρδάνιος*.

drunkenness ; and to other words not a few employed by us still.

But here a question presents itself, one which is not, as at first it might seem, merely speculative ; for it has before now become a veritable case of conscience with some whether they ought to use words which originally rested on, and so seem still to affirm, some superstition or untruth. This question has practically settled itself ; the words will keep their ground : but further, they have a perfect right to do so ; for no word need be considered so to root itself in its etymology, and to draw its sap and strength from thence, that it cannot detach itself from this, and acquire the rights of an independent existence. And thus our *weekly* newspapers commit no absurdity in calling themselves '*journals*' ; we involve ourselves in no real contradiction, speaking of a '*quarantine*' of five, ten, or any number of days more or fewer than *forty* ; the wax of our '*candles*' ('*candela*' from '*candeo*') is not necessarily *white* ; our '*rubrics*' are rubrics still, though seldom printed in *red* ink. I remember once asking a class of school-children whether an announcement which during one very hard winter appeared in the papers, of a '*white blackbird*' having been shot, was correctly worded, or self-contradictory and absurd. The less thoughtful members of the class instantly pronounced against it ; while after a little consideration, two or three perceived and replied that it was perfectly correct, that while no doubt the bird had originally obtained this name from its blackness, yet was it now the name of a species, and one so cleaving to it as not to be forfeited, even when

the blackness had quite disappeared. We do not question the right of the 'New Forest' still to be so called, though it has now stood for nigh eight hundred years; nor of 'Naples' to be the *New City* (Neapolis) still, after an existence three or four times as long.

It must, then, be esteemed a piece of ethical prudery, and an ignorance of the laws which languages obey, when the early Quakers refused to employ the names commonly given to the days of the week, and substituted for these, 'first day,' 'second day,' and so on. This they did, as is well known, on the ground that it became not Christian men to give so much sanction to idolatry as was involved in the ordinary style—as though every time they spoke of Wednesday they would be doing some honour to Woden, of Thursday to Thor, of Friday to Freya, and thus with the rest.\* Now it is quite intelligible that the early Christians, living in the midst of a still rampant heathenism, should have objected, as we know they did, to 'dies solis,' or Sunday, to express the first day of the week, their Lord's-Day. But when the Quakers raised *their* protest, the case was alto-

\* It is curious to find Fuller prophesying, a very few years before it actually happened, that at some future day such a protest as theirs might actually be raised (*Church History*, b. ii. cent. 6): 'Thus we see the whole week besattered with Saxon idols, whose pagan gods were the godfathers of the days, and gave them their names. This some zealot may behold as the object of a necessary reformation, desiring to have the days of the week new dipt, and called after other names. Though, indeed, this supposed scandal will not offend the wise, as beneath their notice; and cannot offend the ignorant, as above their knowledge.'

gether different. The false worship to which these words belonged had ceased in England for about a thousand years ; these words were wholly disengaged from their etymologies, which they had left altogether behind them ; which not one in a hundred was even so much as aware of. Moreover, had these precisions in speech been consistent, they could not have stopped where they did ; every new acquaintance with the derivation or primary use of the words would have entangled them in new embarrassment, would have required them still further to purge their vocabulary. 'To charm,' 'to bewitch,' 'to fascinate,' 'to enchant,' would have been no longer lawful words for those who had outlived the belief in magic, and in the power of the evil eye ; nor 'lunacy,' nor 'lunatic,' for such as did not consider that the moon had anything to do with mental unsoundness ; nor 'panic,' fear, for those who believed that the great *Pan* was indeed dead ; nor 'auguries,' nor 'auspices,' for those to whom divination was nothing ; to speak of 'initiating' a person into the 'mysteries' of an art, would have been utterly heathenish language. Nay, they must have found fault with the language of Holy Scripture itself ; for in the New Testament there is a word in very honourable use, expressing a function that might be exercised by the faithful, that, namely, of an interpreter,\* which word is directly derived from and embodies the name of *Hermes*, a heathen deity, and a deity who did not, like *Woden*, *Thor*, and *Freya*, pertain to a long extinct mythology, but to one existing at that very

\* [Greek *hermēneutēs*, whence is 'hermeneutics,' the science of exegesis or interpretation.]



moment in its strength. And how was it, we may ask, that Paul did not protest against a Christian woman retaining the name of Phœbe (Rom. xvi. 1), a goddess of the same mythology ?

We have abundant right then to speak of a history in words. Now suppose that the pieces of money which in the ordinary intercourse of life are passing through our hands, had each one something of its own which made it more or less worthy of note ; if on one was stamped some striking maxim, on another some important fact, on a third a memorable date ; if others were works of finest art, graven with rare and beautiful devices, or bearing the head of some ancient sage, or heroic king ; while others, again, were the sole surviving monuments of mighty nations that once filled the world with their fame : what a careless indifference to our own improvement would it argue in us, if we were content that these should come and go, should stay by us or pass from us, without our vouchsafing to them so much as one serious regard. Such a currency there is, a currency intellectual and spiritual of no meaner worth, and one with which we have to transact so much of the higher business of our lives. Let us see that we come not here under the condemnation of any such incurious dulness as that which I have imagined.

## V

### ON THE RISE OF NEW WORDS

ONE of the most interesting branches of the study which is occupying us now is the taking note of the periods when great and significant words, or it may be even such as can hardly claim these epithets, have risen up and come into use, with the circumstances attending their rise. The different portions of my theme so run into one another, that this is a subject which I have, though unwillingly, already anticipated in part; yet is it one so curious, and which may be made so instructive, that I purpose to dedicate a lecture exclusively to it. Indeed, I am persuaded that a volume might be written which would have few to rival it in interest, that should do no more than indicate, or, where advisable, quote the first writer or the first document wherein new words, or old words employed in a new sense—such words, I mean, as have afterwards played an important part in the world's history—have appeared. For the feeling wherewith we watch the rise above the horizon of these words, some of them to shine for ever as luminaries in the moral and intellectual heaven above us, can oftentimes be only likened to that which the poet so grandly describes, of—

some watcher of the skies,  
When a new planet swims into his ken.

Thus in respect of words religious and ecclesiastical very noteworthy, and in some sort epoch-making, must be regarded the first appearance of

such as these—'Christian';<sup>1</sup> 'Trinity';<sup>2</sup> 'Catholic,' as an epithet applied to the Church; <sup>3</sup> 'canonical,' as a distinctive title of the received Scriptures; <sup>4</sup> 'New Testament,' as describing the complex of the sacred books of the New Covenant; <sup>5</sup> 'Gospels,' as applied to the four inspired records of the life of our Lord.<sup>6</sup> Very curious too the first coming up of 'monk' and 'nun,'<sup>7</sup> marking as they do the rise of the monastic system;—or again, of 'transubstantiation,'<sup>8</sup> or of 'limbo'<sup>9</sup> in its theological sense, marking as these do the *consolidation* of errors which had long been floating in the Church. So too it is most instructive to note the earliest appearance of names historical and geographical, as the first mention of 'India';<sup>10</sup> of 'Europe';<sup>11</sup> the first emerging of the names 'German' and 'Germany';<sup>12</sup> of the 'Alemanni';<sup>13</sup> of the 'Franks';<sup>14</sup> the earliest notice of Rome in any writer;<sup>15</sup> the first use of 'Italy' as the designation of the entire Hesperian peninsula, a name which

<sup>1</sup> Acts xi. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Tertullian, *Adv. Prax.* c. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Ignatius, *Ad Smyr.* c. 8.

<sup>4</sup> Origen, *Opp.* v. 3. p. 36 (ed. de la Rue).

<sup>5</sup> Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.* 4. 1; *Adv. Prax.* 15, 20.

<sup>6</sup> Justin Martyr, *Apol.* 1. 66.

<sup>7</sup> Nun (nonna) first appears in St. Jerome, *Ad Eustoch.* Ep 22.

<sup>8</sup> Hildebert, bishop of Tours, *Serm.* 93. He died in 1134.

<sup>9</sup> Thomas Aquinas is the first that we know who uses 'limbus' in this sense.

<sup>10</sup> Æschylus, *Suppl.* 282.

<sup>11</sup> Herodotus, 4. 36.

<sup>12</sup> They probably first occur in the Commentaries of Cæsar.

<sup>13</sup> Spartian, *Caracalla*, c. 9.

<sup>14</sup> Vopiscus, *Aurel.* c. 7; about A.D. 240.

<sup>15</sup> Probably in Hellanicus, a cotemporary of Herodotus.

had been gradually creeping up for centuries from its southern extremity;<sup>1</sup> when Asia on this side Taurus was first called 'Asia Minor';<sup>2</sup> the earliest notice which we have of 'Normans' under this title;<sup>3</sup> who first gave to the newly-discovered continent in the west the name of 'America,' and when;<sup>4</sup> the period when this island exchanged its earlier name of Britain for 'Anglia' or 'England;' or, again, when it resumed 'Great Britain' as its official designation. So too, to go back in the world's history, and to take one or two examples of a different character—at what moment the words 'tyrant' and 'tyranny,' marking so distinct an epoch as they do in the political history of Greece, first appeared;<sup>5</sup> when, and from whom,

<sup>1</sup> In the time of Augustus Cæsar.

<sup>2</sup> Orosius, i. 2; in the fifth century of our era.

<sup>3</sup> In the Geographer of Ravenna.

<sup>4</sup> Alexander von Humboldt, who has studied the question profoundly, ascribes its general reception to its having been introduced into a popular and influential work on geography, published in 1507. [See above, p. 122, note.†]

<sup>5</sup> First in the writings of Archilochus, about 700 B.C. I will just observe that 'tyrant' with the Greeks had a much deeper sense than it has in our modern use. The difference between a 'king' and a 'tyrant' was far more profoundly apprehended by them than by us. A tyrant was not a bad king, who abused the advantages of a rightful position to purposes of lust or cruelty or other oppression; but it was of the essence of the tyrant, that he attained supreme dominion through a violation of the laws and liberties of the state; and such an one, with whatever moderation he might afterwards exercise his rule, would not the less retain the name. Thus the mild and bounteous Pisistratus was, and was called, 'tyrant' of Athens, while a Christian the Second of Denmark, 'the Nero of the North,' would not have been esteemed such in their eyes. It was to the honour of the Greeks that they did not allow the course of the

the fabric of the external universe first received the title of 'cosmos,' or 'beautiful order';<sup>1</sup> with many more of the same description.

Of these which I have just adduced let us take, by way of sample, two, and try whether there is not much to be gathered from them, and from attending to the epoch and circumstances of their rise. Our first example is a remarkable one, for it shows us the Holy Spirit Himself counting a name, and the rise of a name, of so much importance as to make it matter of special record in the Book of Life. "The disciples were called *Christians* first in Antioch" (Acts xi. 26). This might seem at first sight a notice curious and interesting, as all must possess interest for us which relates to the early days of the Church, but nothing more. And yet in truth how much of history is enfolded in this name; what light it throws on the early history of Christianity to know when and where it was first imposed on the faithful—'imposed,' I say, for it is clearly a name which they did not give to themselves, but received from their adversaries, however afterwards they may have

word to be arrested or turned aside by any occasional or partial exceptions in the manner of the after exercise of this ill-gotten dominion, but in the hateful secondary sense which the word even with them acquired, and which is felt still more strongly by us, the moral conviction, justified by all experience, spake out, that what was gotten by fraud and violence would only by the same methods be retained; that the 'tyrant,' in the earlier Greek sense of the word, dogged as he would be by suspicion, fear, and an evil conscience, must also by a sure law become a 'tyrant' in the later, which is that in which alone we employ the word.

<sup>1</sup> The word is ascribed, as is well known, to Pythagoras, born about B.C. 570.

learned to accept it as a title of honour, and to glory in it. For it is not said that they "*called themselves*," but "*were called*" Christians first at Antioch; nor do we find the name anywhere in Scripture except on the lips of those alien from, or opposed to, the Gospel (Acts xxvi. 28; 1 Peter. iv. 16). And as it was a name imposed by adversaries, so among those adversaries it was plainly the heathen, and not the Jews, that gave it; since the Jews would never have called the followers of Jesus of Nazareth, 'Christians,' or 'those of Christ,' seeing that the very point of their opposition to Him was, that He was *not* the Christ, but a false pretender to this name.

Starting then from this point, that 'Christians' was a name given to the early disciples by the heathen, let us see what we may learn from it. Now we know that Antioch was the head-quarters of the earliest missions to the heathen, even as Jerusalem was to those of the seed of Abraham. It was there and among the faithful there that the sense of the world-wide destination of the Gospel arose; there it was first plainly seen as intended for all kindreds of the earth.\* Hitherto the faithful in Christ had been called by their enemies, and indeed often were still called, 'Galileans,' or 'Nazarenes,'—both names which indicated the Jewish cradle in which the Gospel had been nursed, and that the world saw in it no more than a Jewish sect. But the name 'Christians,'

\* [Its catholicity was adumbrated by its structure, 'Christianus,' being a Hebrew idea, the Messiah, clothed in a Greek form, *Christos*, with a Latin termination—*anus* implying devotion to His cause or party.]

or 'those of Christ,' imposed upon them now, while it indicated that Christ and the confession of His name was felt even by the world to be the sum and centre of their religion, showed also that the heathen had now come to comprehend, I do not say what the Church would be but what it claimed to be,—no mere variety of Judaism, but a society with a far wider mission ; it is clear that, when this name was given, the Church, even in the world's eyes, had chipped its Jewish shell. Nor will the attentive reader fail to observe that the imposing of this name on believers is by closest juxtaposition connected in the sacred narrative, and still more closely in the Greek than in the English, with the first arrival of St. Paul at Antioch, and his preaching there ; he being the especial and appointed instrument for bringing the Church into the recognition of this its destination for all men. As so often happens with the rise of a new name, the rise of this one marked a new epoch in the Church's life, that it was entering upon a new stage of its development.

It is a merely subordinate matter, but yet I may just observe how remarkably what we know from other quarters confirms the accuracy of this account which lays the invention of this name to the credit of the Antiochenes. The idle and witty inhabitants of Antioch were famous in all antiquity for the invention of nicknames ; it was a manufacture in which they particularly excelled. And thus it was exactly the place, where beforehand we might have expected that such a name, being a nickname or little better in the mouths of those that devised it, should have first sprung up.

Our other example shall be 'Anglia' or 'England.' When and under what circumstances did this island exchange for this its earlier name of Britain, which it had borne for more than a thousand years? There seems no sufficient reason for calling in question, though some have so done, the statement of the old chronicler that it received this new name of Anglia from Egbert, king of Wessex, who with the sanction of his Parliament or Witanegemot, holden A.D. 800 in this very city of Winchester, determined that the name 'Britain' should give place to 'England.'\* It may be that the change was not effected by any such formal act as this, yet the accuracy of the old historian, so far at least as his date is concerned, receives strong confirmation from the circumstance that 'Anglia,' which is nowhere to be traced in any documents anterior to this period, does immediately after begin to appear.

What lessons for the student of English history are here, in the knowledge of this one fact, if he will but seek to look at it all round, and consider it in a thoughtful spirit. I have said that the rise of a new name marks often a new epoch in history; certainly it was so in the instance before us. In the first place, as it is the just law of names, that a people should give a name to the land which they possess, not receive one from it, as the Franks make Gaul to be France, do not suffer themselves to become Gauls, so, as regards our own land, it is plain from the coming up of this name that there must have been now a sense in men's minds

\* [Standing for 'Engla-land,' land of the Engles or Angles.]



that its transformation from a land of Britons to a land of Angles was at length completely accomplished, and might therefore justly claim to find its recognition in a word. That the Normans never made a 'Norman-land' out of England, as they had out of Neustria, and as the Angles had made an 'Angle-land' out of Britain,—that they never so supplanted the population, or dissolved the social frame-work, of the Angles, as these had done of the Britons,—is evident from the fact that there went along with *their* conquest of the land no such substitution of a new name for the old, no such obliteration of the old by the new, as on that prior occupation of the soil had found place.—And then further, how significant a fact, that the invading German tribes, which had hitherto been content to call themselves according to the different provinces or districts which they occupied, should have now felt that they needed, and out of that need should have given birth to, a name common to and including the whole land. Was there not here a sign that the sense of unity, of all making up one corporate body, one nation, was emerging out of the confusion of the preceding period of the Heptarchy? We know from other sources that Egbert was the first who united the different kingdoms of the Heptarchy under his single sceptre; the first in whom the nation was knit together into one. How instructive to find a name which should be the symbol of unity, coming to the birth at this very moment. In respect too of the relations between themselves of the two most important tribes which had settled in this island, the Angles and the Saxons (the Jutes were too few

to contend for the honour), it is assuredly a weighty fact that it was the Angles alone, from whom, though numerically inferior, the new appellation was derived. Doubtless, a moral or political predominance of this tribe, probably a political founded on a moral, asserted itself in this fact. We are the less inclined to attribute it to accident from the circumstance that in the phrase 'Anglo-Saxons,' (Angli-Saxones), a term which is no modern invention of convenience, as is sometimes erroneously asserted, but is of earlier use even than Anglia, the Angles have again the precedence, and the Saxons only follow.\*

It will be seen, I think, by these two examples that new words will repay any attention which we may bestow upon them, and upon the conditions under which they emerge. Let us proceed to consider the causes which give them birth, the periods when a language is most fruitful in them, the regions of society from which they usually proceed, with some other interesting phenomena about them.

That cause which more than any other creates the necessity for these additions to the vocabulary of a language, and evokes the words which shall supply this necessity, when it is felt, is beyond a question this—namely, that in the appointments of highest Wisdom there are certain cardinal epochs in the world's history, in which, far more than at other times, new moral and spiritual forces begin to work, and to stir society to its central depths. When it is thus with a people, they make claims

\* [See Freeman, *Norman Conquest*, vol. i., Appendix, A.]

upon their language which were never made upon it before. It is required to utter truths, to express ideas, which were strange to it in the time of its first moulding and shaping, and for which, therefore, the terms sufficient will naturally not be found in it at once—these new thoughts and feelings being larger and deeper than any with which hitherto the speakers of that tongue had been familiar. But when the bed of a river is suddenly required to deliver a far greater volume of waters than till now has been its wont, it is nothing strange if it should surmount its banks, break forth on the right hand and on the left, or even force new channels with something of violence for itself. The most illustrious example of this whereof I speak, is, of course, the coming in of Christianity, or, including the anterior dispensation, of revealed religion, into the ancient heathen world, with the consequent necessity under which the great novel truths which were then proclaimed to mankind lay, of clothing themselves in the language of men, and first in the languages of Greece and Rome—languages which in their previous form might have sufficed, and did suffice, for heathenism, sensuous and finite as it was, but not for the spiritual and infinite of the new dispensation. How often had the new thoughts to weave a new garment for themselves, inasmuch as that which they found ready made was too narrow to wrap themselves withal ; the new wine to find new vessels for itself, that both might be preserved, the old vessels being neither sufficiently strong nor expansive to hold it.

Thus, not to speak of mere technical matters

which would claim their utterance, how could the Greek language have had a word for 'idolatry,' so long as the sense of the awful contrast between the worship of the living God and of dead things had not risen up in their minds that spoke it? But when men began to employ Greek, and that as the sole utterance and voice of all that was in them, men to whom this distinction and contrast was the most earnest and the deepest conviction of their lives, the words 'idolatry,' 'idolater,' of necessity appeared.\* The heathen did not claim for their deities to be 'searchers of hearts,' did not disclaim for them the being 'accepters of persons'; such attributes of power and righteousness entered not into their minds as pertaining to the objects of their worship. The Greek language therefore, so long as they only employed it, had not the words corresponding. It indeed could not have had, as the Jewish Hellenistic Greek could not have been without them. In like manner, where else but in the bosom of the same Jewish Greek could the word 'theocracy' have been born? †

These difficulties, which would be felt the most strongly when the thought and feeling which had been at home in the Hebrew, the original language of inspiration, were to be translated into Greek,

\* [It may be noted in passing that this word, if it had its rights, ought to be, as it once was, *idolo-latry*, *idolo-later*. Similar compressions are 'hippotamus' and 'physnomy' (in Topsell), 'ignomy' (Shakspeare), 'surgeon,' 'barn,' 'tract,' 'England,' for 'hippopotamus,' 'physiognomy,' 'ignominy,' 'sirurgeon,' 'barern,' 'tractate,' 'Englaland,' and 'tempory,' sometimes heard for 'temporary.']

† We preside at its birth in a passage of Josephus *Con. Apion.* 2. 16.

would also reappear, though naturally not to the same extent, when that which had gradually woven for itself in the Greek an adequate attire, again demanded to find garments in the Latin, wherein it might be suitably arrayed. A single example of the difficulty, and the way it was ultimately overcome, will illustrate this better than long disquisitions. There was in the Greek a word for 'saviour,' which, although it had often been degraded to unworthy uses, having been applied not merely to heathen deities, but bestowed as a title of honour on men, and on such sometimes as were rather 'destroyers' than 'saviours' of their fellows, was yet in itself sufficient to set forth that central office and dignity of Christ—the word being like some profaned temple, which did not need to be rebuilt, but only to be consecrated anew. With the Latin it was otherwise; the language seemed to be without a word of such frequent recurrence and essential use to Christianity: indeed Cicero, than whom none could know better the capabilities of his own tongue, distinctly declared that it possessed no single word corresponding to the Greek 'saviour.'\* 'Salvator' would have been the natural word; but the classical Latin, though it had 'salus' and 'salvus,' had neither this, nor the verb 'salvare'; I say the classical, for some believe that 'salvare' had always existed in the common speech. 'Servator' was instinctively felt to be insufficient, even as in English 'Preserver' would fall very short of uttering all for us which 'Saviour' does now; the seeking of the strayed,

\* "Hoc [σωτήρ] quantum est? ita magnum ut Latine uno verbo exprimi non possit."

the recovering of the lost, the healing of the sick, all this would be very feebly and faintly insinuated in 'Preserver.' God '*preserveth* man and beast,' but He is the 'Saviour' of his own, in a far more inward and far tenderer sense. For some time the Latin Christian writers were in considerable perplexity how they should render the Greek word, employing 'sospitator,' and other terms more unsatisfactory still, as, for instance, the 'salutificator' of Tertullian. The strong good sense of Augustine, however, finally disposed of the difficulty. He made no scruple about employing 'Salvator'; observing well, and with a true insight into the law of the growth of words, that 'Salvator' might not have been, and indeed was not, good Latin before the Saviour came; but when He came, He made it to be such; for as shadows attend substances, so words follow upon things.\*

These are, as I said, the most illustrious examples of the coming in of a new world of thoughts and feelings into the bosom of humanity, whereby has been necessitated a corresponding creation in the world of words, their outward representatives.

\* *Serm.* 299. 6: "Christus Jesus, id est Christus Salvator: hoc est enim Latine Jesus. Nec quærant grammatici quàm sit Latinum, sed Christiani, quàm verum. Salus enim Latinum nomen est: salvare et salvator non fuerunt hæc Latina, antequam veniret Salvator: quando ad Latinos venit, et hæc Latina fecit." Cf. *De Trin.* 13. 10: "Quod verbum [salvator] Latina lingua antea non habebat, sed habere poterat; sicut potuit quando voluit." Other words which we owe to Christian Latin, not to speak of 'incarnatio,' and such purely technical terms as this, are 'deitas' (Augustine, *Civ. Dei*, 7. 1), 'resipiscentia,' 'passio,' 'compassio,' 'longanimitas,' 'tribulatio,' 'soliloquium.'

And the same necessity has repeated itself continually since ; each new reception of the Word of life by another people must needs bring over again the same effects with more or less striking features. It is true we are not so favourably placed for tracing these effects as in the cases of the two classical languages of antiquity : yet our missionaries, to whom the study of language is in many respects so greatly indebted,—have incidentally told us much on this subject, and, were their attention particularly directed to it, might doubtless tell us much more.

But it is not only when new truth directly from God has thus to fit itself to the lips of men, that such enlargements of speech follow ; but in each further unfolding of these seminal truths implanted in man's heart at the first, in each new enlargement of his sphere of knowledge, outward or inward, lie the same necessities involved. The beginnings and progressive advances of moral philosophy in Greece, the transplanting of the same to Rome, the rise of the scholastic, and then of the mystic, theology in the middle ages, the discoveries of modern science and natural philosophy, all these have been accompanied by corresponding extensions in the limits of language. Of the words to which each of these has in turn given birth, many, it is true, have never passed beyond their own peculiar sphere, having remained technical, scientific, or purely theological to the last ; but many also have passed over from the laboratory, the school, and the pulpit, into daily life, and have, with the ideas which they incorporate, become the common heritage of all. For however

hard and repulsive a front any study or science may seem to present to the great body of those who are as laymen to it, there is yet inevitably such a detrition as this going forward in the case of each, and it would not be a little interesting for one who was furnished with the knowledge sufficient, to trace it in all.

Where the movement is a great popular one, stirring the heart and mind of a people to its very depths, such as the first reception of the Christian faith, there these new words will be for the most part born out of their bosom, a free spontaneous birth, seldom or never capable of being referred to one man more than another, because they belong to all. Where, on the contrary, the movement is not so, is more strictly theological, or finds place in those regions of science and philosophy, where, as first pioneers and discoverers, only a few can bear their parts, there the additions and extensions will lack something of the freedom, the unconscious boldness, which marked the others. Their character will be more artificial, less spontaneous, although here also the creative genius of the single man, as there of the nation, will oftentimes set its mark; and many a single word will come forth, which shall be the result of profound meditation, or of intuitive genius, or of both in happiest combination—many a word, which shall as a torch illuminate vast regions comparatively obscure before, and, it may be, cast its rays far into the yet unexplored darkness beyond; or which, summing up into itself all the acquisitions in a particular direction of the past, shall be as a mighty vantage ground from which to advance to new conquests in



the realms of mind or of nature, not as yet subdued to the intellect of man.

'Cosmopolite' is a word often used now shallowly, or even mischievously, enough ; and he who asserts himself to be such often means nothing more than that he is *not* a patriot, that he has no love to his native country. Yet still we might boldly affirm that whoever before the preaching of the Gospel brought first the two words which compose this word into combination was no common man. And we should not be wrong in this ; for it was no other than Diogenes the Cynic, several of whose sayings are as notable as any in antiquity. Being demanded of what city or country he was, Diogenes answered that he was a 'cosmopolite' ; in this word, which he thus launched upon the world, widening the range of men's thoughts, bringing in not merely a word new to Greek ears, but a thought which, however commonplace to us, was most novel and startling at the time when it was uttered first. In saying this, I would by no means affirm that contempt for his citizenship in its narrower sense may not have mingled with this his challenge for himself of a wider citizenship and one that embraced the entire world.

As occupying something of a middle place between those more deliberate word-makers, and the people whose words rather grow than are made, we must not omit him who is a *maker* by the very right of his name—I mean, the poet.\* That creative energy with which he is endowed, "the high-

\* [An interesting parallel to Greek *poiētēs*, the maker, is A. Sax. *scōp*, a poet, "a maker," from *scapan*, to create, make, or shape.]

flying liberty of conceit proper to the poet," will in all probability manifest itself in this region as in others. Extending the domain of thought and feeling, he will scarcely fail to extend that also of language, which does not willingly lag behind. And the loftier his moods, the more of this maker he will be. The passion of such times, the all-fusing imagination, will at once suggest and justify audacities in speech, upon which in calmer moods he would not venture, or, if he ventured, would fail to carry others with him : for only the fluent metal runs easily into novel shapes and moulds. It is not merely that the old and familiar will often become new in his hands ; that he will give the stamp of allowance, as to him it will be free to do, to words, should he count them worthy, which hitherto have lived only on the lips of the multitude, or been confined to some single dialect and province ; but he will enrich his native tongue with words unknown and non-existent before—non-existent, that is, save in their elements ; for in the historic period of a language it is not permitted to any man to bring new roots into it, but only to work on already given materials ; to evolve what is latent therein, to combine what is apart, to recall what has fallen out of sight.

But to return to the more deliberate coining of words. This will often find place for the supplying of discovered deficiencies in a language. The manner in which men most often become aware of such deficiencies, is through the comparison of their own language with another and a richer ; a comparison which is forced upon them, so that they cannot put it by, when it becomes necessary for them

to express in their own tongue that which has already found utterance in another, and so has, at any rate, shown that it is utterable in human speech. Without such a comparison the existence of the want would probably have seldom dawned even on the most thoughtful. For language is to so great an extent the condition and limit of thought, men are so little accustomed, indeed so little able, to meditate on things, except through the intervention, and by the machinery, of words, that nothing short of this would bring them to a sense of the actual existence of any such wants. And it is, I may observe, one of the advantages of acquaintance with another language besides our own, and of the institution which will follow, if we have learned that other to any purpose, of these comparisons, that we thus come to be aware that names are not, and least of all the names which any single language possesses, co-extensive with things (and by 'things' I mean subjects as well as objects of thought, whatever one can *think* about), that a multitude of things exist which, though capable of being resumed in a word, are yet without one, unnamed and unregistered ; so that, vast as is the world of names, the world of realities is even vaster still. Such discoveries the Romans made, when they attempted to transplant the moral philosophy of Greece to an Italian soil ; they found that many of its words had no equivalents in their own tongue ; which equivalents therefore they proceeded with more or less success to devise for themselves, appealing, with this view, to the latent capacities of their own tongue. For example, the Greek schools had a word, and one playing no un-

important part in some of their philosophical systems, to express 'apathy,' or the absence of all passion and pain. As it was absolutely necessary to possess a corresponding word, Cicero invented 'indolentia,' as that "if I may so speak" with which he paves the way to his first introduction of it, manifestly declares.\*

Sometimes, indeed, such a skilful mint-master of words, such a subtle watcher and weigher of their forces † as was Cicero, will note, even without this comparison with other languages, an omission in his own, which thereupon he will endeavour to supply. Thus was it with him in regard of 'invidentia.' While there existed in the Latin two adjectives which, though sometimes confusedly used had yet each its peculiar meaning, 'invidus,' one who is envious, 'invidiosus,' one who excites envy in others,‡ there was only one substantive, 'invidia,' the correlative of them both; with the disadvantage therefore of being employed now in an active, now in a passive sense, now for the envy which men feel, and now for that which they excite. The word he saw was made to do double duty, and that under a seeming unity there lurked a real dualism, from which manifold confusions might follow. He therefore devised 'invidentia,' to express the active envy, or the envying, no doubt desiring that 'invidia' should be restrained to the passive, the being envied. To all appearance the

\* *Fin.* 2. 4; and for 'qualitas' see *Acad.* 1, 6.

† "Ille verborum vigilantissimus appensor ac mensor," as Augustine happily terms him.

‡ Thus the monkish line:

"*Invidiosus ego, non invidus esse laboro.*"

word came to supply a real want ; yet he did not succeed in giving it currency ; indeed does not seem himself to have much cared to employ it again.\*

We see by this example that not every word, which even a great master of language proposes, finds acceptance.† Provided some live, he must be contented that others should fall to the ground, and die. Nor is this the only one which Cicero unsuccessfully proposed. His ‘indolentia,’ which I mentioned just now, hardly passed beyond himself ;‡ his ‘vitiositas,’§ ‘indigentia,’ and ‘mulierositas,’|| not at all. ‘Beatitas’ too and ‘beatitudo,’¶ both of his coining, but which he owns to have something strange and uncouth about them, can hardly be said to have found more than the faintest echo in the classical literature of Rome : ‘beatitudo’ indeed obtained a home, as it deserved to do, in the Christian Church, but the other made no way whatsoever. I do not suppose that Coleridge’s ‘esemplastic,’ with which he was himself so much pleased, will find any considerable favour with others ; while the words of Jeremy Taylor,

\* *Tusc.* 3. 9, 4. 8 ; cf. Döderlein, *Synon.* vol. iii. p. 68.

† Quintilian’s advice to those who come after is excellent here (1. 6, 42) : “ Etiam si potest nihil peccare, qui utitur iis verbis quæ summi auctores tradiderunt, multum tamen refert non solum quid *dixerint*, sed etiam quid *persuaserint*.”

‡ Indeed we find Seneca a little later seeming quite to have forgotten, or not to have known that Cicero had ever made any such suggestion ; for without taking any notice of it, he proposes “impatientia” as an adequate rendering of ἀνδρεία, acknowledging indeed the inconvenience that the word was already used in exactly the opposite sense (*Ep.* 9).

§ *Tusc.* 4. 15. || *Tusc.* 4. 11. ¶ *Nat. Deor.* 1. 34.

of such Latinists as Sir Thomas Browne; and of others, that were born only to die, are multitudinous as the leaves of autumn. Still, even the word which fails is often, though not always, an honourable testimony to the scholarship, the accuracy of thought, the imagination of its proposer; and Ben Jonson is overhard on 'neologists,' if I may bring this term back to its earlier meaning, when he says: "A man coins not a new word without some peril, and less fruit; for if it happen to be received, the praise is but moderate; if refused, the scorn is assured."

I alluded just now to comprehensive words, which should singly be effectual to say that which hitherto it had taken many words to say, in which an higher term has been reached than before had been found. It is difficult to estimate too highly the value of such words for the facilitating of mental processes, and indeed for the making possible of many, which would have been nearly or quite impracticable without them; and those who have invented such words, or have succeeded in putting them into circulation, may be esteemed as benefactors of a high order to knowledge. In the ordinary traffic of life, unless our dealings were on the smallest scale, we should willingly have about us our money in the shape rather of silver than of copper; and if our transactions were at all extensive, rather in gold than in silver; while, if we were setting forth upon a long and arduous journey, we should be best pleased to turn even our gold coin itself into bills of exchange or circular notes; in fact, into the highest denomination of money which it was capable of assuming. How many

words with which we are now perfectly familiar are for us what bills of exchange or circular notes are for the traveller and the merchant. As in one of these last, innumerable pence, a multitude of shillings, not a few pounds are gathered up and represented, so have we in some single word the quintessence and final result of an infinite number of anterior mental processes, ascending one above the other, and all of which have been at length summed up for us in that one. Or we may compare that word to some great river, which does not bring its flood of waters to the sea, till many rills have been swallowed up in brooks, and brooks in streams, and streams in tributary rivers, each of these affluents having lost its individual name and existence in that which at last at once represents and is continent of them all.

Let us only consider all which must have gone before, ere the word 'circle,' with its corresponding idea, could have come into existence ; and then imagine how it would be, if as often as in some long and difficult mathematical problem we had to refer to the figure so named, we were obliged to introduce the entire definition of it, because no single word stood for it,—and not this only, but the definition of each term employed in the definition ;—how impossible, or nearly impossible it would prove to carry the whole process in the mind, or to take oversight of its steps. Imagine a few more words struck out of the vocabulary of the mathematician, and if all mental activity in his direction was not altogether arrested, yet would it be as effectually restricted as commerce and exchange would be, if all transactions had to be car-

ried on with iron or copper as the sole medium of mercantile intercourse. It is not indeed to be supposed that words of such primary, almost vital, necessity for the science whereto they pertain as that I have just referred to, still wait to be coined ; but yet, wherever knowledge is progressive, words are keeping pace with it, which with more or less felicity resume in themselves very much of the labours of the past, at once assist and abridge the labours of the future ; being as tools which, themselves the result of the finest mechanical skill, do at the same time render other and further triumphs of art possible, such as would have been quite unattainable without them.

But it is not merely the widening of man's intellectual horizon, which, as it brings new thoughts within the range of their vision, constrains the origination of corresponding words ; but when regions of this outward world hitherto closed are laid open to them, the various novel objects of interest which these contain will demand to find their names, and not merely to be catalogued in the nomenclature of science, but in so far as they present themselves to the popular eye will require a popular name. Take an example of a word thus popularly born, and such are for the most part the most genuine which rise up in a language ; an example also of the manner in which, at some periods of its growth, everything turns to good, so that mistakes and errors, misshaping, and it would seem marring a word at its first formation, yet do not hinder it from forming a worthy portion of the after tongue. When the alligator, this ugly crocodile of the new world, was first seen by the



Spanish discoverers, they called it, with a true insight into its species, 'el lagarto,' or 'the lizard,' as being the largest of that lizard species to which it belonged. In Sir W. Raleigh's *Discovery of Guiana*, the word still retains this its Spanish form. Sailing up the Orinoco, "We saw in it," he says, "divers sorts of strange fishes of marvellous bigness, but for *lagartos* it exceeded; for there were thousands of these ugly serpents, and the people call it, for the abundance of them, the river of *lagartos*, in their [the Spanish] language." We can perfectly explain the shape which afterwards the word assumed, by supposing that English sailors who brought home the word, and had continually heard, but may probably have never seen it written, blended, as has not unfrequently happened, the Spanish article 'el' with the name, and thus from this annexation of the article it acquired the shape in which we possess it now. In Ben Jonson, who writes 'alligarta,'\* we see the word in the process of its transformation.†

\* *Bartholomew Fair*, Act 2, Sc. 1.

† 'Alcoran' supplies another example of this curious annexation of the article in English. Examples of this annexation—absorption or incorporation we might there more strictly call it—are numerous in French. 'Lierre,' ivy, was once written, as by Ronsard, 'l'hierre,' which is no doubt correct, being the Latin 'hedera.' 'Lingot' comes no doubt from the English 'ingot,' having the same signification, with only the article fused into the word. [Scheler prefers to deduce it from Lat. *lingua*, as if a tongue of metal.] In old French it was always written 'l'endemain,' that is, le jour en demain; 'le lendemain,' as now written, is a barbarous excess of expression. 'La Pouille,' a name given to the southern extremity of Italy, and in which we recognize 'Apulia,' is another variety of error, but moving in the same sphere. On this subject see Génin's *Récréations Philologiques*, vol. i. pp. 102-105.

ONE of the most legitimate methods by which a language may increase in wealth, especially in the times when its generative energy is in good part spent, as after a time will be the case with all, is through the reviving of old words, not, that is without discrimination, but of such as are worthy to be revived ; which yet through carelessness, or ill-placed fastidiousness, or a growing unacquaintance on the part of a later generation with the elder worthies of the language, or some other cause, have been suffered to drop. These words, obsolete or obsolescent, it will sometimes happen that some writer instructed in the early literature of his native language is not willing to let die, and himself using or suggesting to the use of others, is successful in again putting into circulation. And to the poet more than any other it will be thus free to recall and recover the forgotten treasures of his native language. Yet if success is to attend his attempt, or that of any other, the words to which it is thus sought to impart a second life must scarcely belong to the hoar antiquities of the language, with the dust of many centuries upon them, being not merely out of use, but out of all memory as well. A word which has not been employed since Chaucer is in a very different position from one that has only dropped out of active service since Spenser or Shakespeare, and which, being found in their writings or in those of their great compeers, has preserved for the circle of educated readers a certain vitality. Thus, I should question the employment of such 'Chaucerisms,' to use Ben Jonson's phrase on this very subject, as have no point of contact with our present English ; nor do I be-

lieve it possible to give them currency again. But the case is altogether different with words only recently lost, or in some sense not lost at all—such for example, as ‘leer,’ ‘lese,’ ‘debonair,’ ‘deft,’\* ‘malapert,’ ‘moil,’ ‘phantast,’ which I instance, as every one of them to my mind worthy to have continued. The case is different, because of these some have never dropped out of use among our humbler classes, so often the conservators of precious words and genuine idioms : thus you all probably know very well that ‘leer’ is with our rustic population in the south a commoner word than ‘empty’; ‘to lese,’ very much more in use with them than ‘to glean’; indeed this last is scarcely known. Others, as ‘deft,’ ‘debonair,’ ‘malapert,’ reach down, at least in literary use, to the middle of the eighteenth century; with, in the case of the last, the further inconvenience entailed by its loss, that we have been obliged to make ‘pert,’ which remains, do double duty, that of ‘malapert’ and its own.† For as some word is plainly wanting, not so strong as ‘insolent,’ we have been led to employ ‘pert’ exclusively in an unfavourable sense, while yet it was free of old to use it also in a good, even as among our southern poor it still retains the meaning of ‘sprightly’ or ‘lively’; a child recovering from illness, a cage-bird after moulting, are said to look quite ‘pert’ again, an employment of the word justified by Shakespeare’s

Awake the *pert* and nimble spirit of youth.

\* [It seems curious to find a word now in such general use as ‘deft’ is, included among the obsolescent words of forty years ago.]

† [‘Pert’ seems to stand for *perkt*. See Skeat s.v.]

Other and less honourable causes than many of those which I have sought hitherto to trace, give birth to new words ; and it will sometimes happen that the character and moral condition of an epoch are only too plainly revealed by the new words which have risen up in that period, upon which sometimes they reflect back a very fearful light. Thus a great Latin historian tells us of the Roman emperor, Tiberius, one of those " inventors of evil things " to whom St. Paul alludes (Rom. i. 30), that he caused words, unknown before, to emerge in the Latin tongue, for the setting out of wickednesses, happily also previously unknown, which he had invented.

The atrocious attempt of Louis the Fourteenth to convert to Romanism the Protestants in his dominions by quartering dragoons upon them, with all licence to misuse to the uttermost those who would not apostatize from their faith, this " booted mission " (mission bottée), as it was facetiously called at the time, has bequeathed ' dragonnade ' to the French language. I believe ' refugee ' had at the same time its rise, and in the same event, being first applied to those who escaped the tender mercies of these missionaries. ' Convertisseur ' also belongs to the same period. He was a factor who undertook to convert the Protestants on a large scale, and at so much a head.

' Roué,' a word almost naturalized among us, throws light upon a curious though shameful page of history. It is a term applied, as we may be aware, to a man of profligate character and conduct ; but properly and primarily means one ' wheeled,' or broken on the wheel. Now the first

person who gave it its secondary meaning, was the profligate Duke of Orleans, Regent of France in the interval between the reigns of Louis the Fourteenth and Fifteenth. It was his miserable pride to collect around him companions as worthless and wicked as himself, and these he called his 'roués,' inasmuch as there was not one of them that did not deserve, as he was wont to boast, to be broken on the wheel,—that being then in France the punishment for the worst malefactors.\* When we have learned the pedigree of the word, the man and the age which gave it birth rise up before us, glorying in their shame, and no longer caring to pay to virtue even that outward hypocritical homage, which vice not seldom yields.

The great French Revolution has made also its contributions to the French language; and these contributions characteristic enough. We know much of what it was, when we know that among other words it gave birth to these, 'sansculotte,' 'incivisme,' 'terrorisme,' 'noyade,' 'guillotine,' 'lanterner.' Still later, the French conquests in North Africa, and the pitiless methods by which every attempt at resistance on the part of the free tribes of the interior has been put down and punished, all this has left its mark upon the language; for it has added to it the word 'razzia,' to express the sweeping and sudden destruction of a tribe, its herds, its crops, and all that belongs to it—a word bearing on its front that it is not originally of

\* [Saint Simon.] The 'roués' themselves declared that the word expressed rather their readiness to give any proof of their affection, even to the being broken upon the wheel, to their protector and friend.

French formation, having rather an Italian physiognomy, but being, I believe, the popular corruption of an Arabic word\*—one of which the language therefore may be as little proud, as the people of the thing which is indicated by it.

But it would ill become us to look only abroad for examples of that whereof perhaps at least an equal abundance may be found much nearer home, and it must at once be acknowledged that there are words also among ourselves, which preserve a record of passages in our history in which we have little reason to glory. Thus 'mob' and 'sham' had their birth in one of the most disgraceful periods of English history, that between the Restoration and the Revolution. The first of these words originated in a certain club in London in the latter end of the reign of Charles the Second. "I may note," says a writer of the time, "that the rabble first changed their title, and were called the 'mob' in the assemblies of this [The Green Ribbon] Club.† It was their beast of burden, and called first 'mobile vulgus,' but fell naturally into the contraction of one syllable, and ever since is become proper English."‡ Yet

\* [Arab. *ghāziya*, a military raid (*Stanford Dictionary of Anglicized Words*), but the form *ghrazzu* (Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, ii. 584) is also found. Devic states that *razia* is the Algerian pronunciation of Arab. *ghāziya* (Supplement to Littré, p. 58).]

† [About 1680. In the *Memoirs of the Verney Family*, *mobile* occurs in 1679 (iv. 259), but *mobb* in 1688 (iv. 447). The latter form also in Shadwell, *Squire of Alsatia*, 1688, and Dryden, *Don Sebastian* (iii. 3), ab. 1690.]

‡ North's *Examen* [1740], p. 574. If we may trust the origin of 'sham' which he gives, p. 231, it is not less disgraceful than the word itself. [North, in the passage referred to, says that *sham*, for 'sham'd' (ashamed).

we find considerably later a writer in *The Spectator* speaking of 'mob' as still only struggling into existence. "I dare not answer," he says, "that mob, rap, pos, incog., and the like will not in time be looked at as part of our tongue." \* In regard of 'mob' for the 'mobile' vulgar, the multitude swayed hither and thither by each gust of passion or caprice, this, which *The Spectator* hardly expected, while he confessed it possible, has actually taken place. "It is one of the many words formerly slang, which are now used by our best writers, and received, like pardoned outlaws, into the body of respectable citizens." Again, though the murdering of poor helpless lodgers, afterwards to sell their bodies for dissection, cannot be regarded as a crime in which the nation had a share, or anything but the monstrous wickedness of one or two, yet the word 'to burke,' drawn from the name of a wretch who long pursued this hideous traffic,† a word which has won its place in the language, will be a lasting memorial in all after times, unless indeed its origin should be forgotten, to how strange a crime this age of a boasted civilization could give birth.

Such are some of the sources of increase in the wealth of a language, or, it may be, in that which has no just title to be termed by this name. There have been, from time to time, those who have so

was at first a by-word for a disguised harlot, and was afterwards used by Dangerfield of a sham (i.e. fictitious or counterfeit) plot.]

\* [No. 135, 1711, Aug. 4.]

† [Burke was executed in 1829, Feb. 1, when the mob cried out to the hangman, "Burke him! Burke him!" The year following the verb is used by Lamb.]

little understood what a language and the laws of a language are, that they have sought by decrees of theirs to arrest its growth, pronouncing it to have attained to the limits of its growth and development, so that no one should henceforward presume to make further additions to it. But a language has a life, just as really as a man or as a tree; as a man, it must grow to its full stature, being also submitted to his conditions of decay; as a forest tree will defy any feeble bands which should attempt to control its expansion, so long as the principle of growth is in it; as a tree too will continually, while it casts off some leaves, be putting forth others. The attempt therefore has utterly failed, even when made under the most favourable conditions for success. For instance, the French Academy, containing the great body of the distinguished literary men of France, once sought to exercise such a domination over their own language, and if any could have succeeded, might have hoped to do so. But the language recked of their decrees as little as the advancing ocean did of those of Canute. They were obliged to give way, and in each successive edition of their *Dictionary* to throw open its doors to words which had established themselves in the language, and would hold their ground, comparatively indifferent whether they received the Academy's seal of allowance or no.

Certainly those who make attempts of this kind strangely forget that *all* the words in a language, with the exception of its primitive roots, were at one time or another novelties. We have so taken for granted that those with which we have been always familiar, whose right to form a part of it no



one dreams of challenging or disputing, being perfectly naturalized now, have always formed part of it, that we should, I believe, be somewhat startled to discover of how very late introduction not a few of them actually are ; what an amount of remonstrance, and even resistance, some of them encountered at the first. To take two or three Latin examples ;—Cicero, in employing ‘favor,’ a word in a little while after used by everybody, does it with an apology, seems to feel that he is introducing a questionable novelty : ‘urbanus,’ too, in our sense of ‘urbane,’ had in his time only just come up : ‘obsequium’ he believes Terence to have been the first to employ.\* ‘Soliloquium’ seems to us so natural, indeed so necessary, a word, this ‘soliloquy,’ or talking of a man with himself alone, something which would so inevitably seek out its adequate expression, that it is something of a surprise to learn that no one spoke of a ‘soliloquy’ before Augustine, the word having been invented, as he distinctly informs us that it was, by himself.†

When a word has proved an unquestionable gain to the language, it is very interesting to preside, so to speak, at its birth, to watch it as it first comes forth, timid, and it may be as yet doubtful of the reception it will meet with ; and the interest is very much enhanced if it thus comes forth on some memorable occasion, or from some memorable man. Both these interests meet in the word ‘essay.’ If any one were asked what is the most

\* On the new words in classical Latin see Quintilian *Inst.* viii. 3, 30–37.

† *Solil.* 2. 7.

remarkable volume of essays which the world has seen, few, having sufficient oversight of the field of literature to be capable of replying, would fail to answer, Lord Bacon's. But they were also the first which bore that name ; for we certainly gather from the following passage in the (intended) dedication of the volume to Prince Henry, that the word ' essay ' was altogether a very recent one in the English language, and in the use to which he put it, perfectly novel : he says—" To write just treatises requireth leisure in the writer, and leisure in the reader ; . . . which is the cause which hath made me choose to write certain brief notes set down rather significantly than curiously, which I have called *Essays*. The word is late, but the thing is ancient."\* From these words, and others which I have omitted in the quotation, we further gather that, little as ' essays ' at the present day can be considered a word of modesty, deprecating too large expectations on the part of the reader, it had, as ' sketches ' perhaps would have now, as ' commentary ' had in the Latin, such an ethical significance in this its earliest use. In this last respect it resembled the ' philosopher ' of Pythagoras. Before his time the founders of systems of philosophy had styled themselves, or been willing to be styled by others, ' wise men.' This appellation, ' lover of wisdom,' so modest and so beautiful, was of his devising.†

Let us remark, at the same time, that while thus some words surprise us that they are so new, others again that they are so old. Few, I should

\* [The old pronunciation of the word was " an essay."]

† Diogenes Laertius, *præm.* § 12.

imagine, are aware that the word 'rationalist,' and this in a theological, and not merely a philosophical, sense, is of such early date as it is; or that we have not imported quite in these later times both the name and the thing from Germany. This, however, is very far from being in either respect the case. There was a sect of 'rationalists' in the time of the Commonwealth, who called themselves such exactly on the same grounds as those who in later times have challenged the name. Thus, one writing the news from London among other things mentions: \* "There is a new sect sprung up among them [the Presbyterians and Independents], and these are the *Rationalists*, and what their reason dictates them in Church or State stands for good, until they be convinced with better;" with more to the same effect. The word 'Christology' a reviewer has lately characterized as a monstrous importation from Germany. I should quite agree with him that English theology does not need, and can do excellently well without it; yet it is not this absolute novelty; for in the *Preface* to the works of that great divine of the seventeenth century, Thomas Jackson, written by Benjamin Oley, his friend and pupil, the following passage occurs: "The reader will find in this author an eminent excellence in that part of divinity which I make bold to call *Christology*, in displaying the great mystery of godliness, God the Son manifested in human flesh." †

\* With date, Oct. 14, 1646; in *The Clarendon State Papers*, vol. ii. p. 40 of the *Appendix*.

† [1673.] *Preface to Dr. Jackson's Works*, vol. i. p. xxvii. A work of Fleming's, published in 1700, bears the title *Christology*

In their power of taking up foreign or otherwise new words into healthy circulation and making them truly their own, languages are very different as compared with one another, and the same language is very different from itself at different periods of its life. There are languages of which the appetite and digestive power, the assimilative energy, is at some periods almost unlimited. Nothing is too hard for them ; they will shape and mould to their own uses and habits almost whatsoever is offered to them. This, however, is in their youth ; as age advances, this assimilative power diminishes. Words are still adopted ; for this process of adoption can never wholly cease : but a chemical amalgamation of the new with the old does not any longer find place ; or only in some instances, and very partially even in them. They lie often on the surface of the language ; their sharp corners are not worn and rounded off ; they remain foreign still in their aspect and outline, and, having missed their opportunity of becoming otherwise, will remain so to the end. Those who adopt, as with an inward misgiving about their own gift and power of stamping them afresh, seem to make a conscience of keeping them in exactly the same form in which they have received them ; instead of conforming them to the laws of that new community into which they are now received. Nothing will illustrate this so well as a comparison of different words of the same family, which have at different periods been introduced into our language. We shall find that those of an earlier introduction have become English through and through, while the later introduced,

belonging to the same group, have been very far from undergoing the same transforming process. Thus 'bishop,' a word as old as the introduction of Christianity into England, though not hiding its descent from 'episcopus,' is thoroughly English; while 'episcopal,' which has supplanted 'bishoply,'\* is only a Latin word in an English dress. 'Alms,' too, is genuine English, and the English which has descended to us from far; the very shape in which we have the word, one syllable for 'eleemosyna' of six, sufficiently testifying this; "letters," as Horne Tooke observes, "like soldiers, being apt to desert and drop off in a long march." I need not say that the long and awkward 'eleemosynary' is of far more recent date.† Or sometimes this comparison is still more striking, when it is not merely words of the same family, but the very same word which has been twice adopted, at an earlier period and a later—the early form will be truly English, as 'palsy'; the later will be only a Greek or Latin word spelt with English letters, as 'paralysis.' 'Dropsy,' 'quinsy,' 'megrim,' 'surgeon,' 'tansy,' 'dittany,' 'daffodil,'‡ and many more words that one might name, have nothing of strangers or foreigners about them, have made themselves quite at home in English. So entirely is their physiognomy native, that it would be difficult even to suspect them to be of Greek descent as they all

\* ['Bishoply' occurs as late as 1642, and 'episcopal' as early as 1485.—*N.E.D.*]

† [The earliest quotations in the *N.E.D.* for 'eleemosynary' are 1620–30.]

‡ [From *hydrōpisis*, *cynanchē*, *hēmikranion*, *cheirourgos*, *athanasia*, *diktamnos*, *asphōdēlos*.]

are. Nor has 'kickshaws' anything about it now which would compel us at once to recognize in it the French 'quelques choses'—'French *kickshose*,' as with allusion to the quarter from which it came, and while the memory of that was yet fresh in men's minds, it was often called by our early writers.

One of the most striking facts about new words, and a very signal testimony of their birth from the bosom of the people, that is, where they are not plainly from the schools, is the difficulty which is so often found in tracing their pedigree. When the *causæ vocum* are sought, which they justly are, and out of much more than mere curiosity, for the *causæ rerum* are very often contained in them, they continually elude research; and this, not merely where attention has only been called to the words, and interest about their etymology excited, long after they had been in popular use, and where thus they had left their origin, whatever it may have been, very far behind them—for that the words of a remote antiquity should often puzzle and perplex us, should give scope to idle guesses, or altogether defy conjecture,\* this is nothing strange—but even when it has been sought to investigate their origin almost as soon as they have come into existence. Their rise is mysterious; like so many other acts of *becoming*, it is veiled in deepest obscurity. They appear, they are in everybody's mouth; but yet, when it is inquired from whence

\* [Such a word is 'conundrum,' which leaps into existence, like a meteorite from some unknown planet, first in the sixteenth century in Gabriel Harvey. It is next noted in Ben Jonson, *The Fox*, 1605, v. 7.]

they are, nobody can tell. They are but of yesterday, and yet with a marvellous rapidity they have already forgotten the circumstances of their origin. This is nowhere more striking than in the names applied to political or religious parties, and above all in the names of slight, of contempt, of scorn. Thus Baxter tells us in his most instructive *Narrative of his Life and Times*, that there already existed two explanations of 'Roundhead,' \* a word not nearly so old as himself. How much has been written about the origin of the German 'Ketzer,' † or heretic, which yet is still in debate ; hardly less about the French 'cagot,' which however is pretty certainly "*canis Gothicas*," this virtually excommunicated race being a real or supposed remnant of the refugee Gothic population of Spain among the Pyrenees.‡ Is 'Lollard,' or 'Loller' as we have it in Chaucer, from 'lollen' to chaunt ? that is, does it mean the chaunting, or canting people ? §

\* "The original of which name is not certainly known. Some say it was because the Puritans then commonly wore short hair, and the king's party long hair : some say, it was because the Queen at Strafford's trial asked who that *round-headed* man was, meaning Mr. Pym, because he spake so strongly " (p. 34).

† [By one of those strange revolutions of meaning so often exhibited by words. *Katharoi*, the Greek name of a Manichean sect, meaning "the Pure," has yielded *Ketzer* in German (Dut. *Ketter*) in the sense of (1) a heretic, (2) a depraved reprobate. See Kluge, s.v.]

‡ ['Cagot,' so Diez and Scheler.]

§ ['Lollard' is supposed to have meant originally a mumblor of prayers and hymns, like Tennyson's Roundhead who "hummed a surly hymn," being borrowed from Dutch *lollaerd*, a mutterer or mumblor, and that from *lollen*, to mutter, an imitative word from the infantile *lall*, to speak (indistinctly), common to most languages.]

or had the Lollards their title from a principal person among them of this name, who suffered at the stake?—to say nothing of a proposed derivation from ‘lolium,’ these men being regarded by their adversaries as *tares* among the wholesome wheat. The origin of ‘Huguenot,’ as applied to the French Protestants, was already a matter of doubt and discussion in the lifetime of those who first bore it.\* Were the ‘Waldenses’ so called from one Peter Waldo, to whom these “Poor Men of Lyons,” as they were at first called, owed their origin? or is Waldenses for Vallenses, the men of the Alpine valleys, the Dalesmen?—a question, the certain determination of which would go far to settle the most difficult and disputed points in the history of these witnesses for scriptural truth.

One might anticipate that a name like ‘Canada,’ given, and within fresh historic times, to a vast territory, would be accounted for; but it is not; † so too that the Anglo-Americans would be able to explain how they got their word ‘caucus,’ which plays so prominent a part in their elections, but

\* It can hardly be other than a corruption of ‘Eidgenoten,’ low German for ‘Eidgenossen,’ confederates; but this was not the explanation of some who must have been grown men at the time of its first emerging. [This, though discredited by Skeat (*Etym. Dict.* s.v.) and Scheler, is now accepted by MM. Hatzfeld and Darmesteter, the mediating form being *Eiguenots*.]

† [‘Canada’ is said to be the native, i.e. Iroquois, word *Kanata*, a collection of huts or wigwams misinterpreted by the French settlers (Taylor, *Names and their Histories*, p. 82); or according to others, “my dwelling,” the explanatory remark of their Indian guide (E. J. Payne, *Hist. of the New World*, ii. 237, 368).]



they cannot.\* 'Cannibal' as a designation of man-eating savages, came first into use with the great discoveries in the western world of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: no certain explanation of it has yet been offered.†

These are but a handful of examples of the way in which words forget the circumstances of their birth. Now if we could believe in any merely *arbitrary* words, standing in connexion with nothing but the mere lawless caprice of some inventor, the impossibility of tracing their derivations would be nothing strange. Indeed, it would be lost labour to seek for the parentage of all words, when many perhaps had none. But there is no such thing; there is no word which is not, as the Spanish gentleman loves to call himself, an 'hidalgo,' the son of something. All are the embodiment, more or less successful, of a sensation, a thought, or a fact; or if of more fortuitous birth, still they attach themselves somewhere to the already subsisting world of words and things, and have their point of

\* It is most probably a 'corruption of 'caulkers,' being derived from an association of these at Boston, who were especially active in preparing resistance to England in the period immediately preceding the War of Independence. The *thing* corresponds now very nearly to the Latin 'sodalitium.' [Dr. Murray throws doubt on the above account, and thinks 'caucus' may be from the Algonkin word *cau-cau-asu*, that which advises or encourages (*N.E.D.*). It was in use in 1763.]

† Humboldt has certainly made it probable that 'canibal' (for it is spelt, and this is not unimportant, with a single *n* in *Hackluyt's Voyages* and in all our early English) is a Latin corruption of 'Caribales,' a form under which Columbus designates the Caribs (propter rabiem *caninam* anthropophagorum gentis); as in French, 'appetit de *chien*.' [So *N.E.D.*]

contact with it and departure from it, not always discoverable, as we see, but yet always existing.\* And thus, when a word entirely refuses to give up the secret of its origin, it can be regarded in no other light but as a riddle which no one has succeeded in solving, a lock of which no man has found the key—but still a riddle which has a solution, a lock for which there is a key, though now, it may be, irrecoverably lost. And this difficulty, this impossibility oftentimes, of tracing the genealogy even of words of a very recent formation, is, as I observed, an evidence of the birth at least of these out of the heart and from the lips of the people. Had they had their rise first in books, then it would be easily traced ; had it been from the schools of the learned, these would not have failed to have left a recognizable stamp and mark upon them.

There is, indeed, another way in which obscurity may rest on a new word, or a word employed in a new sense ; and while there may be no difficulty at all in its etymology, yet in the application of its etymology there may be the greatest possible difficulty. It may bear unmistakably on its front the word or words from which it is derived, while yet we may be altogether at a loss in regard of the original intention in which it was coined and fashioned. For example, no one has called or could call in question the derivation of ' apocryphal,' that the word means hidden ; but when it is asked, why has this epithet been given to certain books which the Church either sets below the canonical Scrip-

\* Some will remember here the old Greek dispute whether words were *θέσει* or *φύσει*. It is needless to say that the last is the truth.

tures or rejects altogether, then a long and doubtful discussion begins. Were they so called because their origin was *hidden* to the early Fathers of the Church, and so reasonable suspicions of their authenticity entertained? \* or was it because they were mysteriously kept out of sight and *hidden* by the heretical sects which boasted themselves in their possession? or was it that they were books not laid up in the Church chest, but *hidden away* in obscure corners? or were they books *worthier to be hidden* than to be brought forward and read to the faithful?—for all these explanations have been offered, and none with such superiority of proof on its side as to have closed the discussion.

Again, there can be no reasonable doubt that 'Carnival' is 'Caro, vale'; but there is much whether these words in this combination mean, as is commonly assumed, "Flesh, farewell,"—that is, now that Lent, the season of abstinence, is beginning,—or "Flesh, be strong"—a summons, that is, to the Christian to gird up the loins of his mind that he may sustain the rigours and austerities of the coming time.† Again, there is no question that

\* Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, 15. 23): "Apocrypha nuncupantur eo quod eorum occulta origo non claruit Patribus." Cf. *Con. Faust.* 11. 2. [Dr. Murray decides in favour of this explanation, of unknown authorship, and so spurious, uncanonical,—*N.E.D.*]

† [It is now established that *vale* is no part of the word, as long supposed. Ital. *carnevale* (standing for *carnelevale*) is from Med. Latin *carnelevarium*, from *carnem levare*, to remove flesh, and so signifies *il levar del carne*, the putting away of flesh food on Shrove Tuesday, and then the festivity indulged in at that season.—*N.E.D.*]

'tragedy' is "the song of the goat"; but why the song of the goat, whether because a goat was the prize for the best performers of that song in which the germs of the future tragedy lay; or because the first actors were dressed like satyrs in goat-skins;\*—is a question which has stirred abundant discussion, and will remain unsettled to the end. 'Leonine' verses have plainly to do with 'leo' in some shape or other; but are they so called from one Leo or Leolinus, who first composed hexameters with this internal rhyme? or because, as the lion is king of beasts, so this, in the monkish estimation, is the king of metres? No one can certainly say.

But we must conclude. I may have seemed in this present lecture a little to have outrun your needs, and to have sometimes moved in a sphere too remote from that in which your future work will lie. Perhaps it may have been so; yet is it in truth very difficult to say of any words, that they do not touch us, that they do not reach us in their influence, or in some way bear upon our studies, and upon that which we shall hereafter have to teach, or shall desire to learn. It were rash to affirm that there are any conquests which language makes that concern only a few, and may be regarded indifferently by all others. For it is here as with many inventions in the arts and luxuries of life, which, being in the beginning the exclusive privilege and possession of the wealthy,

\* [Or, more probably, because the performer wore a mask like a goat, a primitive custom in dances and histrionic representations. See M. Haberlandt, *Ethnology*, 70-71; L. Dyer, *The Gods in Greece*, 172.]

the cultivated, the refined, do yet gradually descend into lower strata of society, until at length what were once the luxuries and elegancies of a few, have become the decencies, well-nigh the necessities, of all. Exactly in the same manner there are words, once only on the lips of philosophers or theologians, of the deeper thinkers of their time, or of those interested in their speculations, which yet step by step have come down, not debasing themselves in this act of becoming popular, but training and elevating an ever-increasing number to understand and embrace their meaning, till at length they have become truly a part of the nation's common stock, "household words," used naturally and easily by all.

And I know not how I can better conclude this lecture than by quoting some words which express with a rare eloquence all which I have been labouring to utter; for this truth, which many indeed have noticed, none that I am aware of have set forth with at all the same fulness of illustration, or with at all the same sense of its importance, as the author of *The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, whose words now quoted are but one out of many passages on the same theme:—  
"Language is often called an instrument of thought, but it is also the nutriment of thought; or rather, it is the atmosphere in which thought lives; a medium essential to the activity of our speculative powers, although invisible and imperceptible in its operation; and an element modifying, by its qualities and changes, the growth and complexion of the faculties which it feeds. In this way the influence of preceding discoveries upon

subsequent ones, of the past upon the present, is most penetrating and universal, although most subtle and difficult to trace. The most familiar words and phrases are connected by imperceptible ties with the reasonings and discoveries of former men and distant times. Their knowledge is an inseparable part of ours ; the present generation inherits and uses the scientific wealth of all the past. And this is the fortune, not only of the great and rich in the intellectual world of those who have the key to the ancient storehouses, and who have accumulated treasures of their own, but the humblest inquirer, while he puts his reasonings into words, benefits by the labours of the greatest. When he counts his little wealth, he finds he has in his hands coins which bear the image and superscription of ancient and modern intellectual dynasties, and that in virtue of this possession acquisitions are in his power, solid knowledge within his reach, which none could ever have attained to if it were not that the gold of truth once dug out of the mine circulates more and more widely among mankind."

## VI.

### ON THE DISTINCTION OF WORDS.

It is to the subject of synonyms and their distinction, with the advantages which may be derived from the study of these, that I propose to devote the present lecture. But what, it may be asked, do we mean, when, comparing certain words with one another, we affirm of them that they are synonyms? We mean that they are words which, with great and essential resemblances of meaning, have at the same time small, subordinate, and partial differences—these differences being such as either originally, and on the ground of their etymology, inhered in them; or differences which they have by usage acquired in the eyes of all; or such as, though nearly latent now, they are capable of receiving at the hands of wise and discreet masters of the tongue. Synonyms are words of like significance in the main, but with a certain unlikeness as well.

So soon as the term is defined thus, it will be at once perceived by any acquainted with the derivation, that strictly speaking, it is a misnomer, and is given to these words with a certain inaccuracy and impropriety; since in strictness the terms 'synonyms,' or 'synonymous,' applied to words, would affirm of them that they covered not merely almost the same extent of meaning, but altogether and exactly the same, that they were in their signification perfectly identical and coincident. The terms, however, are not ordinarily so used; and plainly they are not so, when it is undertaken to trace out the distinction between synonyms; for, without undertaking to deny that there may be

such absolutely coincident words, such perfect synonyms, yet these could not be the object of any such discrimination ; since, where there was no real distinction, it would be lost labour and the exercise of a perverse ingenuity to attempt to draw one.

There are indeed those who affirm that words in one language are never exactly synonymous, in all respects commensurate, with words in another ; that, when they are compared, there is always something more or something less, or something different, in these and in those. And in respect of all words save those which designate objects in their nature absolutely incapable of a more or less, or of any qualitative difference, I should be disposed to consider the exceptions to this assertion exceedingly rare. For what after all is a word, but the enclosure of a certain district, larger or smaller, from the great outfield of thought or fact, and in this a bringing of it into human cultivation, a redeeming of it for human uses ? But how extremely unlikely it is that nations, drawing altogether independently of one another these lines of enclosure, should draw them in any cases exactly in the same direction, neither narrower nor wider ; how inevitable, on the contrary, that very often they should not coincide—and this, even supposing no moral forces were at work to disturb the falling of the lines. How vast and instructive a field of comparison between languages does this fact lay open to us ; while it is sufficient to drive a translator with a high ideal of the task which he has undertaken well-nigh to despair.

Synonyms then, as the word is generally un-



derstood, and as I shall use it here, are words with slight differences already existing between them, or with the capabilities of such. They are not on the one side words absolutely identical ; but neither, we may add, on the other only very remotely related to one another ; for the differences between these last will be self-evident, will so lie on the surface and proclaim themselves to all, that it would be impossible to make them clearer than they already are, and it would be like holding a candle to the sun to attempt it. They must be words which are more or less liable to confusion, but which yet ought not to be confounded ; words, as one has said, “ *quæ conjungi, non confundi, debent* ” ; words in which there originally inhered a difference, or between which, though once absolutely identical, such has gradually grown up, and so established itself in the use of the best writers, and in the instinct of the best speakers of the tongue, that it claims to be recognized and openly admitted by all.

But here an interesting question presents itself to us, which is this : How do languages come to possess synonyms of this latter class, which are differenced not by etymology or other deep-lying and necessary distinction, but only by usage ? Now if languages had been made by agreement, of course no such words could exist ; for when one word had been found which was the adequate representative of a feeling or an object, no further one would have been sought. But languages are the result of processes very different from, and far less formal and regular than, this. Various tribes, each with its own dialect, kindred indeed, but in many respects

distinct, coalesce into one people, and cast their contributions of language into a common stock. Thus the French possesses many synonyms from the *langue d'Oc* and *langue d'Oil*, each having contributed its word for one and the same thing, as 'âtre' and 'foyer,' both for hearth. Sometimes two have the same word, but in forms sufficiently different to cause that both remain, but as different words; thus in Latin, 'serpo' and 'repo' are merely two slightly different appropriations of the same Greek word, and of 'puteo' and 'foeteo' the same may be said; \* just as in German, 'Odem' and 'Athem' were originally only dialectic differences of the same word. Or again, a conquering people have fixed themselves in the midst of a conquered; they impose their dominion, but do not succeed in imposing their language; nay, being few in number, they find themselves at last compelled to adopt the language of the conquered; or after a while that which may be called a transaction, a compromise between the two languages finds place. Thus it was in England; our modern English being in the main such a compromise between the Anglo-Saxon and the Norman-French.

These are causes of the existence of synonyms, which reach far back into the history of a nation and a language; but other causes at a later period are also at work. When a written literature springs up, authors familiar with various foreign tongues, import from one and another words which are not absolutely required, which are oftentimes rather luxuries than necessities. Sometimes

\* [The identification of the latter pair of words is inadmissible.—Curtius, i. 356.]

having a very good word of their own, they must needs go and look for a finer one, as they esteem it, from abroad ; as, for instance, the Latin having its own good and expressive 'succinum' (from 'succus') for amber, some must import from the Greek the ambiguous 'electrum.' But of these which are thus proposed as candidates for admission, some fail to obtain the rights of citizenship, and after longer or shorter probation are rejected ; it may be, never advance beyond their first proposer. Enough, however, receive the stamp of popular allowance to create embarrassment, for a while until, that is, their relations with the already existing words are adjusted. As a single illustration of the various quarters from which the English has thus been augmented and enriched, I would instance the words 'trick,' 'device,' 'finesse,' 'artifice,' and 'stratagem,' and enumerate the various sources from which we have drawn them. Here 'trick' is Saxon,\* 'devisa' is Italian, 'finesse' is French, 'artificium' is Latin, and 'stratagema' Greek.

By and bye, however, as a language becomes itself an object of greater attention, at the same time that society, advancing from a simpler to a more complex state, has more things to designate, more thoughts to utter, and more distinctions to draw, it is felt a waste of resources to employ two or more words for the signifying of one and the same object. Men feel, and rightly, that with a boundless world lying around them, and demanding to be named, and which they only make their own in the measure and to the extent that they do name it, with infinite shades and varieties of thought and

\* [Rather Dutch.—Skeat.]

feeling subsisting in their own minds, and claiming to find utterance in words, it is a mere and wanton extravagance to expend two or more signs on that which could adequately be set forth by one—an extravagance in one part of their expenditure, which will be almost sure to issue in, and to be punished by, a corresponding scantness and straitness in another. Some thought or feeling will wholly want its adequate sign, because another has two. Hereupon that which has been well called the process of 'desynonymizing' begins—that is, of gradually coming to discriminate in use between words which have hitherto been accounted perfectly equivalent, and, as such, indifferently employed. It is a positive enriching of a language when this process is at any point felt to be accomplished, when two or more words, which were once promiscuously used, are felt to have had each its own peculiar domain assigned to it, which it shall not itself overstep, upon which the others shall not encroach. This may seem at first sight but as the better regulation of old territory; for all practical purposes it is the acquisition of new.

It is not to be supposed that this desynonymizing process is effected according to any pre-arranged purpose or plan. The working genius of the language accomplishes its own objects, causes these synonymous words insensibly to fall off from one another, and to acquire separate and peculiar meanings. The most that any single writer can do, save indeed in the terminology of science, is, as has been observed, to assist an already existing inclination, to bring to the consciousness of all that which may already have been implicitly felt

by many, and thus to hasten the process of this disengagement, or, as it has been excellently expressed, "to regulate and ordinate the evident nisus and tendency of the popular usage into a severe definition"; and establish on a firm basis the distinction, so that it shall not be lost sight of or brought into question again. This, for instance, Wordsworth did in respect of the words, 'imagination' and 'fancy.' Before he wrote, it was, I suppose, obscurely felt by most that in 'imagination' there was more of the earnest, in 'fancy' of the play, of the spirit, that the first was a loftier faculty and gift than the second; yet for all this the words were continually, and not without loss, confounded. He first, in the *Preface* to his *Lyrical Ballads*, rendered it impossible that any one, who had read and mastered what he had written on the two words, should remain unconscious any longer of the essential difference existing between them.\*

\* I had read a great many years ago, in De Quincey's *Letters to a Young Man whose Education has been Neglected* a passage which I had still clearly in my mind while writing this paragraph. I have now recovered this passage, which, though it only says over again what is said above, yet does this so much more forcibly and fully, that I shall not hesitate to quote it, and the more readily that these letters, in many respects so valuable, have never been reprinted, but lie buried in the old numbers of a magazine (*The London Magazine*, 1823), like so many other of the 'dissecta membra' of this illustrious master of English prose: "All languages," he says, "tend to clear themselves of synonyms, as intellectual culture advances; the superfluous words being taken up and appropriated by new shades and combinations of thought evolved in the progress of society. And long before this appropriation is fixed and petrified, as it were, into the acknowledged vocabu-

Let me here remark how many other words in English are still waiting for such a discrimination. Thus how great an ethical gain would it be, how much clearness would it bring into men's thoughts and feelings, if the distinction which exists in Latin between 'vindicta' and 'ultio,' that the first is a moral act, the just punishment of the sinner by his God, of the criminal by the judge, the other an act in which the self-gratification of one who counts

lary of the language, an insensible *clinamen* (to borrow a Lucretian word) prepares the way for it. Thus, for instance, before Mr. Wordsworth had unveiled the great philosophic distinction between the powers of *fancy* and *imagination*, the two words had begun to diverge from each other, the first being used to express a faculty somewhat capricious and exempted from law, the other to express a faculty more self-determined. When, therefore, it was at length perceived, that under an apparent unity of meaning there lurked a real dualism, and for philosophic purposes it was necessary that this distinction should have its appropriate expression, this necessity was met half way by the *clinamen* which had already affected the popular usage of the words." Compare with this what Coleridge had before said (*Biogr. Lit.* vol. i. p. 90). It is to Coleridge we owe the word 'desynonymize,' against which indeed purists will object that it is of hybrid formation, the prefix Latin, the body of the word Greek; and his own contributions direct and indirect in this province are perhaps both more in number and more important than those of any English writer; as, for instance, the disentanglement of 'fanaticism' and 'enthusiasm,' which we mainly owe to him (*Lit. Rem.*, vol. ii. p. 365); of 'keenness' and 'subtlety' (*Table-Talk*, p. 140), 'poetry' and 'poesy' (*Lit. Rem.*, vol. i. p. 219); and that on which he himself laid so great a stress, 'reason' and 'understanding.' (Since this note was written, De Quincey's Works have been republished in a collected form in America. He is also himself republishing them in England; but it is to be feared that it will be long before he reaches the Letters alluded to above.) [See his *Works*, 1863, vol. xiii. pp. 9-94.]

himself injured or offended is sought, could in like manner be fully established (it does vaguely exist), between our 'vengeance' and 'revenge'; so that only 'vengeance' (with the verb 'avenge') should be ascribed to God, and to men acting as the executors of his righteous doom; while all in which their evil and sinful passions are the impulsive motive should be exclusively termed 'revenge.' As it now is, the moral disapprobation which cleaves, and cleaves justly, to 'revenge,' is oftentimes transferred almost unconsciously to 'vengeance'; while yet without vengeance it is impossible to conceive in an evil world any assertion of righteousness, any moral government whatsoever. These distinctions which still wait to be made we may fitly regard as so much reversionary wealth in our mother tongue.

The two causes which I mentioned above, the fact that English is in the main a compromise between the languages spoken by the Anglo-Saxon and the Norman, and the further circumstance that it has received, welcomed, and found place for many later additions, these causes have together effected that we possess in English a great many duplicates, not to speak of triplicates, or even such a quintuplicate as that which I adduced just now, where the Saxon, French, Italian, Latin, and Greek had each given us a word. Let me mention a few duplicate substantives, Anglo-Saxon and Latin: thus we have 'shepherd' and 'pastor'; 'feeling' and 'sentiment'; 'handbook' and 'manual'; 'ship' and 'nave'; 'anger' and 'ire'; 'grief' and 'dolour'; 'kingdom' and 'realm'; 'love' and 'charity'; 'feather' and

'plume'; 'forerunner' and 'precursor'; 'freedom' and 'liberty'; 'murder' and 'homicide'; 'moons' and 'lunes'—a word which has not been met with in the singular. Sometimes, in theology and science especially, we have gone both to the Latin and to the Greek, and drawn the same word from them both: thus 'deist' and 'theist'; 'numeration' and 'arithmetic'; 'Revelation' and 'Apocalypse'; 'temporal' and 'chronical'; 'compassion' and 'sympathy'; 'supposition' and 'hypothesis'; 'transparent' and 'diaphanous'; 'digit' and 'dactyle.' But to return to the Anglo-Saxon and Latin, the main factors of our tongue, besides duplicate substantives we have duplicate verbs, such as 'to heal' and 'to cure'; 'to whiten' and 'to blanch'; 'to soften' and 'to mollify'; 'to cloke' and 'to palliate'; with many more. Duplicate adjectives also are numerous, as 'shady' and 'umbrageous'; 'unreadable' and 'illegible'; 'unfriendly' and 'inimical'; 'almighty' and 'omnipotent.' Occasionally where only one substantive, an Anglo-Saxon, exists, yet the adjectives are duplicate, and the English, which has not adopted the Latin substantive, has yet admitted the adjective; thus 'burden' has not merely 'burdensome' but also 'onerous,' while yet 'onus' has found no place with us; 'priest' has 'priestly' and 'sacerdotal'; 'king' has 'kingly,' 'regal,' which is purely Latin, and 'royal,' which is Latin distilled through the Norman. 'Bodily' and 'corporal,' 'boyish' and 'puerile,' 'bloody' and 'sanguine,' 'fearful' and 'timid,' 'manly' and 'virile,' 'womanly' and 'feminine,' 'starry' and 'stellar,' 'yearly' and 'annual,' 'wooden' and



'ligneous,' may all be placed in the same list. Nor are these more than a handful of words out of the number which might be adduced, and I think you would find both pleasure and profit in seeking to add to these lists, and as far as you are able, to make them gradually complete.

I will observe by the way, that I have only adduced instances in which both the words have continued to maintain their ground in our spoken and written language to the present day. Other cases are not few in which these duplicates once existed, but in which the one word has in the end proved fatal to and has extinguished the other. Thus 'resurrection' and 'againrising' no doubt existed co-temporaneously; Wiclif uses them indifferently; we may say the same of 'judge' and 'doomsman,' 'adultery' and 'spouse-breach,' 'medicine' and 'leechcraft,' and of many words more. In each of these cases, however, instead of dividing the intellectual domain between them, which perhaps would not always have been easy, the one word has definitely put the other out of use; the Latin word, as you will observe, has triumphed over the Anglo-Saxon. I am not of those who consider these triumphs of the Latin element of our speech to be in every case a matter of regret; though I would not willingly have seen 'pavone,' which Spenser would have introduced, for our much older 'peacock'; or 'terremote,' which Gower employs, for 'earthquake,' or other such Latinisms as these.

But to return; if we look closely at those other words which have succeeded in maintaining side by side their ground, we shall not fail to observe

that in almost every instance they have asserted for themselves separate spheres of meaning, that although not in etymology, they have still in use become more or less distinct. Thus we use 'shepherd' almost always in its primary meaning, keeper of sheep; while 'pastor' is exclusively used in the topical sense, one that feeds the flock of God; at the same time the language having only the one adjective, 'pastoral,' that is of necessity common to both. 'Love' and 'charity' are used in our authorized version of Scripture promiscuously, and out of the sense of their equivalence are made to represent one and the same Greek work; but in modern use 'charity' has come predominantly to signify one particular manifestation of love, the supply of the bodily needs of others, 'love' continuing to express the affection of the soul. 'Ship' remains in its literal meaning, while 'nave' has become a symbolic term used in sacred architecture alone. So with 'illegible' and 'unreadable,' the first is applied to the handwriting, the second to the subject-matter written; thus, a man writes an 'illegible' hand; he has published an 'unreadable' book. So too it well becomes boys to be 'boyish,' but not men to be 'puerile.' Or take 'to blanch' and 'to whiten': we have grown to use the first in the sense of to withdraw colouring matter: thus we 'blanch' almonds or linen; the cheek is 'blanched' with fear, that is, by the withdrawing of the blood; but we 'whiten' a wall, not by the withdrawing of some other colour, but by the superinducing of white; thus 'whited sepulchres.' 'To palliate' is not now used, though it once was, in the sense of wholly 'to cloke' or

cover over, as it might be, our sins, but in that of *extenuating*; 'to palliate' our faults is not to hide them altogether, but to seek to diminish their guilt in part.

It might be urged that there was a certain preparedness in these words to separate off in their meaning from one another, inasmuch as they originally belonged to different stocks; nor would I deny that this may have assisted; but we find the same process at work where original difference of stock can have supplied no such assistance. 'Astronomy' and 'astrology' are both drawn from the Greek, nor is there any reason beforehand why the second should not be in as honourable use as the first; for it signifies the *reason*, as 'astronomy' the *law*, of the stars. But seeing there is a true and a false science of the stars, both needing words to utter them, it has come to pass that in our later use, 'astrology' designates always that pretended science of imposture, which affecting to submit the moral freedom of men to the influences of the heavenly bodies, prognosticates future events from the position of these, as contrasted with 'astronomy,' that true science which investigates the laws of the heavenly bodies in their relations to one another and to the planet upon which we dwell.

As these are both from the Greek, so 'despair' and 'diffidence' are both, though the second more directly than the first, from the Latin. At a period not very long past the difference between them was hardly appreciable; it certainly could not be affirmed of one that it was very much stronger than the other. If in one the absence of all *hope*, in the other that of all *faith*, was implied. In

proof I would only refer you to a book with which I am sure every English schoolmaster will wish to be familiar, I mean *The Pilgrim's Progress*, where "Mistress *Diffidence*" is "Giant *Despair's*" wife, and not a whit behind him in deadly enmity to the pilgrims; even as Jeremy Taylor speaks of the impenitent sinner's "*diffidence* in the hour of death," meaning, as the context plainly shows, his despair. But to what end two words for one and the same thing? And thus 'diffidence' did not retain that force of meaning which it had at the first, but little by little assumed a more mitigated sense (Hobbes speaks of "men's diffidence," that is, distrust, "of one another") till it has come in our present English to signify a becoming distrust of ourselves, an humble estimate of our own powers, with only a slight intimation in the word, as in the later uses of 'verecundia,' that perhaps this distrust is carried too far.

Again, 'interference' and 'interposition' are both from the Latin; and here too it lies not by any anterior necessity in the several derivations of the words, that they should have the different shades of meaning which yet they have obtained among us;—the Latin verbs which form their latter halves being about as strong one as the other. And yet in our practical use, 'interference' is something offensive; it is the pushing in of himself between two parties on the part of a third, who was not asked, and is not thanked for his pains, and who, as the feeling of the word implies, had no business there;\* while 'interposition' is employed

\* [*Inter-ference* is not, as might be supposed, a compound of Lat. *fero*, like *con-ference*, *in-ference*, etc., but

to express the friendly peacemaking mediation of one whom the act well became, and who, even if he was not specially invited thereunto, is still thanked for what he has done. How real an increase is it in the wealth and capabilities of a language thus to have discriminated such words as these ; and to be able to express acts outwardly the same by different words, as we would praise or blame them.\*

Let us now take some words which are not thus desynonymized by usage only, but which have an inherent etymological distinction,—one however, which it might be easy to overlook, which so long as we dwell on the surface of the word, we shall overlook ; and let us see whether we shall not be gainers by bringing out the distinction into clear consciousness. Here are the words ‘arrogant,’ ‘presumptuous,’ and ‘insolent’ : we often use them

of *inter* and *ferio*, I strike, and expresses the action of a stickler who strikes in, or between, two fencers to part them, and so intermeddles in the engagement. It may be doubted whether ‘interposition’ always implied friendly intervention.]

\* It must at the same time be acknowledged, that if in the course of time distinctions are thus created, and if this is the tendency of language, yet they are also sometimes, though far less often, obliterated. Thus the fine distinction between ‘yea’ and ‘yes,’ ‘nay’ and ‘no,’ that once existed in English, has quite disappeared. ‘Yea’ and ‘Nay,’ in Wiclif’s time, and a good deal later, were the answers to questions framed in the affirmative. “Will he come?” To this it would have been replied, ‘Yea,’ or ‘Nay,’ as the case might be. But “Will he not come?”—to this the answer would have been, ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ Sir Thomas More finds fault with Tyndale, that in his translation of the Bible he had not observed this distinction, which was evidently therefore going out even then, that is in the reign of Henry VIII, and shortly after it was quite forgotten.

promiscuously ; yet let us examine them a little more closely, and ask ourselves, as soon as we have succeeded in tracing the lines of demarcation between them, whether we are not now in possession of three distinct thoughts, instead of a single confused one. Thus, he is 'arrogant,' who claims the observance and homage of others as his due (*ad rogo*), does not wait for them to offer, but himself demands it ; or who, having right to one sort of observance, claims another to which he has no right. Thus, it was 'arrogance' in Nebuchadnezzar, when he required that all men should fall down before the image which he had reared. He, a man, was claiming for man's work the homage which belonged only to God. But one is 'presumptuous' who *takes* things to himself *before* he has acquired any title to them (*præ sumo*), the young man who already takes the place of the old, the learner who speaks as with the authority of the teacher. By and bye all this may very justly be his, but it is 'presumption' to anticipate it now. 'Insolent' means properly no more than unusual ; to act 'insolently' is to act unusually. The offensive sense which the word has acquired rests upon the feeling that there is a certain well-understood rule of society, a recognized standard of moral behaviour, to which each of its members should conform. The 'insolent' man is one who violates this rule, who breaks through this order, acting in an *unaccustomed* manner.\* The same

\* [To carry on the historical illustrations, as suggested above, it was 'presumption' in Prince Henry to forestall his father's death by putting on his crown (2 *Hen. IV.*, iv. 5) ; it was 'insolence' in the cynic Diogenes when he snarled at Alexander out of his tub.]

sense of the orderly being also the moral, speaks out in the word 'irregular'; a man of 'irregular,' is for us a man of immoral, life; and yet more strongly in the Latin language, which has but one word (*mores*) for customs and morals.

Or consider the following words: 'to hate,' 'to loathe,' 'to detest,' and 'to abhor.' Each of them rests on an image entirely distinct from the others; two, the first and second, being Anglo-Saxon, and the others Latin. 'To hate' is properly to be *inflamed* with passionate dislike, the word being connected with 'heat,' 'hot'; just as we speak, using the same figure, of persons being 'incensed' with anger, or of their anger 'kindling'; 'ira' and 'uro' being perhaps in like manner related;\* and 'excan-descentia' at any rate resting on this same image. 'To loathe' is properly to feel nausea, the turning of the stomach at that which excites first natural, and then by transfer, moral disgust. 'To detest' is to bear witness against, not to be able to keep silence in regard of something, to feel ourselves obliged to lift up our voice and testimony against it. 'To abhor' is to shrink shuddering back, as one would from an object of fear, an hissing serpent rising in one's path. Thus our blessed Lord 'hated' to see His Father's house profaned, when, the zeal of that house consuming Him, He drove forth in anger the profaners from it; He 'loathed' the lukewarmness of the Laodiceans, when He

\* [The *rapprochements* suggested here must be abandoned. 'Hate' has no connexion with 'heat,' but rather with Ger. *hatz*, baiting, *hetzen*, to pursue with hostile intent (Kluge). 'Ira' and 'uro,' I burn, are also quite unconnected.]

threatened to spue them out of His mouth ; He 'detested' the hypocrisy of the Pharisees and Scribes, when He proclaimed their sin, and uttered those eight woes against them (Matt. xxiii.) ; He 'abhorred' the evil suggestions of Satan, when He bade the Tempter to get behind Him, seeking to put a distance between Himself and him.

Sometimes words have no right at all to be considered synonyms, and yet are constantly used one for the other ; having in fact more need than synonyms themselves to be discriminated. Thus, what confusion is often made between 'genuine' and 'authentic.' How very commonly they are incorrectly used. And yet the distinction is a very plain one. A 'genuine' work is one written by the author whose name it bears ; an 'authentic' work is one which relates truthfully the matters of which it treats. For example, the apocryphal *Gospel of St. Thomas* is neither 'genuine' nor 'authentic.' It is not 'genuine,' for St. Thomas did not write it ; it is not 'authentic,' for its contents are mainly fables and lies. The history of the Alexandrian War which goes under Cæsar's name, is not 'genuine,' for he did not write it ; it is 'authentic,' being in the main a truthful record of the events which it professes to relate. Thiers' *History of the French Empire*, on the contrary, is 'genuine,' for he is certainly the author, but very far from 'authentic' ; while Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* is 'authentic' and 'genuine' both.\*

You will observe that in most of the words

\* [The usage is not so clearly defined as is here implied. See *N.E.D.*, s.v. 'Authentic,' A, 4 and 6.]



which I have adduced, I have sought to refer their usage to their etymologies, to follow the guidance of these, and by the same aid to trace the lines of demarcation which divide them. For I cannot but think it an omission in a very instructive volume upon synonyms which has lately been edited by Archbishop Whately, and a partial diminution of its usefulness, that in the valuation of words reference is so seldom made to these, the writer relying almost entirely on present usage, and the tact and instinct of a cultivated mind, for the appreciation of them aright. The accomplished author (or authoress) of this book indeed justifies this omission on the ground that a book of synonyms has to do with the present relative value of words, not with their roots and derivations; and further, that a reference to these brings in often what is only a disturbing force in the process, tending to confuse rather than to clear.\* But

\* Among the words of which the etymology, if we were to suffer ourselves to be led by it, would place us altogether on a wrong track as to its present meaning, the writer adduces 'allegiance,' which by usage signifies "the fidelity of the subject to his prince," while the etymology would rather suggest "contormity to law." But surely this derivation of it, as though it were 'ad legem,' is an erroneous one. It is rather derived from 'alligo,' as 'liege' from 'ligo'; and thus is perfectly true to its etymology, signifying as it does the obligation wherewith one is bound to his superior. Algeron Sidney, in his *Discourse concerning Government*, c. iii. § 36, falls into the same mistake; for, replying to some who maintained that submission was due to kings, even though they should act in direct contradiction to the fundamental laws of the kingdom, he observes that the very word 'allegiance,' of which they made so much, refuted them; for this was plainly "such an obedience as the law requires." He would have done

while it is quite true that words may often ride very slackly at anchor on their etymologies, may be borne hither and thither by the shifting tides and currents of usage, yet are they for the most part still holden by them. Very few have broken away and drifted from their moorings altogether. A 'novelist,' or writer of *new* tales in the present day is very different from a 'novelist' or upholder of *new* theories in politics and religion, of two hundred years ago ; yet the idea of *newness* is common to them both. A 'naturalist' was then a denier of revealed truth, of any but *natural* religion ; he is now an investigator, and often a pious one, of *nature* and of her laws ; yet the word has remained true to its etymology all the while. A 'methodist' was once a follower of a certain 'method' of philosophical induction, now of a 'method' in the fulfilment of religious duties ; but in either case 'method,' or orderly progression, is the soul of the word. Take other words which have changed or modified their meaning—'plantations,' for instance, which were once colonies of men (and indeed we still 'plant' a colony), but are now nurseries of young trees, and you will find the same to hold good. 'Ecstasy' *was* madness, it *is* delight, but in neither case has it departed from its fundamental meaning, since it is the nature alike of this and that *to set men out of and beside themselves*.

better appealing, as indeed on one occasion he does, to the word 'loyalty,' which, being derived from 'loi,' expresses properly that fidelity which one owes according to law, and does not necessarily include that attachment to the royal person which happily we in England have been able further to throw into the word.

And even when the fact is not so obvious as in these cases, the etymology of a word exercises an unconscious influence upon its uses, oftentimes makes itself felt when least expected, so that a word, after seeming quite to have forgotten, will after longest wanderings, return to it again. And one of the arts of a great poet or prose writer, who wishes to add emphasis to his style, to bring out all the latent forces of his native tongue, will very often consist in reconnecting a word by his use of it with its original derivation, in not suffering it to forget itself and its father's house, though it would. How often and with what signal effect Milton does this ; while yet how often the fact that he is doing it passes even by scholars unobserved.\* And even if all this were not so, yet the past history of a word, which history must needs *start* from its derivation, how soon soever that may be left behind, is surely a necessary element in its present valuation. A man may be wholly different now from what once he was, yet not the less to know his antecedents is needful, before we can ever perfectly understand his present self ; and the same holds good with a word.

There is often a moral value in the possession of synonyms, enabling us, as they do, to say

\* Bossuet supplies a good example of the same, who in his panegyric of the great Condé expresses himself thus : " On le vit *étonner* de ses regards étincelants ceux qui échappaient à ses coups." Take *étonner* in its usual secondary sense, and how feeble and pointless the whole ; but doubtless the sacred orator brought it back to the 'attonitus' from which it and our 'astonish' alike proceed, and then how grand its employment ! [Not quite correct, as our 'astonish' or 'astony' is from O. Fr. *estoner*, a Latin *ex-tonare*.]

exactly what we intend, without exaggeration or the putting of more into our words than we feel in our hearts, allowing us, as one has said, to be at once courteous and precise. Such moral advantage there is, for example, in the choice which we have between the words 'to felicitate' and 'to congratulate,' for the expressing of our sentiments and wishes in regard of the good fortune that happens to others. 'To felicitate' another is to wish him happiness, without affirming that his happiness is also ours. Thus out of that general goodwill with which we ought to regard all, we might 'felicitate' one almost a stranger to us ; nay, more, I can honestly felicitate one on his appointment to a post, or attainment of an honour, even though I may not consider him the fittest to have obtained it, though I should have been glad if another had done so ; I can desire and hope, that is, that it may bring all joy and happiness to him. But I could not, without a violation of truth, 'congratulate' him, or that stranger whose prosperity awoke no lively delight in my heart ; for when I 'congratulate' a person (con gratulor), I declare that I am sharer in his joy, that what has rejoiced him has rejoiced also me. We have all, I dare say, felt, even without having analysed the distinction between the words, that 'congratulate' is a far heartier word than 'felicitate,' and one with which it much better becomes us to welcome the good fortune of a friend ; and the analysis, as you perceive, perfectly justifies the feeling. 'Felicitations' are little better than compliments ; 'congratulations' are the expression of a genuine sympathy and joy

Let me illustrate the importance of synonymous distinctions by another example, by the words, 'to invent' and 'to discover'; or 'invention' and 'discovery.' How slight may seem to us the distinction between them, even if we see any at all. Yet try them a little closer, try them, which is the true proof, by aid of examples, and you will perceive that by no means can they be indifferently used; that, on the contrary, a great principle lies at the root of their distinction. Thus we speak of the 'invention' of printing, of the 'discovery' of America. Shift these words, and speak, for instance, of the 'invention' of America; you feel at once how unsuitable the language is. And why? Because Columbus did not make that to be which before him had not been. America was there before he revealed it to European eyes; but that which before *was*, he *showed* to be; he withdrew the veil which hitherto had concealed it; he 'discovered' it. So too we speak of Newton 'discovering' the law of gravitation; he drew aside the veil whereby men's eyes were hindered from perceiving it, but the law had existed from the beginning of the world, and would have existed whether he or any other man had traced it or no; neither was it in any way affected by the discovery of it which he had made. But Gutenberg, or whoever else it may have been to whom the honour belongs, 'invented' printing; he made something to be which hitherto was not. In like manner Harvey 'discovered' the circulation of the blood; but Watt 'invented' the steam-engine; and we speak, with a true distinction, of the 'inventions' of Art, the 'discoveries' of Science. In the very highest

matters of all, it is deeply important that we be aware of and observe the distinction.\* In religion there have been many 'discoveries,' but (in true religion I mean) no 'inventions.' Many discoveries—but God in each case the discoverer; He draws away the veils, one veil after another, that have hidden Him from men; the discovery or revelation is from Himself, for no man by searching has found out God; and therefore, wherever anything offers itself as an 'invention' in matters of religion, it proclaims itself a lie,—all self-devised worships, all religions which man projects from his own heart. Just that is known of God which He is pleased to make known, and no more; and men's recognizing or refusing to recognize in no way affects it. They may deny or may acknowledge Him, but He continues the same.

As involving in like manner a distinction which cannot safely be lost sight of, how important the difference, of which the existence is asserted by our possession of the two words, 'to apprehend' and 'to comprehend,' with their substantives, 'apprehension,' and 'comprehension.' For indeed we 'apprehend' many truths, which we do not 'comprehend.' The great mysteries of our faith,—the doctrine for instance of the Holy Trinity, we lay hold upon it (*ad* prehendo), we hang on it, our souls live by it; but we do not '*comprehend*' it,

\* [The distinction here made seems to be modern. The discovery of the Cross by the Empress Helena is called in the Prayer-Book Calendar "The Invention of the Cross," May 3rd (from *in-venire*, to come upon), and in the Authorized Version of the Bible 'discover' often means to uncover, or make bare, e.g. "the voice of the Lord *discovereth* the forests."—Psalm, xxix. 9.]

that is, we do not take it all in ; for it is a necessary attribute of God that He is *incomprehensible* ; if He were not so, either He would not be God, or the being that comprehended Him would be God also. But it also belongs to the idea of God that He may be ‘*apprehended*,’ though not ‘*comprehended*,’ by his reasonable creatures ; He has made them to know Him, though not to know Him all, to ‘*apprehend*,’ though not to ‘*comprehend*’ Him. We may transfer with profit the same distinction to matters not quite so solemn. I read Goldsmith’s *Traveller*, or one of Gay’s *Fables*, and I feel that I ‘*comprehend*’ it ;—I do not believe, that is, that there was anything in the poet’s mind or intention which I have not in the reading reproduced in my own. But I read *Hamlet*, or *King Lear* : here I ‘*apprehend*’ much ; I have wondrous glimpses of the poet’s intention and aim ; but I do not for an instant suppose that I have ‘*comprehended*,’ taken in, that is, all that was in his mind in the writing ; or that his purpose does not stretch in manifold directions far beyond the range of my vision ; and I am sure there are few who would not shrink from affirming, at least if they at all realized the force of the words they were using, that they ‘*comprehended*’ Shakespeare ; however much they may ‘*apprehend*’ in him.

How often ‘*opposite*’ and ‘*contrary*’ are used as if there was no difference between them, and yet there is a most essential one, one which perhaps we may best express by saying that ‘*opposites*’ *complete*, while ‘*contraries*’ *exclude* one another. Thus the most ‘*opposite*’ moral or mental characteristics may meet in one and the same person,

while to say that the most 'contrary' did so, would be manifestly absurd; for example, a soldier may be at once *prudent* and *bold*, for these are opposites; he could not be at once *prudent* and *rash*, for these are contraries. We may *love* and *fear* at the same time and the same person; we pray in the Litany that we may *love* and *fear* God, the two being opposites, and thus the complements of one another; but to pray that we might *love* and *hate* would be as illogical as it would be impious, for these are contraries, and could no more coexist together than white and black, hot and cold, in the same subject at the same time. Or to take another illustration, *sweet* and *sour* are 'opposites,' *sweet* and *bitter* are 'contraries.'\* It will be seen then that there is always a certain relation between 'opposites'; they unfold themselves though in different directions from the same root, as the positive and negative forces of electricity, and in their very opposition uphold and sustain one another; while 'contraries' encounter one another from quarters quite diverse, and one only subsists in the exact degree that it puts out of working the other. Surely this distinction cannot be an unimportant one either in the region of ethics or elsewhere.

It will happen continually that rightly to distinguish between two words will throw great light upon some controversy in which those words play a principal part, nay, may virtually put an end to that controversy altogether. Thus when Hobbes, with a true instinct, would have laid deep the

\* See Coleridge's *Church and State*, p. 18.



foundations of atheism and despotism together, resolving all right into might, and not merely robbing men, if he could, of the power, but denying to them the duty, of obeying God rather than man, his sophisms could stand only so long as it was not perceived that 'compulsion' and 'obligation,' with which he juggled, conveyed two ideas perfectly distinct, indeed disparate, in kind. These sophisms collapsed at once, so soon as it was perceived that what pertained to one had been transferred to the other by a mere confusion of terms and cunning sleight of hand, the one being a *physical* the other a *moral* necessity.\*

There is indeed no such fruitful source of confusion and mischief as this—two words are tacitly assumed as equivalent, and therefore exchangeable, and then that which may be assumed, and with truth, of one, is assumed also of the other, of which it is not true. Thus, for instance, it often is with 'instruction' and 'education.' Cannot we 'instruct' a child, it is asked, cannot we teach it geography, or arithmetic, or grammar, quite independently of the Catechism, or even of the Scriptures? No doubt you may; but can you 'educate,' without bringing moral and spiritual forces to bear upon the mind and affections of the child? And you must not be permitted to transfer the admissions which we freely make in regard of 'instruction,' as though they also held good in respect of 'education.' For what is

\* [Abp. Whately calls this "the thaumatrope fallacy," when different things are presented to the mind in such rapid succession that it becomes dazzled, and takes them to be one—Cicero's *præstigiæ verborum*.]

'education' ? Is it a furnishing of a man from without with knowledge and facts and information ? or is it a drawing forth from within and a training of the spirit, of the true humanity which is latent within him ? Is the process of education the filling of the child's mind, as a cistern is filled with waters brought in buckets from some other source, or the opening up of its own fountains ? Now if we give any heed to the word 'education,' and to the voice which speaks in the word, we shall not long be in doubt. Education must educe, being from 'educare,' which is but another form of 'educere' ; and that is 'to draw out,' and not to 'put in.' 'To draw out' 'what is in the child, the immortal spirit which is there, this is the end of education ; and so much the word declares. The putting in is indeed most needful, that is, the child must be instructed as well as educated, and the word 'instruction' just means furnishing ; but not instructed instead of educated. He must first have powers awakened in him, measures of spiritual value given him ; and then he will know how to deal with the facts of this outward world ; then instruction in these will profit him ; but not without the higher training, still less as a substitute for it.

It has occasionally happened that the question which out of two apparent synonyms should be adopted in some important state-document has been debated with no little earnestness and vigour ; as at the Great English Revolution of 1688, when the two Houses of Parliament were for a considerable time at issue whether it should be declared of James the Second that he had 'abdicated,' or

'deserted,' the throne. This might seem at first sight a mere strife about words, and yet, in reality, serious constitutional questions were involved in the selection of the one word or the other. The Commons insisted on the word 'abdicated,' not as wishing to imply that in any act of the late king there had been an official renunciation of the crown, which would have been manifestly untrue; but because 'abdicated' to their minds alone expressed the fact that James had so borne himself as virtually to have entirely renounced, disowned, and relinquished the crown, to have irrecoverably forfeited and separated himself from it, and from any right to it for ever; while 'deserted' would have seemed to leave room and an opening for a return, which they were determined to declare for ever excluded; as, were it said of an husband that he had 'deserted' his wife, or of a soldier that he had 'deserted' his colours, this language would imply not only that he might, but that he was bound to return. Lord Somers' speech on the occasion is a masterly specimen of synonymous discrimination, and an example of the uses in highest matters of state to which it may be turned.\*

Let me press upon you in conclusion some few of the many advantages to be derived from the habit of distinguishing synonyms. These advantages we might presume to be many, even though we could not ourselves perceive them; for how

\* As little was it a mere strife about words when at the restoration of our interrupted relations with Persia, Lord Palmerston insisted that the Shah should address the Queen of England not as 'Maleketh' but as 'Padischah,' refusing letters which had not this superscription.

often do the great masters of style in every tongue, perhaps none so often as Cicero, the greatest of all,\* pause to discriminate between the words they are using; how much care and labour, how much subtlety of thought, they have counted well bestowed on the operation; how much importance do they avowedly attach to it; not to say that their works, even where they do not intend it, will be a continual lesson in this respect: a great writer merely in the accuracy with which he employs words will always be exercising us in synonymous discrimination. But the advantages of attending to them need not be taken on trust; they are evident. How great a part of true wisdom it is to be able to distinguish between things that differ, things seemingly, but not really, alike—this is remarkably attested by our words ‘discernment’ and ‘discretion’; which are now used as *équiva-*

\* Thus he distinguishes between ‘voluntas’ and ‘cupiditas’; ‘cautio’ and ‘metus’ (*Tusc.* 4. 6); ‘gaudium,’ ‘lætitia,’ ‘voluptas’ (*Tusc.* 4. 6; *Fin.* 2. 4); ‘prudentia’ and ‘sapientia’ (*Off.* 1. 43); ‘caritas’ and ‘amor’ (*De Part. Or.* 25); ‘ebrius’ and ‘ebriosus,’ ‘iracundus’ and ‘iratus,’ ‘anxietas’ and ‘angor’ (*Tusc.* 4. 12); ‘vitium,’ ‘morbus,’ ‘ægrotatio’ (*Tusc.* 4. 13); ‘labor’ and ‘dolor’ (*Tusc.* 2. 15); ‘furor’ and ‘insania’ (*Tusc.* 3. 5); ‘malitia’ and ‘vitiositas’ (*Tusc.* 4. 15). Quintilian also often bestows attention on synonyms, observing well (vi. 3. 17): “Pluribus nominibus in eâdem re vulgo utimur; quæ tamen si diducas, suam quandam propriam vim ostendent;” he adduces ‘salsum,’ ‘urbanum,’ ‘facetum,’ 6. 3. Among Church writers Augustine is a frequent and successful discriminator of words. Thus he separates off from one another ‘flagitium’ and ‘facinus’ (*De Doct. Christ.* 3. 10); ‘æmulatio’ and ‘invidia’ (*Expl. ad Gal.* v. 20); ‘arrha’ and ‘pignus’ (*Serm.* 23. 8, 9); ‘studiosus’ and ‘curiosus’ (*De Util. Cred.* 9); ‘sapientia’ and ‘scientia’; with many more.

lent, the first to 'insight,' the second to 'prudence'; while yet in their earlier usage, and according to their etymology, being both from 'discerno,' they signify the power of so seeing things that in the seeing we distinguish and separate them one from another. Such were originally 'discernment' and 'discretion,' and such in great measure they are still. And in words is a material ever at hand on which to train the spirit to a skilfulness in this; on which to exercise its sagacity through the habit of distinguishing there where it would be so easy to confound. Nor is this habit of discrimination only valuable as a part of our intellectual training; but what a positive increase is it of mental wealth when we have learned to discern between things, which really differ, but have been hitherto confused in our minds; and have made these distinctions permanently our own in the only way by which they can be made secure, that is, by assigning to each its appropriate word and peculiar sign.

What an help moreover will it prove to the writing of a good English style, if instead of having many words before us, and choosing almost at random and at haphazard from among them, we at once know which, and which only, we ought in the case before us to employ, which will be the exact vesture of our thoughts. It is the first characteristic of a well-dressed man that his clothes fit him: they are not too small and shrunken here, too large and loose there. Now it is precisely such a prime characteristic of a good style that the words fit close to the thoughts: they will not be too big here, hanging like a giant's robe

on the limbs of a dwarf ; nor too small there, as a boy's garments into which the man has painfully and ridiculously thrust himself. You do not feel in one place that the writer means more than he has succeeded in saying ; in another that he has said more than he means ; or in a third something beside what his intention was : and all this, from a lack of dexterity in employing the instrument of language, of precision in knowing what words would be the exactest correspondents and fittest exponents of his thoughts.

And let us not suppose this power of exactly saying what we mean, and neither more nor less than we mean, to be merely an elegant mental accomplishment. It is indeed this, and perhaps there is no power so surely indicative of a high and accurate training of the intellectual faculties. But it is also much more than this : it has a moral meaning as well. It is nearly allied to morality, inasmuch as it is nearly connected with truthfulness. Every man who has himself in any degree cared for the truth, and occupied himself in seeking it, is more or less aware how much of the falsehood in the world passes current under the concealment of words, how many strifes and controversies

Which feed the simple, and offend the wise,

find all or nearly all their fuel and their nourishment in words carelessly or dishonestly employed. And when a man has had any actual experience of this fact, and has at all perceived how far this mischief reaches, he is sometimes almost tempted to say with Shakespeare's clown, " Words are

grown so false, I am loth to prove reason with them." He cannot, however, forego their employment ; not to say that he will presently perceive that this falseness of theirs whereof he accuses them, this cheating power of words, is not of their proper use, but only of their abuse ; he will see that, however they may have been enlisted in the service of lies, they are yet of themselves most true ; and that where the bane is, there the antidote should be sought as well. Ask then words what they mean, that you may deliver yourselves, that you may help to deliver others, from the tyranny of words, and from the strife of 'word-warriors.'\* Learn to distinguish between them, for you have the authority of Hooker, that "the mixture of those things by speech, which by nature are divided, is the mother of all error." And although I cannot promise you that the study of synonyms, or the acquaintance with derivations, or any other knowledge but the very highest knowledge of all, will deliver you from the temptation to misuse this or any other gift of God—a temptation which always lies so near us—yet I am sure that these studies rightly pursued will do much in leading us to stand in awe of this gift of words, and to tremble at the thought of turning it to any other than those worthy ends for which God has endowed us with so divine a gift.

\* [Referring to 'logo-machies.' 1 Tim. vi. 4.]

## VII

### THE SCHOOLMASTER'S USE OF WORDS

I SHALL now attempt to apply, and to suggest some ways in which you may apply, what has been hitherto spoken to practical ends. I shall invite you to consider how this study of words and their meaning, which I have been pressing upon you, may tell upon your own teaching hereafter ; for assuredly we ought never to disconnect what we ourselves are learning from the hope and expectation of being enabled by its aid to teach others more effectually ; our studies, when we do so, become instantly a selfish thing ; and in the end as barren of profit to ourselves as we have resolved to make them barren of profit to others. Such a spirit and temper is implicitly rebuked in a noble line of Chaucer, where, characterizing a true scholar, he says of him,

And gladly would he learn, and gladly teach ;

and in the spirit of this line I trust that we shall every one of us work and live.

But here allow me to address to you one or two words of warning before we advance any further. They are by no means unnecessary ; for indeed etymology, or the science of the origin of words, one of the studies to which I have been inviting you, is a study which many who profess an earnest devotion to it, have yet done all in their power to bring into discredit, and to make the laughing-stock of the frivolous and the vain. A great scholar in Germany, I allude to Niebuhr. has somewhere remarked on what he calls the unspeakable spirit of absurdity which seemed to



possess the ancients, whenever they meddled with this subject ; but the charge might very well be made to include others beside them. Certainly their mantle has often fallen upon no unworthy successors.

What is commoner than to find the investigator of words and their origin looking round about him here and there, in all the languages, ancient and modern, to which he may have access, till he can fasten on some word, it matters little or nothing to him in which of these, bearing more or less resemblance to that which he wishes to derive ? and he then considers his problem solved, and that in this phantom hunt he has successfully run down his prey. Even Dr. Johnson, with his robust, strong, English common sense, too often offends in this way. He has fallen into absurdities as bad, or almost as bad, as the worst which I shall presently note. In many respects his Dictionary will probably never be surpassed. We shall never have better, more concise, more accurate, more vigorous explanations of the present meanings of words than he has furnished. Whatever fault we may find with him, we must cheerfully allow and recognize this. But even those who admire his Dictionary the most, must own that he was ill equipped by any previous studies for tracing the past history of words ; that in these he errs often and greatly ; as for instance when he suggests that the name of the peacock may be derived from the ' peak,' or tuft of pointed feathers, on its head ! while other derivations proposed by him and others are so far absurder than this, that when Swift, in ridicule

of the whole band of philologists, suggests that 'ostler' is only a contraction of oat-stealer, and 'breeches' of bear-riches, it can scarcely be said that these etymologies are more ridiculous than many which have in sober earnest, and by men of no inconsiderable reputation, been proposed.

Oftentimes in this scheme of random etymology a word in one language is derived from one in another, the proposer of the derivation never once pausing to consider whether there was any historic connexion, mediate or immediate, between the two languages; whether it were thus so much as possible that the word should have passed over from the one language to the other; or whether in fact the resemblance was not merely superficial and illusory, so that when stripped of their accidents they would be found altogether diverse from one another. Take a few specimens of this manner of dealing with words; and first from the earlier etymologists. They are often hopelessly astray, and can only lead as many as trust in them astray likewise.

Thus, what profit can there come of derivations such as Varro's, when he deduces 'pavo,' the peacock, from 'pavor,' because of the fear which the harsh shriek of the peacock awakens; or Pliny's, of 'panthera,' the panther, from *πανθήριον*, because the properties of all beasts meet in this one; \* or the derivation of 'formica' the ant, that it means 'ferens micas,' the grain-bearer? As vain are some of the medieval

\* [The Greek *pan-thēr* (as if 'every beast') is held to be a grecized form of the Sanskrit *pundarika-s* (Benfey: Pictet; Curtius, *Greek Etymology*, ii. 28).]

suggestions in like kind, as of 'apis,' a bee, from a word of somewhat similar sound in Greek, signifying 'without feet,' and this because bees are born without feet, the etymology and the natural history keeping excellent company together. Or what shall we say of one who draws 'mors' from 'amarus,' because death is bitter; or from 'Mars,' because death triumphs in war;\* or 'à morsu vetiti pomi,' because that forbidden bite brought death into the world? or of a modern investigator of language, and one of high reputation in his time, who deduces 'girl' from 'garula,' girls being commonly talkative?

All experience indeed proves how perilous it is to etymologize at random, and on the strength of mere surface similarities of sound. I cannot refuse to illustrate the absurdities into which this may easily betray us by an amusing example. A clergyman, who has himself told me the story, had sought, and not unsuccessfully, to kindle in his schoolmaster a passion for the study of derivations. He was one day asked by this schoolmaster if he were aware of the derivation of 'crypt.' He naturally replied in the affirmative, that 'crypt' came from a Greek word meaning to conceal, and meant a covered place, itself concealed, and where things intended to be concealed were placed out of sight. The other rejoined that he was quite aware the word was commonly so explained, but he had no doubt

\* [Mommsen does not hesitate to connect Mars (or Maurs), the killing god, with *Mors* (*History of Rome*, i. 175), and M. Müller traces both to a common root, *mar* (*Science of Language*, ii. 357).]

erroneously; that 'crypt,' as he had now convinced himself, was in fact contracted from 'cry-pit'; being indeed the pit where in days of Popish tyranny those who were condemned to cruel penances were plunged, and out of which their cry was heard to come up—therefore called the 'cry-pit,' now contracted into 'crypt.' Let me say, before quitting my tale, that I would far sooner a schoolmaster had made a hundred mistakes of this kind than that he had been careless and incurious in respect of that marvellous implement of language, by aid of which he was to instruct himself, and to instruct others. To make mistakes as we are on the way to knowledge is far more honourable than to escape making them through never having set out to seek knowledge.

Yet of one thing let us be sure, namely, that they will do little in etymology; they will continually err and make others err, who do not lay this down as a maxim to be kept constantly in sight—namely, that no amount of resemblance between words in different languages is of itself sufficient to prove their relationship, even as no amount of apparent unlikeness in sound or present form is sufficient to disprove consanguinity. "Judge not according to appearance," must everywhere here be the rule. One who in many regions of human knowledge anticipated the discoveries of later times, said well two centuries ago, "Many etymologies are true which at the first blush are not probable";\* and he might

\* Leibnitz (*Opp.* 5. 61): "Sæpe fit ut etymologiæ veræ sint, quæ primo aspectu verisimiles non sunt."

have added, Many appear probable, which are not true. Which things being so, it is our wisdom on the one side to distrust superficial likenesses, on the other not to be dismayed and deterred by superficial differences and unlikenesses. I cannot go into this matter, but I would just say, Have no faith in books which etymologize on the strength of *sounds*, and not on that of *letters*, and of letters moreover dealt with according to fixed and recognized laws of equivalence and permutation. Never forget that great man's word, that much, very much, in this region of study is true which does not seem probable; nor the converse, perhaps still more important, that much seems probable which is not true. The beginning of all successful investigation here is to have learned to despise phenomena, the deceitful shows and appearances of things, and to be determined to reach and to grapple with the things themselves. It is the fable of Proteus over again. He will take a thousand shapes with which he will seek to elude and delude him who is resolved to obtain from him the true answer, which he is capable of yielding, but will only yield on compulsion. The true investigator is deceived by none of these. He still holds him fast; binds him in strong chains; until he takes his own and his true shape at the last; and answers as a true seer whatever question may be put to him. Nor, let me take the opportunity of saying by the way, will his gains be small who, having learned here to distrust the obvious and the plausible, carries out and applies in other regions of study and of morals the lessons which he has

thus learned ; who determines to seek the ground of things, and to plant his foot upon that ; to believe that a lie may look very fair, and yet be a lie for all that ; that the truth may show very unattractive, very unlikely and paradoxical, and yet be the very truth notwithstanding.

To return from a long, but not needless digression. You all here are made acquainted with a good deal more than the first rudiments of the Latin tongue. Every one who can at all appreciate what your future task will be, must rejoice that it is so. Indeed, it is hard to understand how you could without this be fitted and accomplished for the work which you have before you. For our language is not like the Greek and the German, which, for all practical purposes, may be considered rounded and complete in themselves ; which contain all the resources for discovering the origin and meaning of their words in their own bosom, or so nearly so, that the few exceptions need not be taken into account. In these languages it is conceivable that one might advance very far in the knowledge of his own tongue, who should remain ignorant of every other ; and that, himself possessing this knowledge, he might be able to impart it to others. In fact, the Greek, who certainly understood his own language thoroughly, never did extend his knowledge beyond it. But it is different with English. Would we follow up its words, not to their remotest sources, but only a step or two, it carries us at once beyond itself and to a foreign soil, and mainly to the Latin. This being the case, he who has not some acquaintance with Latin can only

explain a vast number of words loosely and at hazard ; he has some general sense or impression of what they intend, of the ideas which they represent, but nothing certain. He feels about for their central meaning ; he does not grasp it with confidence and precision.

And having these convictions in regard of the advantage of following up words to their sources, of 'deriving' them, that is, of tracing each little rill to the river from which it was first drawn, let me here observe, as something not remote from our subject, but, on the contrary, directly bearing upon it, that I can conceive no method of so effectually defacing and barbarizing our English tongue, no scheme that would go so far to empty it, practically at least and for us, of all the hoarded wit, wisdom, imagination, and history, which it contains, to cut the vital nerve which connects its present with the past, as the introduction of the scheme of phonetic spelling, which some have lately been zealously advocating among us. I need hardly tell you the principle of this is that all words should be spelt according as they are sounded, that the writing should be, in every case, subordinated to the speaking.\* The tacit assumption that it ought so to be, which is everywhere taken for granted, and not proved, is the pervading error running through the whole system. There is no necessity whatever that it should ;

\* I do not know whether the advocates of phonetic spelling have urged the authority and practice of Augustus as being in their favour. Suetonius, among other amusing gossip about this Emperor, records of him : "Videtur eorum sequi opinionem, qui perinde scribendum ac loquamur, existiment" (*Octavius* c. 88).

every word, on the contrary, has *two* existences, as a spoken word and a written ; and you have no right to sacrifice one of these, or even to subordinate it wholly, to the other. A word exists, as truly for the eye as for the ear, and in an highly advanced state of society, where reading is almost as universal as speaking, as much perhaps for the first as for the last. That in the *written* word moreover is the permanence and continuity of language and of learning, and that the connexion is most intimate of a true orthography with all this, is affirmed in our words 'letters,' 'literature,' 'unlettered,' even as in other languages by words exactly corresponding to these.\*

The gains consequent on the introduction of such a change as is proposed would be insignificantly small, while the losses would be enormously great. The gains would be the saving of a certain amount of labour in the learning to spell ; an amount of labour, however, absurdly exaggerated by the promoters of the scheme. But even these gains would not long remain, seeing that pronunciation is itself continually altering ; custom is lord here for better and for worse ; and a multitude of words are now pronounced in a different manner from that of an hundred years ago, so that, ere very long, there would again be a chasm between the spelling and pronunciation of words ;—unless indeed the former were to vary, as I do not see well how it could consistently refuse to do, with each variation of the latter, reproducing each

\* As γράμματα, ἀγράμματος, *litteræ*, *belles-lettres*.



one of its capricious or barbarous alterations ; which thus, it must be remembered, would be changes not in the pronunciation only, but in the word itself, for the word would only exist as a pronounced word, the written being a mere shadow of this. When these had multiplied a little, and they would indeed multiply exceedingly, so soon as the barrier against them which now exists was removed, what the language would ere long become, it is not easy to guess.

This fact, however, though alone sufficient to show how little the scheme of phonetic spelling would remove even those inconveniences which it proposes to remedy, is only the smallest objection to it. The far deeper and more serious one is, that in innumerable instances it would obliterate altogether those clear marks of birth and parentage, which, if not all, yet so many of our words bear now upon their very fronts, or are ready, upon a very slight interrogation, to declare to us. Words have now an ancestry ; and the ancestry of words, as of men, is often a very noble part of them, making them capable of great things, because those from whom they are descended have done great things before them ; but this would deface their 'scutcheon, and bring them all to the same ignoble level. Words are now a nation, grouped into tribes and families, some smaller, some larger ; this change would go far to reduce them to a promiscuous and barbarous horde. Now they are often translucent with their inner thought, as an alabaster vase is lighted up by a lamp placed within it ; in how many cases would this inner light be then quenched.

They have now a body and a soul, and the soul looking through the body ; oftentimes then nothing but the body, not seldom nothing but the carcass, of the word would remain. Both these objections were urged long ago by Bacon, who characterizes this so-called reformation, "that writing should be consonant to speaking," as "a branch of unprofitable subtlety" ; and especially urges that thereby "the derivation of words, especially from foreign languages, are utterly defaced and extinguished."

From the results of various approximations to phonetic spelling, which at different times have been made, and the losses which have thereon ensued, we may guess what the loss would be were the system fully carried out. Of those sufficiently acquainted with Latin, it would be curious to know how many have seen 'silva' in 'savage,' since it has been so written, and not 'salvage,' as of old ? or have been reminded of the hindrances to a civilized and human society which the indomitable forest, more perhaps than any other obstacle, presents. When 'fancy' was spelt 'phant'sy,' as by Sylvester in his translation of Du Bartas, and by the other scholarly writers of the seventeenth century, no one could then doubt of its connexion, or rather its original identity, with 'phantasy,' as no Greek scholar could miss its relation with *φαντασία*.\* Spell 'analyse' as I have sometimes seen it, and as phonetically it ought to be, 'analize,' and the

\* [But even the writer would hardly desire to see 'frenzy' and 'frantic' brought back to *phrenesy* and *phrenetic*.]

tap-root of the word is cut. What number of readers will recognize in it then the image of *dissolving* and *resolving* aught into its elements and use it with a more or less conscious reference to this? It may be urged that few do so even now among those who employ the word. The more need they should not be fewer; for these few do in fact retain the word in its place, prevent it from gradually drifting out of that place; they preserve its vitality, and the propriety of its use, not merely for themselves, but also for the others that have not this knowledge. In phonetic spelling is, in brief, the proposal that the educated should of free choice place themselves in the conditions and under the disadvantages of the ignorant and uneducated, instead of seeking to elevate these last to their own more favoured condition.\*

Even now the relationships of words, so im-

\* The same attempt to introduce phonography has been several times made, once in the sixteenth century, and again some twenty years ago, in France. Let us see by one or two examples what would be the results there. Here is the word 'temps'; from which the phonographers eject the *p* as superfluous. What is the consequence? At once its visible connexion with the Latin 'tempus,' with the Spanish 'tiempo,' with the Italian 'tempo,' with its own 'temporel' and 'temporaire,' is broken, and for many effaced. Or again, here are 'poids,' a weight, 'poix,' pitch, 'pois,' peas. I do not suppose the Frenchman who spoke his own language the best could mark in pronunciation the distinction between these; and thus to the ear there may be confusion between them, but to the eye there is none; not to say that the *d* in 'poids' puts it for us at once in relation with 'pondus,' the *x* in 'poix' with 'pix,' the *s* in 'pois' with the low Latin 'pisum.' In each case the letter which these reformers of orthography would dismiss as useless, and worse than useless, contains the secret of the word.

portant for our right understanding of them, are continually overlooked; a very little matter serving to conceal from us the family to which they pertain. Thus, how many of our nouns substantive and adjective are indeed unsuspected participles, or are otherwise most closely connected with verbs, with which notwithstanding, until some one points out the fact to us, we probably never think of putting them in any relation. And yet with how lively an interest shall we discover words to be of closest kin, which we had never considered till now but as entire strangers to one another; what a real increase will it be in our acquaintance with, and mastery of, English to become aware of such relationship. Thus 'heaven' is only the perfect of 'to heave,' and is so called because it is 'heaved' or 'heaven' up,\* being properly the sky as it is raised aloft; while the 'earth' is that which is 'eared' or ploughed; † the 'smith' has his name from the sturdy blows that he 'smites' upon the anvī; ‡ 'wrong' is the perfect participle of 'to wring,' that which one has 'wrung' or wrested from the

\* [This is Verstegan's suggestion, which is now generally rejected. The Old Eng. *hefen*, *heofon* is probably to be connected with Goth. *himins*, meaning originally the 'vault' of the sky, or a 'covering,' or 'brightness' (Kluge and Lutz).]

† [Dr. Murray doubts if there is any relationship between 'earth' and 'ear' to plough (*N.E.D.*), as does Curtius also. But Kluge and M. Müller think it possible.]

‡ [This account of the word is no longer tenable. 'Smith' is not he that 'smiteth' (nor yet he that 'smootheth,' as once supposed), but a 'worker,' a 'forger,' Gothic *smi-þa* (Icel. *smidhr*), from the root *smi*, to work in metal (Kluge, s.v., *Schmied*).]

right ; just as in French 'tort,' from 'torqueo,' is that which is twisted ; 'guilt' of 'to guile' or 'beguile' ; to find 'guilt' in a man is to find that he has been 'beguiled,'\* that is, by the devil, 'instigante diabolo,' as it is inserted in all indictments for murder, the forms of which come down to us from a time when men were not ashamed of tracing evil to his inspiration. The 'brunt' of the battle is the 'heat' of the battle, where it 'burns' the most fiercely.† 'Haft,' as of a knife, is properly only the participle perfect of 'to have,' that whereby you 'have' or hold it.‡ Or take two or three nouns adjective ; 'strong' is the participle past of 'to string ;' a 'strong' man means no more than one whose sinews are firmly 'strung.'§ The 'left' hand, as distinguished from the right, is the hand which we 'leave' ; inasmuch as for twenty times we use the right hand, we do not once employ *it* ; and it

\* [It is now established that 'guilt' has nothing to do with 'guile.' It may be a derivative of A. Sax. *gildan*, to pay (a penalty), like A. Sax. *scyld*, guilt, from *sculan*, to owe. The ideas of debt and guilt are often associated. Dr. Murray thinks its origin is unknown.]

† [Dr. Murray holds the origin of 'brunt' to be unknown, but the primitive meaning seems to have been a sharp blow or shock (*N.E.D.*). Skeat admits the connexion with 'burn.' But see a note on 'Bronté' in H. H. S. Croft, *Elyot's Gouverneur*, ii. 463.]

‡ [A. Sax. *hæft*, 'that which is seized,' a handle ; compare Icel. *hafir* (=Lat. *captus*), 'one seized,' a prisoner (Skeat), also Lat. *capulus*, a handle or hilt (but not 'hilt' as if from 'hold.')]

§ ['Strong' is not identical with 'strung,' though no doubt akin to it. Its congeners Dut. and Ger. *streng*, Icel. *strangr*, and perhaps Gk. *σπαργός* (*stranggos*) point to a radical meaning, tightly-twisted, tense, and so well-knit, muscular.]

obtains its name from being 'left' unused so often.\*

This exercise of putting words in their true relation and connexion with one another might be carried much further. We might take whole groups of words, which seem to us at first sight to acknowledge hardly any kinship, if indeed any, with one another, and yet with no great difficulty show that they had a common parentage and descent. For instance, here are 'shire,' 'shore,' 'share,' 'shears'; 'shred,' 'sherd'; they all are derived from one Anglo-Saxon word, which signifies to separate or divide, and still exists with us in the shape of 'to sheer,' which made once the three perfects, 'shore,' 'share,' 'shered.' 'Shire' is a district in England, as it is separated from the rest; a 'share' is a portion of anything thus divided off; 'shears' are instruments effecting this process of separation; the 'shore' is the place where the continuity of the land is interrupted or separated by the sea; a 'shred' is that which is 'shered' or shorn from the main piece; a 'sherd,' as a pot-'sherd' (also 'pot-share,' Spenser), that which is broken off and thus divided from the vessel; and these which I have adduced by no means exhaust this group or family of words, though it would take more time than I can spare to put some other words in relation with it.

\* [The 'left' hand is not etymologically, as suggested, the one "left" unused, although that indeed is probably its root meaning. It is the old Eng. *left*, *lyft*, *lêf*, which means weak, worthless, and so unserviceable, cognate with Frisian *luf*, the same. See *N.E.D.*<sup>1</sup>

But this analysing of groups of words for the detecting of the bond of relationship between them, and the one root out of which they all grow, is a process which may require more etymological knowledge than you possess, and more helps from books than you can always expect to command. There is another process, and one which may prove no less useful to yourselves and to others, which will lie more certainly within your reach. It will often happen that you will meet in books, sometimes in the same book, and perhaps in the same page of this book, a word used in senses so far apart from one another, that it will seem to you at first sight almost absurd to assume as possible that there can be any bond of connexion between them. Now when you do thus fall in with a word employed in these two or more senses seemingly far removed from one another, accustom yourselves to seek out the bond which there certainly is between these its several uses. This tracing of that which is common to and connects all its meanings can of course only be done by getting to its heart, to the seminal meaning, from which, as from a fruitful seed, all the others unfold themselves ; to the first link in the chain, from which every later one, in a direct line or a lateral, depends. And we may proceed in this investigation, certain that we shall find such, or at least that such there is to be found. For this we may start with, as being lifted above all doubt (and the non-recognition of it is one great fault in Johnson's *Dictionary*), that a word has originally but one meaning, and that all the others, however widely they may diverge from one another and seem

to recede from this one, may yet be affiliated upon it, may be brought back to the one central meaning, which grasps and knits them all together; just as the races of men, black, white, and red, despite of all their present diversity and dispersion, have a central point of unity in that one pair from whom they all have descended.

Let me illustrate what I mean by two or three familiar examples. Here is the word 'post'; how various are the senses in which it is employed; 'post'-office; 'post'-haste; a 'post'-standing in the ground; a military 'post'; an official 'post'; 'to post' a ledger. Might one not at first presume it impossible to bring all these uses of 'post' to a common centre? Yet indeed when once on the right track, nothing is easier: 'post' is the Latin 'positus,' that which is *placed*; the piece of timber is 'placed' in the ground, and so a 'post'; a military station is a 'post,' for a man is 'placed' in it, and must not quit it without orders; to travel 'post,' is to have certain relays of horses 'placed' at intervals, that so no delay on the road may occur; the 'post'-office is that which avails itself of this mode of communication; to 'post' a ledger is to 'place' or register its several items.

Or take the word 'stock'; in what an almost infinite number of senses it is employed; we have live 'stock,' 'stock' in trade, the village 'stocks,' the 'stock' of a gun, the 'stock'-dove, the 'stocks' on which ships are built, the 'stock' which goes round the neck, the family 'stock,' the 'stocks,' or public funds, in which money is invested, and other 'stocks' very likely besides these. What point in common can we find be-



tween them all ? This, that they are all derived from, and were originally the past participle of 'to stick,' which as it now makes 'stuck,' made formerly 'stock' ; and they cohere in the idea of *fixedness*, which is common to every one. Thus, the 'stock' of a gun is that in which the barrel is fixed ; the village 'stocks' are those in which the feet are fastened ; the 'stock' in trade is the fixed capital ; and so too, the 'stock' on the farm, although the fixed capital has there taken the shape of horses and cattle ; in the 'stocks' or public funds, money sticks fast, inasmuch as those who place it there cannot withdraw or demand the capital, but receive only the interest ; the 'stock' of a tree is fast set in the ground ; and from this use of the word it is transferred to a family ; the 'stock' or 'stirps' is that from which it grows, and out of which it unfolds itself. And here we may bring in the 'stock'-dove, as being the 'stock' or *stirps* of the domestic kinds. I might group with these, 'stake' in both its spellings ; a 'stake' in the hedge is stuck and fixed there ; the 'stakes' which men wager against the issue of a race are paid down, and thus fixed or deposited to answer the event ; a beef-'steak' is a piece of meat so small that it can be stuck on the point of a fork ; with much more of the same kind.

How often does the word 'quick' in the Creed perplex children ; and even after they have learned that " the *quick* and the dead " mean the *living* and the dead, they know it only on trust ; for they fail to put this 'quick' in any connexion with the 'quick' of their own vocabulary, the 'quick' with which one bids another to throw up the ball, or the

' quick ' -set hedge which runs round their father's garden, or the ' quick ' parts for which some unwise person has praised one of them at school : yet that all these are one and the same ' quick ' it is of course very easy to show. Life is the fundamental idea of the word, and in this its primary sense it is used in the Creed, " the *quick* and the dead " : so too the ' quick ' -set hedge is properly the *living* fence as contrasted with that made of dead timbers. But motion as it is at once of the essence, so it is also one of the most obvious signs of life ; as the absence of motion is of death, a ' *still-born* ' child is a child born dead ; and thus ' quick ' in a secondary sense was applied to all which was rapid or prompt in its motions, whether bodily or mental ; thus a ' quick ' runner, a boy of ' quick ' parts ; and so too ' quick ' -silver, and ' quick,' or fast-shifting, sands.\* The same sense of the connexion between life and motion has given us our secondary use of ' animated ' and ' lively.'

Sometimes a slightly different spelling comes in aid of an enormous divergence of meaning, to disguise the fact of two words having originally rested on one and the same etymology, and really being so closely related to one another, that we may say, in fact, they are one and the same word. I would instance as a notable example of this, ' canon ' with a single *n*, as the ' canon ' of Scripture, and ' cannon,' or heavy artillery. Can there, it may well be asked, be any point in common

\* [' Fast-shifting ' is beside the mark. " Sailors say that the sand is ' all *alive* ' (=quick), when it is soft and quick, and ready to suck in anything that lodges upon it "—J. Gilmore, *Storm Warriors*, p. 87.]

between them ? can they be resolved ultimately into the same word ? I believe they can. The word ' canon ' with the single *n*, which is a Greek word, means properly ' rule ' ; first, the measuring rule or line of the carpenter ; and then figuratively any measure or rule by which we try other things ; and in its crowning use, the Holy Scriptures, as being *regulative* of life and doctrine in the Church. But the carpenter's rule was commonly a reed (*canna*), that being selected on account of its straightness ; you may remember in Scripture mention once or twice being made of the measuring ' reed ' (Rev. xxi. 15, 16) ; and from this reed or ' *canna*,' the rule or line (the ' canon ') had its name, or at any rate the words are most closely allied. A reed, however, as we all know, besides being *straight* is also *hollow*, and thus it came to pass when the hollow engines of war, our modern artillery, were invented, and were feeling about for their appropriate name, none was nearer at hand than this which the reed supplied, and they were called ' cannon ' too.\*

When it is thus said that we can always reduce the different meanings in which a word is employed to some one point from which they all immediately or mediately proceed, that no word has primarily more than one meaning, it must be remembered that it is quite possible there may be two words pronounced and even spelt exactly alike, which yet

\* In confirmation of this view of the derivation of ' cannon,' and in proof that it lay very near to the imagination of men to liken them to reeds, we have the application of ' Rohr ' in German, which, at first signifying a cane or reed, has in like manner been applied to the barrel of a gun.

are wholly different in their derivation and primary usage ; and that of course between these, homonyms they are called, no bond of union on the score of this identity is to be sought ; neither does this fact in the least invalidate the assertion. We have in such cases, as Cobbett has expressed it well, the same combination of letters, but not the same word. Thus we have 'page,' one side of a leaf, from 'pagina,' and 'page,' a youthful attendant, from quite another word ;\* 'league,' a treaty, from 'ligare,' to bind, and 'league,' a measure of distance, thought to be a word of Gallic origin ; we have 'host,' an army, from 'hostis,' and 'host,' in the Roman Catholic sacrifice of the mass, from 'hostia' ; 'ear' (auris), and 'ear' (ahre) ; so too 'riddle,' a sieve, which is the Latin 'reticulum,' a small net-work, and 'riddle,' an enigma, from a German source ; † the 'Mosaic' law, derived from the name of the inspired lawgiver of Israel, 'mosaic,' as 'mosaic work,' which is 'opus musivum,' work graceful, as connected with the *Muses* ; with other words, such as 'date,' 'mint,' 'pupil,' 'ounce,' 'dole,' 'bull,' 'quire,' 'plain,' 'grain,' not a few. In all these the identity is merely on the surface

\* ['Page,' probably from Low Lat. *pagius*, a country lad, a servant, from *pagus*, a village.' Thus it is virtually the same word as *peasant* from Lat. *pagensis*, a villager. Diez, Kluge and Lutz suggest a connexion with Greek *paidion*, a little boy.]

† [Both are really native English words. 'Riddle,' sieve, is another form of 'ridder,' common in the Southern dialects (cf. "As sib'd as sieve and *ridder*."—Ray, *Proverbs*, 1678, p. 288), A. Sax. *hriddcr*, from *hridian*, to sift. 'Riddle,' enigma, is a mistaken singular of "a riddles," Old Eng. *redels*, A. Sax. *rædelse*, something to be 'read' or interpreted.]

and in sound, and it would of course be lost labour to seek for a point of contact between meanings which have not any closer connexion really than apparently with one another.

Let me suggest some further exercises in this region of words, which I will venture to promise that you will find profitable as ministering to the activity of your own minds, as helping to call out a like activity in those of others. Do not, I would say then once more, suffer words to pass you by, which at once provoke and promise to reward inquiry, by the readiness with which they will evidently yield up the secret of their birth or of their use, if duly interrogated by us. Many we must all be content to leave, which will defy all efforts to dissipate the mystery which hangs over them, but many also announce that their explanations cannot be very far to seek. I would instance such a word as 'candidate.' At a contested election how familiar are the ears of all with this word, nor is it strange to us at other times. Now does it not argue an incurious spirit to be content that this word should thus be given and received by us an hundred times, and we never to ask ourselves, What does it mean? why is one seeking to be elected to a seat in Parliament, or otherwise offering himself to the choice of his fellows, called a 'candidate'? If the word lay evidently beyond our horizon, we might acquiesce in our ignorance here, as in such infinite other matters; but resting, as on its face it does, upon the Latin 'candidus,' it challenges inquiry, and a very little of this would at once put us in possession of the Roman custom out of which the word grew, and to which it alludes

—namely, that such as intended to offer themselves to the suffrages of the people for any of the great offices of the State, presented themselves beforehand to them in a *white* toga, being called therefore ‘*candidati*,’ with other interesting particulars. And as it so happens that in the act of seeking information on one subject we obtain it upon another, so will it probably be here ; for in making yourselves fully aware of what this custom was, you will hardly fail to learn the original meaning of ‘*ambition*,’ and from whence we have obtained the word.

Or again, any one who knows so much as that ‘*verbum*’ means a ‘word,’ might well be struck by the fact, (and if he followed it up would be led far into the relation of the parts of speech to one another), that grammarians do not employ it, as one might have expected, to signify any word whatsoever, but restrict it to the verb alone ; ‘*verbum*’ is the verb. Surely here is matter for thought. Why does the verb monopolize the dignity of being ‘the word’ ? what is there in it which gives it the right so to do ? Is it because the verb is the animating power, the vital principle of every sentence, and that without which, understood or uttered, no sentence can exist ? or is there any other cause ? I leave this to your own consideration.

Again, here is ‘*conscience*,’ a solemn word, if there be such in the world. There is not one of us whose Latin will not bring him so far as to tell him that this is from ‘*con*’ and ‘*scio*.’ But what does that ‘*con*’ intend ? ‘*Conscience*’ is not merely that which I know, but that which I know

*with some other* ; for this prefix cannot, as I think, be esteemed superfluous, or taken to imply merely that which I know *with* or *to myself*. That other knower whom the word implies is God, who makes his law and his presence felt and acknowledged in the heart ; and the work of 'conscience' is to bring each of our acts as a lesser, to be tried and measured by this law and this presence as a greater,—our thoughts as the result of a comparison with this standard "accusing or excusing one another."\* The word in fact grows out of and declares that awful duplicity of our moral being which arises from the presence of God in the soul.

Once more, you call certain books 'classics.' You have indeed a double use of the word, for you speak of Greek and Latin as the 'classical' languages, and the great writers in these as '*the classics*'; while at other times you hear of a 'classical' English style, or of English '*classics*.' Now 'classic' is connected plainly, as we all perceive, with 'classis.' What then does it mean

\* Many ethical writers, as is well known, pass by the 'con' in their explanation of 'conscience,' finding merely the expression of the *certainty* of the inner moral conviction in the word ; for which view they may plead the German 'Gewissen' ; yet I cannot think but that herein they err : "conscience," in the words of South. "according to the very notation of it, importing a double or joint knowledge ; to wit, one of a divine law or rule, and the other of a man's own action ; and so is properly the application of a general law to a particular instance of practice" : and Vossius (*De Theol. Gent.* 3. 42) : "Est enim conscientia syllogismus, cujus major est principium practicum à conscientia suggestum ; minor est bona malave actio nostra ; conclusio autem actionem ad normam istius principii collatam, aut probat, aut improbat ; ex quo, pro conclusionis diversitate, vel tranquillitas animi sequitur, vel intranquillitas."

in itself, and how has it arrived at this double use ? “The term is drawn from the political economy of Rome. Such a man was rated as to his income in the third class, such another in the fourth, and so on ; but he who was in the highest was emphatically said to be of *the* class, ‘classicus’—a class man, without adding the number, as in that case superfluous ; while all others were *infra classem*. Hence, by an obvious analogy, the best authors were rated as ‘classici,’ or men of the highest class ; just as in English we say ‘men of rank’ absolutely, for men who are in the highest ranks of the state.” The mental process by which this title, which would apply rightly to the best authors in all languages, came to be often confined to those only in two, and those two to be claimed, to the seeming exclusion of all others, as *the* classical languages, is one of the most constantly recurring, and most widely extended, making itself felt in all times and in all regions of human life, and one to which I would in passing just direct your attention, though I cannot now do more.

But seek, I would further urge you, to attain a consciousness of the multitude of words which there are, that, however now used only in a figurative sense, did yet originally rest on some fact of the outward world, vividly presenting itself to the imagination ; a fact which the word has incorporated for ever, having become the indestructible vesture of a thought. If I may judge from my own experience, there are few intelligent boys in your schools who would not feel that they had gotten something, when you had shown them that to ‘insult’ means properly to leap as on the



prostrate body of a foe ; ' to affront,' to strike him on the face ; that ' to succour ' means by running to place oneself under one that is falling, and thus support and sustain him ; ' to relent,' (connected with 'lentus,' not 'lenis,') to slacken the swiftness of one's pursuit ; \* ' to reprehend,' to lay hold of one with the intention of forcibly pulling him back from the way of his error ; that ' to be examined ' means to be weighed. They would be pleased to learn that a man is called 'supercilious,' because haughtiness with contempt of others expresses itself by the raising of the eyebrows or 'supercilium' ; that 'subtle' (subtilis for subtexilis) is literally 'fine-spun' ; that 'astonished' (attonitus) is properly thunderstruck ; that 'imbecile,' which we use for weak, and now always for weak in intellect, means strictly, (unless indeed we must renounce this etymology,) leaning upon a staff, (in bacillo,) as one aged or infirm might do ; † that 'chaste' is properly white, 'castus' being a participle of 'candeo,' as is now generally allowed ; ‡ that 'sincere' may be, I will not say that it is, without wax, (sine cerâ,) as the best and finest honey should be ; § that a 'com-

\* " But nothing might *relent* his hasty flight."—SPENSER.

† [Lat. *im-becillus*, a difficult word, may be distantly akin to *bacillum* and *bac-ulu-m*, a 'walking stick,' Greek *bak-tron*, from the root *bak* (=ba, Sk. *gâ*), to go, and so mean "not able to go" or 'walk.']

‡ [Hardly so now. Curtius connects *cas-tu-s* (for *cad-tu-s*) with Greek *kath-aro-s*, pure, Sansk. *Cudh*, but separates it from *candeo*.—Greek Etymology, i. '169.]

§ [François de Sales being asked the meaning of the word '*sincère*,' "Cela mesme, respondit-il, que le mot sonne, c'est à dire, *sans cire*" (*L'Esprit du Fr. De Sales*, ed. 1840, ii. 73. It has all the appearance of a 'folk-etymology.')

panion' is one with whom we share our bread, a messmate; that a 'sarcasm' is properly such a lash inflicted by 'the scourge of the tongue' as brings away the *flesh* after it; with much more in the same kind.

'Trivial,' again, is a word borrowed from the life. Mark three or four persons standing idly at the point where one street bisects at right angles another, and discussing there the worthless gossip, the idle nothings of the day; there you have the living explanation of 'trivial,' 'trivialities,' such as no explanation which did not thus root itself in the etymology would ever give you, or enable you to give to others. For you have there the 'tres viæ,' the 'trivium'; and 'trivialities' properly mean such talk as is holden by those idle loiterers that gather at these meetings of three roads.\* And 'rivals' by curious steps has attained its present signification. 'Rivals,' in the primary sense of the word, are those who dwell on the banks of the same river. But since, as all experience shows,

\* I have allowed this explanation, which found place in earlier editions of this book, to stand; yet at the same time feel many misgivings whether 'trivial' is not from 'trivium' in another sense; that is, from the 'trivium,' or three preparatory disciplines—grammar, arithmetic, and geometry—as contrasted with the four more advanced, or 'quadrivium,' which together were esteemed in the Middle Ages to constitute a complete liberal education. Preparatory schools were called often "*trivial* schools," as occupying themselves with the 'trivium.'

[The first explanation is the better one. Compare Italian "*triviale*, triviall, common, of small estimation, used or taught in high-waies."—Florio, 1611. So the *trivial* name of a plant is its road-side, vulgar or popular name, and a "*trivial* saying" formerly meant a popular saw, like Greek *paroimia*, a wayside saying, a proverb.]

there is no such fruitful source of contention as a water-right, these occupants of the opposite banks would be often at strife with one another in regard of the periods during which they severally had a right to the use of the stream, turning it off into their own fields before the time or leaving open the sluices beyond the time, or in other ways interfering, or being counted to interfere, with the rights of their opposite neighbours. And thus 'rivals,' which was at first applied only to those dwellers on opposite banks of a river, came afterwards to be used of any who were on any grounds in more or less unfriendly competition with one another.\*

Or if your future pupils shall be your companions in your walks, (as it always speaks well for a teacher's influence that he is sought, not shunned, by his pupils in play hours,) how much will there be which you may profitably impart to them, suggested by the names of common things which will meet you there; how much which you, if you know, will love to tell, and they, I am sure, will be well pleased to hear. Who would not care, for instance, to learn names of our English birds; that the 'ospray,' one of our eagles, is properly the 'ossifrage,' or bone-breaker, being named from its strength and from the way in which it uses its strength; that the 'hawk,' if it be not the same word with 'havoc,' (and it was called 'hafoc' in

\* [The contentions of *rivales* were regulated by a *lex rivalicia* (Bréal, *Semantics*, 127). Landor says, "Brooks make even worse neighbours than oceans do" (*Works*, 1876, v. 91). 'Esek' or 'strife' was the name given to a spring of water over which the herdsmen of Isaac and of Gerar had a contention (Gen. xxvi. 20).]

Anglo-Saxon,) has at least a common origin ; \* its very name announcing the 'havoc' and destruction which it makes among the smaller birds, just as in the 'raven's' name is expressed its greedy, or as we say 'ravenous' disposition ? † Or when they are listening of an evening to the harsh shriekings of the 'owl,' that the name of this dissonant night-bird is in fact the past participle of 'to yell,' (as in Latin, 'ulula,' the screech-owl, is from *ululare*,) ‡ and differs from 'howl' in nothing but its spelling, the diminutive 'howlet' being in fact as often spelt with an *h* as without it. Even the little 'dabchick' which so haunts our waters here, diving and dipping when any one approaches, it may be as well to know why it has this name, that the first syllable would more correctly be spelt with a *p* than a *b*, this 'dap' being the old perfect of 'to dip,' so that the name is no idle unmeaning thing, but brings out the most salient characteristics of the bird which bears it, its swift diving and 'dipping' under the water at every apprehension of danger : § just as in

\* ['Hawk,' Old Eng. *hcafoe* (properly 'the seizer,' from the root *haf*, to seize, like *ac-cip-itur* and *capus* from the root *cap*) is quite a distinct word from 'havoc.' Ang. French *havok*, old Fr. *havot*, the signal word for pillage.]

† [The resemblance of 'raven' to 'ravenous' is purely accidental, the one being the A. Sax. *hræfn*, and the other standing for 'ravinous,' derived from Fr. *ravener*, Lat. *rapinare*, to plunder.]

‡ [This needs correction. 'Owl' (A. Sax. *ule*) is not the past partic. of 'yell,' but a word of imitative origin like Ger. *eule* and *uhu*, Lat. *ul-ul-a*, the bird that cries oo ! (Shakspeare's *to-whoo !*); so Fr. *hibou*.]

§ [The older forms of the word are *dap-chick*, *dop-chick*, and *dip-chick*.]

Latin a certain water-fowl is called 'mergus,' from 'mergo.' On taking them into the corn-fields you may point out how the 'cockle' which springs up only too luxuriantly in some of our Hampshire furrows, acquires its name from that which often it effectually does, namely from its 'choking' or strangling the good seed.\*

By such teaching as this you may often improve, and that without turning play-time into lesson-time, the hours of relaxation and amusement. But I must not let that word 'relaxation,' on which I have lighted as by chance, escape me. It contains an important lesson for us all. How can the bow be 'relaxed' or slackened, (for this of course is the image), which has not ever been bent, whose string has never been drawn tight? Let us draw the bow of our mind tight by earnest toil, and then we may look to have it from time to time 'relaxed.' Having been attentive and assiduous, then, but not otherwise, we may claim 'relaxation' and amusement. But 'attentive' and 'assiduous' are themselves words which it is worth our while to realize what they mean. He then is 'assiduous,' who sits close to his work; † he is 'attentive,' who stretches out his neck that so he may bring the organ of hearing nearer to the speaker, and lose none of his words. And then what a lesson the word 'diligence' contains. How

\* [The archbishop has been peculiarly unfortunate on these pages. "Cockle," A. Sax. *coccel*, tares, cannot be derived from "choke," Old Eng. *cheoke*.]

† [Or as a careful nurse *sits* by the bedside of her patient. Addison uses the word with happy propriety when he describes a sitting hen as "*assiduous* in her attendance" on her eggs (*Spectator*, 1711, No. 120, p. 183, ed. Morley).]

profitable it is for every one of us to be reminded, as we are reminded when we make ourselves aware of its derivation from 'diligo,' to love, that the only secret of true industry in our work is love of that work. And as there is a great truth wrapped up in 'diligence,' what a lie, on the other hand, lurks at the root of our present use of the word 'indolence.' This is from 'in' and 'doleo,' not to grieve; and 'indolence' is thus a state in which we have no grief or pain; so that the word, employed as we now employ it, seems to affirm that indulgence in sloth and ease is that which would constitute for us the absence of all pain. Now it may be quite true that 'pain' and 'pains' are often nearly allied; no one would wish to deny this; but yet these pains hand us over to true pleasures; while indolence is so far from yielding what it is so forward to promise, and we with our slothful self-indulgent hearts are so ready to expect, that Cowper spoke only truth, when, perhaps purposing expressly to witness against the falsehood of this word, he spoke of

Lives spent in *indolence*, and therefore *sad*,

not 'therefore *glad*,' as the word would promise.

Let me mention another method in which these studies which I have been urging upon you, may be turned to account in your future work. Doubtless you will ever seek to cherish in your scholars, to keep lively in yourselves, that spirit and temper which attach a special value and interest to all relating to the land of our birth, that land which the Providence of God has assigned as the sphere of our life's work and of theirs. Our schools are

called 'national,' and if we would have them such more than in name we must neglect nothing that will assist us in fostering a national spirit in them. I know not whether this is sufficiently considered among us, yet certainly we cannot have Church schools worthy the name, and least of all in England, unless they are truly national as well. It is the anti-national character of the Romish system, though I do not in the least separate this from its anti-scriptural, but rather regard the two as most intimately cohering with one another, which mainly revolts Englishmen ; as we have lately very plainly seen ; and if their sense of this should ever grow weak, their protest against that system would soon lose nearly all of its energy and strength. Now here, as everywhere else, knowledge must be the food of love. Your pupils must know something about England, if they are to love it ; they must see some connexion of its past with its present, of what it has been with what it now is, if they are to feel that past as anything to them.

And as no impresses of the past upon the present are so abiding, so none, when once attention has been awakened to them, are so self-evident as those which names preserve ; although, without this calling of the attention to them, the most broad and obvious of these foot-prints of time may very probably continue to escape our observation to the end of our lives. Leibnitz tells us, and one can quite understand, the delight with which a great German Emperor, Maximilian the First, discovered that 'Habsburg,' the ancestral name of his house, really had a meaning, one moreover full of vigour and poetry. This he did, when he heard

it by accident on the lips of a Swiss peasant, no longer cut short and thus disguised, but in its original fulness, 'Habichtsburg,' or 'Hawk's-Tower,' being no doubt the name of the castle which was the cradle of his race. Of all the thousands of Englishmen who are aware that the Angles and Saxons established themselves in this island, and that we are in the main descended from them, it would be curious to know how many have realized to themselves that this 'England' means 'Angle-land,' or that in the names 'Essex,' 'Sussex,' and 'Middlesex,' we preserve a record to this day of East Saxons, South Saxons, and Middle Saxons, who occupied those several portions of the land; or that 'Norfolk' and 'Suffolk' are two broad divisions of 'northern' and 'southern' folk, into which the East Anglian kingdom was divided. I cannot but believe that these Angles and Saxons, about whom our pupils may be reading, will be to them more like actual men of flesh and blood, who indeed trod this same soil which we are treading now, when we can thus point to the traces surviving to the present day, which they have left behind them, and which England, as long as it is England, will retain.

And then as regards the Danes—all of us who are at all acquainted with the early history of our land—will be aware how much Danish blood there is in the veins of Englishmen; what large colonies from Scandinavia, (for probably as many came from Norway as from modern Denmark,) settled in some parts of this island. It will be interesting to show that the limits of this Danish settlement and occupation may even now be confidently



traced by the frequent occurrence in all such districts of the names of towns and villages ending in 'bye,' which word signified in their language, 'town,' as Netherby, Appleby, Derby. Thus, if you examine closely a map of Lincolnshire, one of the chief seats, as is well known, of Danish immigration, you will find that well-nigh a fourth part of the towns and villages have this ending ; the whole coast is indeed studded with them ; while here in Hampshire it is utterly unknown.\*

Who that has seen London from one of its bridges, with that magnificent forest of masts stretching down the river, or that has only heard of its commerce, but would learn with interest that 'London,' according to the most probable etymology, is the name formed out of two Celtic words, and means, "City of ships" ? † Such a prophecy of the future greatness of the great commercial capital of England and of the world lay from the very first in the name which it bore ; not to say that this name indicates that from earliest times, before a Roman had set his foot upon the soil, the wonderfully advantageous position of London for commerce had been discovered and improved.

You are yourselves learning, or hereafter you may be teaching others, the names and number of the English counties or shires. What a dull routine task for them and for you this may be, task-

\* [See G. S. Streatfield, *Lincolnshire and the Danes* 1884, where the whole subject is carefully discussed. For names ending in 'by' see pp. 13 seq.]

† [This account is rejected by I. Taylor, *Names and their Histories*, 177. Another suggestion is that *Lon-dûr* meant "the marsh fort" (Sir H. Maxwell, *Scot. Land-Names*, p. 3).]

ing the memory, but supplying no food for the intellect, no points of attachment for any of its higher powers to take hold of. And yet in these two little words 'shire' and 'county,' if you would make them render up even a small part of their treasure, what lessons of English history are contained. One who knows the origin of these names, and how we come to possess such a double nomenclature, looks far into the social condition of England in that period when the rudimental germs of all that has since made England glorious and great were being laid, and by these words may excellently show how the present links itself on with the remotest past; how of a land as of a person, it may be truly said, "The child is father of the man." 'Shire,' as I observed just now, is connected with 'shcar' 'share,' and is properly a portion 'shered' or 'shorn' off. When a Saxon king would create an earl, it did not lie in men's thoughts, accustomed as then they were to deal with realities, that such could be, as now it may, a merely titular creation, or could exist without territorial jurisdiction; and a 'share' or 'shire' was assigned him to govern, which also gave him his title. But at the Conquest this Saxon officer was displaced by a Norman, the 'earl' by the 'count,'—this title of count,' borrowed from the later Roman empire, meaning originally 'companion,' (comes,) one who had the honour of being closest companion to his leader; and the 'shire' was now the 'county' (comitatus), as governed by this 'comes.' In that singular and inexplicable fortune of words, which causes some to disappear and die out under the circumstances

apparently most favourable for life, others to hold their ground when all seemed against them, 'count' has disappeared from the titles of English nobility, while 'earl' has recovered its place; although in evidence of the essential identity of the two titles, or offices rather, the wife of the earl is entitled a 'countess,' and in further memorial of these great changes that so long ago came over our land, the two names 'shire' and 'county' equally survive as household, and in the main interchangeable, words in our mouths.

Let us a little consider, in conclusion, how we may usefully bring our etymologies and our other notices of words to bear on the religious teaching which we would impart in our schools. To do this with much profit we must often deal with words as the sovereign does with the gold and silver coin of the realm. When this has been current long, and by much use and often passing from man to man, with perhaps occasional clipping in dishonest hands, has quite lost the clear brightness, the well-defined sharpness of outline, and a good part of the weight and intrinsic value which it had when first issued from the royal mint, it is the sovereign's prerogative to recall it, and issue it anew, with his image stamped on it afresh, bright and sharp, weighty and full as at first. Now to a process such as this the true mint-masters of language will often submit the words which they use; and something of this kind we all of us may do. Where use and custom have worn away the significance of words, we too may recall and issue them afresh. And this has been the case with how many; for example,

with a word which will be often in your mouths—the 'lessons' of the day. What is 'lessons' here for most of us but a lazy synonym for the morning and evening chapters appointed to be read in church? But realize the word 'lessons,' and what the Church intended in calling these chapters by this name; namely, that they are to be the daily instruction of her children.\* Listen to them as such; address yourselves to their explanation in the spirit of this word; make your pupils regard them in this light; show them that, using this name in regard of them, they affirm them to be such, to be not in word only but in truth, daily 'lessons' for every one.

The 'Bible' itself,—with no irreverent use of the word, it may yet be no more to us than the sign by which we designate the written Word of God. But if we ask ourselves what the word means, and know that it means simply 'the Book,' so that there was a time when 'bible' in English would be applied to any book, (in Chaucer it is so,) then how much matter of thought and reflection is

\* [It should be remembered, however, that 'lesson' originally and properly meant only a reading, being the French *leçon* from Lat. *lectio*, a reading (whence *lectionary*, a collection of readings), from which the secondary meaning of an instruction was afterwards evolved. Sir M. Monier-Williams makes the same confusion when he says, "I sometimes wonder whether we rightly understand the true meaning of the term 'LESSON' applied to each chapter of the Bible in the services of the Church of England. . . . I fear that too often we neglect to lay to heart the *lesson* (=instruction) each chapter is intended to convey."—*The Holy Bible and Sacred Books of the East*, p. 45. And so a correspondent of *The Guardian* (June 1, 1904, p. 930), "'Lessons' are very often not lessons in any real sense of the word."]

here, and in this our present restriction of the word to one book, to the exclusion of all others. So prevailing, that is, has been the sense of Holy Scripture being *the* Book, the worthiest and best, that one which explained all other books, standing up in their midst,—like Joseph's kingly sheaf, to which all the other sheaves did obeisance—that this name of 'Bible' or 'Book' has come to be restricted to it alone: just as 'Scripture' means no more than 'writing'; but this inspired Writing has been felt to be so far above all other writings, that this name also it has challenged as exclusively its own.

You will present, I think, to your pupils the Collects which they learn from Sunday to Sunday under a more interesting aspect, when you have taught them that they probably are so called because they 'collect,' as into a focus, the teaching of the Epistle and Gospel, gathering them up into a single petition;\* and from this you may profitably exercise them in tracing the bond of relation which thus will be found ever to exist between the Collect, and the Epistle and Gospel which follow it. And I am sure there is much to be learned from knowing that the 'surname,' as distinguished from the Christian name, is the name over and above, not the 'sire'-name, or name receive from the father, but 'sur'-name (*super nomen*)†—that while there never was a time when every baptized man had not a Christian name, inasmuch as his person-

\* [The ecclesiastical *collecta* (or *collectio*) was a summing-up of the subjects suggested by the *rogatio* or 'bidding,' or in the *capitula* of the day.—N.E.D.]

† [See further in A. S. P., *The Folk and their Word lore*, p. 183.]

ality before God was recognized, yet the surname, the name expressing a man's relation, not to the kingdom of God, but to the worldly society in which he lives, is only of a much later growth, an addition to the other, as the word itself declares. And what a lesson at once in the upgrowth of human society, and in the contrast between it and the heavenly society, might be appended to this explanation. There was a period when only a few had surnames, only a few, that is, had any significance or importance in the order of things temporal ; while the Christian name from the first was common to every man. Surely this may be brought usefully to bear on your exposition of the first words in the Catechism.

And then, further, in regard of the long Latin words, which, with all our desire to use all plainness of speech, we yet cannot do without, nor find their adequate substitutes in the other parts of our language, but which must remain the vehicles of so much of the truth by which we live—in explaining these, make it, I would say, your rule always to start, where you can, from the derivation, and to return to that as often as you can. Thus you have before you the word 'revelation.' How great a matter, if you can attach some distinct image to the word, and one to which your scholars, as often as they hear the word, may mentally recur! Nor is this impossible. God's revelation of Himself is the drawing back of the veil or curtain which concealed Him from men ; not man finding out God, but God declaring or discovering Himself to man ; all which lies plainly in the word. Or you have the word 'absolution,' many will

know that it has something to do with the pardon of sins ; but in how much more lively a way, to say the least, will they know this, when they know that ' to absolve ' means ' to loosen from ' : God's ' absolution ' of men is His releasing of them from the bands of sin with which they were tied and bound. Here every one will connect a distinct image with the word, one that will always come to his help when he would realize what its actual meaning is. That which was done for Lazarus naturally, the Lord saying in regard of him, " Loose him, and let him go," the same is done spiritually for us, when we receive the ' absolution ' of our sins.

Tell them that ' atonement ' means ' at-one-ment '—the setting at one of those who were at twain before, namely God and man, and they will attach to the word a definite meaning, which perhaps it no way else would have had for them ; and from this you may muster the passages in Scripture which describe the sinner's state as one of separation, estrangement, alienation, from God, the Christian's state as one in which he walks together with God, because the two are agreed and at one. Or you have the words ' to redeem,' ' Redeemer,' ' redemption.' Do not lose yourselves here in vague generalities, but fasten on the central point of each of these words, that they have reference to a ' buying,' and not merely a buying, but a buying ' back ' ; and then put in relation with the words so explained the whole circle of Scriptures which rest on this image, all, that is, which speak of sin as a slavery, of sinners as servants and bondsmen of an alien lord, Christ's blood as a ransom, of the condition of

the Christian as that of one who has recovered his liberty.

Many words more suggest themselves ; but only one more I will bring forward ; and that one, because we shall find in it a lesson more for ourselves than for others, and it is with such an one I would fain bring these lectures to a close. How important, I would observe then, is the truth which we express in the naming of our work in this world our ' vocation,' or, which is the same finding utterance in homelier Anglo-Saxon, our ' calling.' What a calming, elevating, ennobling view of the task which we find ourselves set in this world to do, this word would give us, if we did but realize it to the full. We did not come to our work by accident ; we did not choose it for ourselves ; but, under much which may wear the appearance of accident and self-choosing, came to it by God's leading and appointment. What a help is this thought to enable us to appreciate justly the dignity of our work, though it were far humbler work, even in the eyes of men, than that of any one of us present ! What an assistance in calming unsettled thoughts and desires, such as would make us wish to be something else than that which we are ! What a source of confidence, when we are tempted to lose heart, and to doubt whether we shall be able to carry through our work with any blessing or profit to ourselves or to others ! It is our ' vocation,' our ' calling ' ; and He who ' called ' us to it, will fit us for it, and strengthen us in it.



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